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

PAUL GAUGUIN: BAIGNEUSES TAHITIENNES *see page 46*

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

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World Review

INCORPORATING REVIEW OF REVIEWS

EDITED BY EDWARD HULTON

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THINKING ALOUD

EDWARD HULTON

FORMS

If all goes well, these few words should appear about New Year, 1946. At the moment I am attempting to get to Paris, France, in order to get a more or less first-hand view of what is going on on board the Continent of Eurasia.

The number and frequency of forms of all sizes, types, shapes and colours to be filled up is very great. In fact it can only be described as flabbergasting! One has to have first-hand experience of this form-filling business to appreciate fully how pulverising it can be to the cerebration. During most of the war I seem to have avoided the bulk of it, and therefore did not feel quite the sympathy I might have towards those less fortunate. Take, as only one example, the 'Application For The Renewal Of A Passport'. The way the questions are set out is enough to dismay the strongest. And what is the point of many of the regulations? For instance, my own passport began its life in 1939, and had not been used since I was in Italy and France just before the fall of France. Therefore it required renewing. However, had I asked for a renewal for five years—a reasonable period—the total life of the passport would then have exceeded ten years, and the renewal would not have been granted. I therefore, wisely I hope, put in for three years. Luckily I discovered a regulation covering this point tucked away on the back. (You know the usual style, 'For regulations, see back!') But why all this fuss and faldidal? And why make a distinction between a 'Renewal' and 'a New Passport'? Why can't a passport go on *ad infinitum*, if the holder is still alive, and still considered passport-worthy, and while there are enough pages in the thing? And why not put more pages in it, anyway?

There is a lively interest in turning the pages of history these days, and learning that before A.D. 1914, people actually wended their way about the world *without passports at all!* If as to clothing they were rather heavily laden during that epoch, in the matter of passports and similar *paperasse* they were in a state of primordial nakedness! Of course, if you wanted to go to Russia, even then, you had to have a passport. This was part of the fun of going there! For at that time people were terribly starved of papers and forms to fill up, and the passport made them feel quite cloak-and-swordish, and almost like a character from Sardou, that giant of the stage who was said to have known as little about diplomacy as he did about the theatre. You *could*, at a pinch, get the Foreign Office to give you a passport if you were only going to Spain, and some people did avail themselves of this romantic amenity. All of which reminds me of an incident during my Edwardian childhood, which has been robbed of much of its charm now that the female leg is no longer a subject for hushed asides. A young 'professional beauty', as good-looking young women were apt to be called then, so long as they were in no sense professional, was filling in her Application For A Passport to Russia (or Spain, I really don't know). She was the owner, it must be added, of tresses of more than usual beauty, amplitude and length. Thus when she came upon the query, 'Any distinguishing characteristics?' pride moved her to fill in the words,

'Hair to knees'. Her mortification was profound, on opening the passport when it was duly granted, to discover that the official in question had inserted the words 'hairy legs'.

No! despite the fact that scientists still keep on telling us that the wonders of modern invention have made it easier to flit by plane from place to place upon the surface of the globe, unregenerate man has succeeded in boxing himself up more securely than ever, and umpteen forms have to be filled in, and infinitudes of time have to be wasted, even by V.I.P.s, or people who allege that they are V.I.P.s, (or quasi-V.I.P.s) even in order to get to France (which is a mere 22 miles away). Actually during this last war petrol restrictions and police regulations, if one was an alien, even a 'friendly' one, kept one practically in the mediæval state of being *glebae adscriptus*, or stuck to the soil of one's own village.

Before war became really 'modernised' and run on 'sensible' and 'rational' lines, civilians could go to and fro, even in enemy countries while the war was in progress. A big change for the worse was made by the genius of Buonaparte, who conceived the then outrageous idea of confining within the boundaries of France all Englishmen who chanced to be sojourning there. He even had the temerity to confine the Earl of Bristol, Bishop of Derry, in durance vile, and the rumbling of his famous carriage wheels was for ever stilled. In practice most of these unfortunate Englishmen were free within the wide boundaries of *la grande nation*, and often diverted themselves by giving a series of splendid receptions to their French hosts. What barbarians our ancestors must have been! Actually during the war of 1914 the Ottoman Government continued this pleasant practice in respect of their distinguished captive, General Townshend,



A cry of horror went up when Buonaparte put to death a single rival, the DUKE D'ENGHIEN. *Compare existing dictatorships!*

taken at Kut, who was fêted, and in return gave fêtes; though similar treatment was not accorded to 'other ranks'. Incidentally, it is comical to recall what a cry of horror went up when Buonaparte illegally put to death *a single* political rival, the ill-fated Duke D'Enghien.

WHY IMITATE?

In connection with this it is surprising to find our popular press condemning Nazi and Italian atrocities, and then, in almost the same breath, urging greater severity towards the German and Italian prisoners in our own hands. Why would it be a good thing to imitate Nazi behaviour? This type of journal has gloatingly shown pictures of the discomfiture of German and Italian Generals. While having no sympathy for Fascism, it might be remarked that it was at one time thought that Englishmen took no pleasure in gloating over a man when he was down. In actual fact, the way the German Generals are being treated in England, and by these I mean

men who have *not* been included under the heading of 'War Criminals', is, to say the least of it, not dignified, and will be regretted by us (later).

As for the 'War Criminal Trials' themselves, they have largely failed in their purpose, which was to produce a psychological effect upon 'the free peoples of the world'. This surely everyone will freely admit they have not succeeded in doing. For the Belsen trials seem to the ordinary man to be far too long, and the same sort of thing seems to be going on at Nuremberg. The daily press has certainly not assisted in creating the psychological effect that was presumably desired; and if Irma Grese was not made into a Joan or Arc, she was certainly starred as an alternative Lauren Bacall! Behind it all is the knowledge in so many people's minds that similar crimes are being committed in Eastern Europe today, where we have not the power to punish the evildoer.

THE LOAN

TALK in railway carriages centres at the present on 'The Loan'. This is hailed in the *Daily Mirror* as a triumph for the Labour Government, and the harbinger of goodies to come, perhaps by Christmas; but by other journals, including the *News of the World*, as an almost unmitigated long-term disaster, which, some say, will not even fill the people with good things in the immediate future.

My humble opinion would be that The Loan represents a considerable defeat for Britain, if not quite complete Unconditional Surrender to the United States of America. There seems little doubt that Keynes did not get all he wanted for Britain; in fact he has admitted as much. While The Loan by the U.S.A. of £1,100 million pounds should undoubtedly ease our austerities for the nonce, for it represents a big credit enabling us to purchase all sorts of goods of which we stand in need, it has surely been granted at a very high price, which is nothing less than a surrender of our financial and economic independence to the United States. Britain will in effect be tied once again to the Gold Standard, abandoned in the fatal year of 1931. This must mean Deflation, or in other words, less purchasing power in the pockets of the workers. Secondly, a big blow has been struck at the British Commonwealth; for by 'discriminatory practices' the Americans mean our system of Imperial preferences within the Imperial family. Thirdly, if the Americans do not behave themselves reasonably and admit British goods, our power to leave them aside, and to make trading arrangements with the Western European Bloc and its colonies is taken away. However, the most serious item for a Labour Government is that Britain's power to control her own internal economy, and thus promote a higher standard of living, and full employment, is also removed, largely by the link to the Dollar, (or in more honest words, Gold.) *The Wall Street Journal* is indeed frank and sensible in remarking that a country like Britain, which has chosen a Socialist-planned economy, cannot very well be linked with America, which is blatantly unplanned. Something is going to snap somewhere! *The Wall Street Journal* suggests that Britain will soon have to cut the painter with America after all. What may happen, nevertheless, is that Labour may have to give up some of its internal policy. In any event, it seems somewhat futile that we should all be busy form-filling while we are now to be economically a satellite of a non-form-filling state.

I personally am strongly in favour of a planned economy, with over-all state control, though without too much Nationalisation or state ownership, and without



LORD KEYNES, *the greatest world economist of our times, had a rough time in Washington over the Loan*

too much filling up of forms, or unrestrained bureaucracy. I wish we could have held out against the Americans, and made arrangements to extend the Sterling Area and to trade with our Western European friends. I realise, though, that with the difficulties in Western Europe (which are being fanned daily by Russia and by the Communist Party in France), and with the prospect of further austerities to come in Britain, the temptation to fall down before the Golden Calf must have been of the severest. A comparison with the 'Displaced Persons' of Ancient Israel during their wanderings in the desert is very apposite. Sir S. Cripps recently declared that we would not sell our birthright for a mess of potage. But it looks as if, after a few more days of hunger-striking, he has decided to do so after all.

In all probability, no Government, outside Russia, could condemn its people to so much immediate austerity. We can also perhaps take comfort from the fact that this Government, with the advice of Dalton and Keynes, probably does know what it is doing; while Churchill, in the deflationary days of 1924, or whenever he has been walking in the realms of finance, decidedly did not.

As to the price to be paid, that is another question. The Loan is undoubtedly a signal defeat for British Socialism (even when wrapped up in the *Daily Mirror*), though not one for which it can perhaps be blamed. The Socialists have certainly proved that they are able to work with a foreign government of a different hue. Yet the whole point surely is that they have done this merely by giving way to the economic tenets of that other country. The bad effects, of course, may not be felt for several years. This may well give the Labour Government considerably enhanced popularity here and now. Nevertheless it is conceivable that it may prevent their return at the next General Election. There must still be something very ominous about the figures 1931 for Socialist leaders! At the next General Election the voters will be presented with this choice, 'a Socialist economy, or an agreement with America?' But by their recent surrender the Labour Government have already given away their case; and have admitted, rightly or wrongly, that whatever the merits of Socialism in Britain, Britain no longer possesses the strength to pull against the United States of America.

MOSCOW BOUND!

SUDDENLY and without warning it is announced that the two Western Foreign Ministers are to tootle off to Moscow once again. Previous to this intelligence, President Truman had said that it was not necessary for the 'Big Three' ever to meet again, and that it

was not really a case of the Big Three at all, but of the Fifty-One United Nations. Our Ernie has given vent to similar sentiments, and has officially advocated an almost immediate General Election for a World Parliament. What has persuaded the two Westerners to try this return to the Trinity can only be conjectured at the present juncture.

Actually Truman's innocent remark that there do not happen to be three united nations but fifty-one is full of common sense. It is so simple! And what a pity it was that nobody thought of it before! I am being quite serious about this. Why did we ever think that the three-card trick was a short cut to peace? As a matter of justice, there are fifty-one, or more, nation-states; and there is every reason to think that, if the leadership of the world were broadened, the chances of agreement would not grow less. Personally, I have always felt that all this Big Three talk was not only a mockery of what we fought for in the war but anyhow idiotic and unpractical. For, among many other things, those not included in The Three or The Five are not in fact all small states of the size and importance of Guatemala. Many of them are quite big countries which played a vital part in the late struggle, such as Canada, Australia, New Zealand, Holland and Brazil. There are also such countries as Spain, Argentina, Sweden, Switzerland and Mexico. In fact, if the non-privileged are added together, they comprise a very large slice of the size and power of the earth. And if we are going to have the atom bomb, why not confide it to all countries, if it is to pass out of American hands? Why is Russia the one power to which the secret must be passed?

Bevin's suggestion in black and white in Hansard of a World Parliament, to be directly elected by the peoples of the world, has received remarkably little comment. The idea is hardly new in informal discussions; but as a statement of policy by a major Foreign Minister it is revolutionary. It is, incidentally, a triumph for Federal Union; though whether that society has noticed this fact I know not. It is certainly one in the eye for Russia's present line of policy. At a People's Parliament of the World (which would no doubt have to be rather rudimentary, and of an advisory character at first), the Russians would be out-voted anyhow; so that it would not matter so much if the members they despatched to it, if they consented to send them, had really been hand-picked at the Kremlin.



DR. HUGH DALTON *in his robes as Chancellor of the Exchequer. He and Keynes at least have profound knowledge of economic matters*

MR. PRIESTLEY

À PROPOS Russia, Mr. J. B. Priestley's contributions to the *Sunday Express* about that country have caused surprise

in the British metropolis. It is certainly a fair puzzle to discover why this experienced Social Democrat has felt himself bound to write this recent series of skilfully-concealed eulogies. Admittedly the articles are on the light side, and tell mostly of wine parties in aeroplanes, and sheep-frying barbecues and ballet in the Trans-Caucasus. But the impression so skilfully conveyed, is that all is well with the Soviet Union. Bearing in mind Mr. P.'s long interest in Socialism of a more western and democratic order, and in liberty and genuine democracy, it is astonishing that he should desire to reinforce this erroneous impression at the present time, when the Soviet dictatorship is being so particularly aggressive from Berlin to Teheran. Or is he one of those who still believe that Appeasement is, after all, the best policy? Shades of Neville Chamberlain! Are there some people who will never learn the lesson of 1938?

A NEW DIPLOMACY?

THE subject of the fundamental reform of the Foreign Office has long been a favourite with progressive journalists, and at the present moment the British Foreign Office is going through many changes, almost all for the better, by virtue of the presence within its portals of the massive figure of Ernest Bevin.

It is a commonplace of Left-Wing criticism these last fifty years that the Foreign Office errs by being recruited almost entirely from 'the aristocracy', and through possessing far too little knowledge of 'modern subjects', such as economics and sociology, and far too few contacts with Left-Wing or working-class opinion and personalities in lands overseas. Correct as many of these criticisms are, are they not altogether too superficial? What are the really fundamental requisites for the conduct of diplomacy, and what about the discoveries of the mainsprings of human action made by modern psychologists?

I would suggest that it would be worth while trying to make an entirely new approach to the conduct of foreign affairs, namely, a psychological one, and also a psychological approach to the grave problem of avoiding or minimising the effects of war. This is not to say that I believe that psychology is the whole story, though many psychologists believe that it is. I would infinitely prefer to regard it as an additional method of looking at the situation.

At once Russia, for example, would be viewed in a totally new light. Russia's apparent desires to control Eastern Europe, Persia and Eastern Asia would be seen not so much in an economic or military light, but perhaps as a result of primitive Russia's babylike 'oral' desire to swallow everything within sight, partly as a result of a feeling of insecurity, and partly perhaps as a result of a feeling of guilt, leading to a quite genuine feeling, in the *conscious* mind, that *she* was the country which was about to be attacked. The same view could have been taken by Chamberlain of the late Herr Hitler's ambitions and demands. I repeat that it is at any rate unpractical to treat psychology as everything. A country, for example, may be suffering from genuine economic ills or military difficulties. But psychology, none the less, would give the statesmen a new insight, and in all probability a new line of approach. Finally, he would be in a better position to exercise the supreme, and the essential, function of a diplomatist—that is to know when to give way, and when to hold fast, or even to threaten.

Giving way at the wrong time has been amply proved to be fatal; yet an aggressive attitude at the wrong moment may lead to a serious 'loss of face' for one's opponent, and thus make war inevitable.



A poster by the great Czech painter, Kokoschka, urging help for Europe's starving children, put up by an anonymous benefactor in the London tubes

The statesman, if he has a general knowledge of psychology, would be assisted in these difficulties. He should also have some specialised psychological knowledge of his particular 'opponent'. For Russian reactions are not always the same as those of Americans or Frenchmen.

WHAT TRAINING FOR FOREIGN OFFICE?

WHILE it is only fair to emphasise that major foreign policy is conducted by the Prime Minister and his Cabinet, and that therefore a number of the strictures delivered against our Foreign Office have been unjust (Neville Chamberlain did not listen to the warning about Hitler, given by Vansittart), yet the Prime Minister must be supported by a Foreign Service equipped with modern information and modern minds. A member of the Foreign Service should certainly possess considerable general psychological training, and if he is *en poste* in France, he should also possess a psychological knowledge of probable French reactions to British moves. He should naturally devote the whole of his diplomatic career to France; for it is none too easy for a man to understand two countries, without bringing in any more. There should also be at the British Embassy in Paris a special psychological expert who has also devoted his entire life to the study of Anglo-French relations.

In general, it may be said that a man is emotionally prejudiced in favour of a country in which he has spent his earliest years, that is from birth to the age of five. He is, of course, also influenced by the fact of his nationality, and the views of his parents. Very likely the best man to be sent to France would be one who, although having British parents on both sides, had yet resided while a young child in France. In this case it is likely that his loyalty would be to Britain, but he would understand the workings of the French mind.

Contemplation of recent happenings moves me to the thought that foreign nations are far more difficult to understand than was recently thought to be the case. Add to this that at no recent period in history have the major powers possessed so ludicrously little knowledge of the minds of their rivals. In the eighteenth century a British diplomatist could achieve a considerable understanding of a French or Austrian statesman, since they all belonged to a social class which had become more or less international. Today it has been a tragi-comedy that Hitler and Stalin have scarcely been to the local Isle of Wight (Litvinov and Maisky were almost the only modern Russians who had the slightest knowledge of foreign mentalities) while the Americans are thoroughly 'subjective', peering at everything through their own great glasses, with the object further obscured by the fumes of American cigarette tobacco. Mr. Bevin has proved to be a rare exception. Perhaps because he was born a countryman, he seems to possess an inherent sanity, and a genuine organic approach; and because he's a real man, he seems to be able to see things in a human way, which is, after all, the only way to see things. His strength of character, far greater than that of recent Conservative Foreign Secretaries, or by permanent Foreign Office men, has also held him in good stead.

Labour and Britain are both more than well served by Mr. Bevin. Though whether the Labour Government can ever escape from the ultimate effects of the American Loan is, to say the least, very debatable.

This country looks like having an uncomfortable time as an illegitimate forty-ninth state of the American Union, possessing all the disadvantages of being tied to American economic leaders, with their amazing lack of experience, and their panicky jumpiness, without enjoying the rights of full membership, which among other things would mean being inside the American Tariffs! Britain, in fact, looks like being a sort of not very glorified Philippines Commonwealth. For the unfortunate Filipinos are about to be accorded 'sovereign independence', or in other words, the kick-out from the tariff union, in deference to United States sugar interest in Cuba.

THE PRIMROSE REVIVED

POSSIBLY only a revived Conservative Party, with a new name, and a new policy embracing the best of Tory Reform and Radical Action, can ever bring Britain back again to the place which she ought to occupy amongst the nations.

As it leaves me at present, there are no signs of genuine revival within the Conservative Opposition. Mr. Churchill's speech during the Censure Debate must have been highly diverting, and helped to make up for the lack of fireworks on Guy Fawkes Day; but it was full of sound and fury, signifying nothing constructive. Mr. Thorneycroft's speech was in brilliant contrast.

Mr. Churchill and some of his most intimate friends will have to retire, if the Conservative Party is ever again to sway the destinies of this kingdom.

FOREIGN AFFAIRS: Monthly Comments (VI)

SIMON HARCOURT-SMITH

RARELY has it been more difficult than today to write for publication several weeks ahead. As I prepare this commentary, two great events are pending, events which may alter the whole shape of the foreign picture. I mean, the forthcoming debate in the Commons on the Anglo-American Loan Agreement, not to speak of Bretton Woods, and the Moscow meeting of the 'Big Three'.

No one can gush over the terms which the Americans impose upon us. Morally, I suppose there was every reason for giving us a grant-in-aid. We have fought longest, hardest, and perhaps sacrificed even more than have the Russians. But it were folly ever to expect Congress to acquiesce in so noble a gesture. We should never forget that while the President of the United States wields far more power than any constitutional monarch, nowhere else is the executive so much fettered by the legislature. A few discreet words from a tactful Under-Secretary can exert immense influence in our House of Commons. During a debate on foreign affairs one does not often find the private members rising in any strength against Foreign Office policy. But Congress remains strangely divorced from the State Department and the U.S. Treasury. Not even the appropriate Senatorial Committees maintain a satisfactory liaison.

The American people, the people who elect Congress, have been taught since childhood that the Old World, and particularly the English, are a pack of decadent and subtle tyrants, incapable of running their own affairs on a peaceful and businesslike principle, and eternally trying therefore in devious ways to trick Honest Jonathan out of the fortune he has made by his straightforward virtues of efficiency and hard work. Moreover, they know little and care less about our war effort. For four years all the terrible power of American advertising has been exerted to persuade them their 'boys' alone defeated the Germans and the Japanese. A press much franker than ours tended on the whole to denigrate the brilliant triumphs of British arms. The whole world in chorus praised the vast industrial achievements of the Union.

Mid-term elections to Congress take place next autumn. The average Representative who voted for a grant-in-aid to this country because of our supreme contribution to victory would be regarded as a loose-minded traitor, and be thrown out into oblivion the moment the polls opened.

In order, therefore, to pass any sort of reasonable loan agreement through Congress, it must have an air of a hard bargain, driven by Yankee shrewdness. And a hard bargain it undoubtedly is, perhaps even an unwise, a foolish one. Its main defect undoubtedly lies in the obligation to swallow whole the Bretton Woods arrangement. The tying of our monetary policy to America's may, of course, prove in practice less of a danger than we apprehend. But it is an undoubted danger, for it depends upon the readiness of future Congresses to pursue a liberal international policy. Henceforward, one may say with little exaggeration, the economic health of this realm will be jeopardised every time America goes to the polls.

Then the implied engagement to modify Imperial preferences. A thousand stones can be flung against the Ottawa arrangements. They are foreign to our traditions, and to what a pre-war dictator would no doubt have called our destiny. But we do not want to sacrifice them for nothing. We must urge upon the Americans with all our power the need for a reciprocal scaling down of U.S. tariffs.

Unfortunately, tariffs have become as sacred a corner of American life as the text of the Constitution itself. American industry grew up under their benevolent shade. A perfectly healthy procedure, when you are a debtor nation, with struggling new factories, and arrayed against you the vast economic power of your creditors, the British. But high tariffs are utterly irreconcilable with an overwhelming creditor position, a virtual monopoly of the world's gold stocks and the greatest industrial machine on earth.

The American public, however, still cling to their debtor mentality. They refuse to see that our only way of paying them is with goods. They envisage foreign trade merely as a question of selling to the rest of the world the surplus of goods which their home markets cannot comfortably digest, and thus averting unemployment. Meanwhile, in those home markets there must arise no question of foreign competition. In short, we must increase our debt to America by purchasing the surplus of American production,



Government House, Tabriz, capital of Persian Azerbaijan and nerve centre of present crisis

and then only be allowed to pay our debts in hard cash we have not got.

That, I think is the 'picture at its blackest'. I do not, however, suggest that because of these dangers we ought to reject the loan agreement. We cannot afford to. It would be dangerous to alienate America at this moment when relations with Russia are still far from happy; and we can by no means be certain the British people would be able at this stage to bear the additional privations that a break-down of the Washington negotiations would inevitably have brought upon them.

In connection with the Moscow conference, three questions are worth examining—the French thesis on Germany, the signs of an increasingly liberal Russian policy in Europe, and the Persian situation. The issue of Atomic energy is so closely bound up with the general question of relations with Russia, it is hardly worth discussing separately.

The French claim to have been misunderstood. They have never opposed unified *control* for Germany. They do oppose the resurrection of a German administration that would one day assume authority over the whole Reich. In particular, as the Russians, for the most naked of security reasons, have sliced off a large area of eastern Germany and given it to their puppet, Poland, so now the French yearn to see the Ruhr similarly amputated, then internationalised, or perhaps included in some Western arrangement. To the American thesis that such modifications of Reich frontiers can only be decided at the peace conference, the French return cynical laughter. Is it likely, they ask, the Russians will ever allow the Peace Conference to restore Silesia to Germany?

In a previous article we have examined this French plan for the Ruhr, which indeed seems to possess many virtues. Until Atomic or some other analogous power supersedes coal, the Ruhr will remain indispensable to any revival of Germany's military power. Take the Ruhr away, and you castrate the German Mars, far more effectively than by the mere dismantling of Krupps or I. G. Farben. Meanwhile, if we can reach some kind of agreement over this question, we should then be able to work for a more unified policy throughout the Reich, the dissipation of these wretched suspicions, which if they do not plunge us back into war, at least hold for Europe the menace of famine.

Eastern Europe is desperately short of livestock. In Poland, the head of horses has fallen from nearly five million to seven hundred thousand. There are not enough animals for the ploughing and spring sowing. Ninety per cent of the sheep have disappeared, seventy-five per cent of the pigs. On the other hand, the Russians control supplies of fertilizers for which the British zone cried out. Almost certainly the harvest in 1946 will be negligible. If we do not quickly establish a healthy exchange between the Russian and the Anglo-Saxon zones, that of 1947 may well prove little better.

On the other hand, the sky is not totally bare of hopeful portents. Strangely, almost inexplicably, Soviet policy during the last months has melted from its first truculent defiance. Free

Port Arthur, Manchuria, now under joint Soviet-Chinese control

elections in Austria, a reasonable temper in Hungary, the evacuation of Czecho-Slovakia, all point to a change of spirit. Even Tito speaks with a new and almost gentle voice.

Undoubtedly, this almost yielding mood comes from Anglo-American pressure and fear of Atomic power. The cynic, too, might argue in dealing with her vassals close to her frontiers, like the miserable Roumania, or with nominally free countries like Persia which she is well placed to browbeat, Russia remains inflexibly hard. For all that, whereas a month or so ago it seemed as if we would never be able to lie down in peace beside the Russians anywhere, now one does begin to see the first vague design for making a bed with them.

Here, however, we must confine our optimism to Europe. Soviet policy in Asia permits us no such handsome hopes. True, in Manchuria Chinese Kuomintang troops are now allowed to occupy the principal southern centres, Mukden, Changchun and the like. But this Russian concession is but illusory. The Russians are back astride their Chinese Eastern Railway, dominating Northern Manchuria according to tradition. And at Port Arthur they control or will control the North China seas much more effectively than ever they did before the Russo-Japanese war of 1905, when British statesmen complained of the balance of power being upset. Russia's position in China is still vague. We cannot yet discern her policy towards the Chinese Communists. But one thing is certain. Already she can dictate who rules China down to the Yellow River. In a few years' time, when she has nursed back her strength, who can say how far south her power will stretch?

In Korea on the other hand, while news from the Russian zone is scarce more than a dream, the Soviet authorities appear to behave with finer discretion than the American, who tend to support conservative elements that cannot be absolved from the charge of working hand in glove with the Japanese in bygone days.

The Azerbaijan crisis follows the classic pattern of Russian policy on North Persia during the last seventy years. It is always said the moment you leave Teheran for Tabriz you can tell the omnipresence of Russian influence by the general use of samovars. Persia has always been a battle-ground for Russian and British influence, and at the end of the last war a situation not unlike the present one developed. The Azerbaijanis lie across the Russo-Persian frontier. The possibilities of intrigue must therefore be almost irresistible. Nor must we forget that Russia's frontiers with Persia and Turkey are the only ones of her many borders beyond which she has not yet been able to set up compliant puppet governments. 'Festung Russland' is almost built. But while at Teheran and Ankara survive régimes not wholly docile to Moscow's whims, no doubt the Russians will not feel entirely secure.

Meanwhile, if one must consider the unhappy business in terms of 'power politics' (and the Russians leave us little choice), one cannot shake oneself free of a certain apprehension for our oil in Persia and Iraq, particularly if the Kurds, at the junction of the Russian, Persian and Turkish frontiers choose to join in the dance . . .

THE VEIL LIFTED ON SOVIET DOINGS

S. ROSING, Special Correspondent of *World Review*

(I) ROUMANIAN CRISIS IN SNAPS

1 KING MICHAEL THE FIRST. The young king who, at the age of 23, by his courageous action brought Roumania to the side of the Allies by the *coup d'état* of 23 August 1944. For this the Soviet Union decorated him with the Order of Victory (which we can see in the picture). Once more he showed his courage, and his real democratic feelings, when he asked (22 August 1945) for the resignation of the Groza Cabinet, which is not supported by the majority of the people. On the refusal of the Government to resign, he stopped all co-operation with them. He is now a King without a Government



2 DR. PETRE GROZA is still Roumanian Prime Minister. He thinks that the existing laws are sufficient to rule the country, and that he does not need the King. This wealthy Transylvanian landowner, a well-educated man who likes sports, life in the open air (and flowers), would like very much to retire from his unpleasant job which, against his will, brings him into opposition to the King, whom he deeply respects. He would like to collaborate with all the democratic parties. But the Communists, who brought him to power, are holding him under pressure. Their leader

3 ANNA PAUKER, who recently declared that she was 'not afraid of the atomic bomb', is not interested in a democratic Roumania, but is fighting for a Communist dictatorship. She is one of the oldest fighters for Communism in Roumania, and spent many years in prison. According to her opinion, everyone who is not a Communist is a Fascist, and there is no democracy besides Communism. Her party has declared open war on the two big democratic parties—the National Peasants and the National Liberals



4 DINU BRATIANU, the venerable leader of the National Liberals

5 JULIU MANIU, head of the National Peasants. Bratianu and Maniu are old Roumanian democratic politicians. They fought during this war against the Antonescu dictatorship; helped the King in preparing the *coup d'état,* and took part in the first three Governments till March 1945. Now their parties are 'illegal', and they are attacked as 'Fascist' by the Communist Press

6 GHEORGHE TATARESCU, the present Vice-Premier and Foreign Minister. Before the sixth of March members of the Government asked in a Cabinet Meeting that he should be put on the list of war criminals. He escaped, by entering the present government, in order to support the Communists in their fight against the National Liberals and the National Peasants, although he is himself a former enthusiastic member of the National Liberal Party

7 CONSTANTIN TITEL PETRESCU, leader of the Social Democrat Party, a widely educated man of Western standards. As an admirer of French Socialism and the British Labour Party, he does not approve of the Communist interpretation of Socialism and Democracy. He supports the King in his democratic attitude. Although he is a member of the bloc which forms the present Government, he still maintains relations with Maniu and Bratianu, and is trying to solve the crisis

8 No longer ago than July 1945, when the King was decorated with the Soviet Order of Victory. Lunch-time at the Palace. The King is sitting between General Sussaikov (Russia), the 'Chief of the Allied Control Commission', and Dr. Petre Groza

9 VISHINSKI, Russian Vice-Commissar for Foreign Affairs in 'Fascist' Company. From left to right, Lucretiu Patrascanu, Communist Minister of Justice; Juliu Maniu; Gheorghiu-Dej, Communist Minister of Communications; Vishinski; Titel Petrescu; Dinu Bratianu. A happy gathering during the first visit of Vice-Commissar Vishinski to Roumania, when everybody apparently still appreciated Maniu's and Bratianu's contribution to the *coup d'état*

(II) THE GOVERNMENTS BRITAIN AND U.S.A. DO NOT RECOGNISE

DOES the Third International still exist? This is the question a neutral observer travelling about in South-Eastern Europe these days must ask himself. Has Russia really renounced her slogan 'Workers of the World Unite!'? Will there be no more Communist interference with other countries' internal affairs? I leave the reader to answer these questions, considering the facts I collected during my stay in the Balkans, where I was able to follow the daily developments of the Communist Movement, and the methods used by the Communists in influencing the local Governments. I should like to state that I am by no means anti-Soviet, but as a Socialist I am observing things from a democratic point of view.

When dealing with this problem, we have two main factors to take into consideration: one political and the other economic.

POLITICAL FACTS

The majority of the Communist leaders in the countries occupied by the Red Army, where Soviet Marshals or Generals head the Allied Control Commission, are members of the Russian Communist Party, or, at least, have spent years in Soviet Russia, where they had a rigorous training to fit them for taking over leadership in their own country. Here are some of the prominent Communist personalities of South-Eastern Europe.

The most popular Bulgarian Communist leader is George Dimitroff, known the world over for his courageous attitude at the Reichstag Fire Trial. Although an active member of the Comintern, and a defender of internationalism, he could not forget that Bulgarian blood was running in his veins. From Moscow, where he was obliged to go because the Bulgarian Government at that time withdrew his citizenship, he is still directing the policy of the Bulgarian Communist Party; and whenever an important decision has to be taken by his party friends in Sofia, George Dimitroff is applied to, and his answer never comes too late. The local leaders of the Bulgarian Communist Party, Sola Dragoiczeva, a fifty-year-old woman, and Treicza Kostieff, a lawyer, were both trained in Moscow, from where they still receive their Party orders.

The two outstanding figures in the Roumanian Communist Party are Vasile Luca and Anna Pauker. The former spent four years in Soviet Russia, where he was even elected a member of the Supreme Soviet in 1940. (He was known then under the name of Laszlo Luca.) The latter is one of Roumania's oldest Communist fighters. In 1942, when she had been in prison for many years, she was exchanged for a Roumanian M.P., then imprisoned in Russia, and so got to the U.S.S.R. Both were sent back to Roumania in 1944, and are now responsible for the whole policy of the Roumanian Party.

The same sort of thing applies to Hungary, and its Communist leaders. It is quite understood that, when one of these people applies to the local Allied Control Commission, he receives much better attention than the representative of any other party. When, for example, Juliu Maniu, the leader of the Roumanian National-Peasants, a well-known democrat who, together with Dinu Bratianu, took the most important part in the *coup d'état* of August 1944, applied at

the end of 1944 for an interview with the Soviet Vice-Commissar Vishinski, he got the reply that Mr. Vishinski was willing to see him only on condition that he would not talk about the three questions which interested him most, namely, Moldavia, Transylvania, and the general political situation of the country. Mr. Maniu had previously sent memoranda on these topics, which came back unopened. He remarked to me that it was the first time in his life that the representative of a friendly country had informed him before a talk what matters he was willing to discuss with him. Mr. Maniu, who was the first leading Roumanian politician to back Titulescu's policy of understanding with Soviet Russia, claims that he deserved better treatment from Vishinski.

It is quite clear that no Communist leader has ever received a similar reply from a Soviet representative. On the contrary, these leaders get all possible help, in order to spread their ideas throughout the country, and to fight against their opponents, who are not anti-Russian, but just anti-Communist. This accounts for the tremendous influence the Communists have in the Governments of these countries, where the democratic opposition is reduced to silence, or has carefully to watch every step. That is the reason why the Anglo-Americans have refused so far to recognise these Governments, which cost they are fully justified in considering not democratic.

ECONOMIC FACTS

Before the war, the economic life of South-East Europe was mainly based on exchange with Germany. The richest of these countries, Roumania, has suffered very little from the war. Although she generally yielded to Germany's political and military claims, she did not give in on economic questions. The economic clauses of the Armistice signed in Moscow were rather generous, and it was generally hoped that Roumania would take a prominent part in the economic rebuilding of Europe, and that she would even be able to help her neighbouring countries.

Bulgaria's foodstuffs, tobacco, and other exports could also be of importance for Europe, or even Britain, or the U.S.A.

Hungary's situation is worse, on account of the huge destruction caused by bombs and fighting. But there could still be economic relations in the West, or even investment of Western capital.

There is no chance of Russia alone taking the place of Germany in the foreign trade of these countries, and it is only with Anglo-American capital and manufactured goods that these countries can be brought back to a normal economic situation, taking their place among the mixed agricultural and industrial countries.

THESE COUNTRIES UNDER THE ARMISTICE

Armistice conditions have been signed by all three allies with the countries of the South-East. Bulgaria's situation is the best from an economic point of view because, as she has not been at war with Russia, she has no reparations to pay. Hungary and Roumania, although they have payments to make, have still a sufficient margin left to start economic relationship with other countries. We can see from the example of Roumania how the Communist-controlled Governments managed to absorb these margins to the profit of one ally only, leaving no opportunity for business with the others.

In May 1945 the Groza Government, which is not recognised by the Anglo-Americans, signed a series of commercial agreements with the U.S.S.R. These agreements not only provided for mutual exchanges of goods, but stipulated a vast programme of economic collaboration in Roumania itself. Russo-Roumanian companies have to be founded, in order to exploit all the economic possibilities of the country. This gives Russia an option on the whole Roumanian economy, reserving her the right to establish any commercial or industrial enterprise she should think convenient. Moreover, these mixed companies are granted such privileges inside the country that they will soon reach a situation of monopoly. A first consequence of these agreements could be stated when recently a Czechoslovakian economic delegation arrived in Bucharest, and was not able to do the slightest business, although goodwill prevailed upon both sides.

So far, Russo-Roumanian companies are working in the following lines: Banking, Petrol Industry, Navigation, and Air Transport. They are all based on organisations already existing before the war in Roumania, and none of the new enterprises announced in the agreement has actually been set up, although the need is great. In the meantime British and American investment is impossible.

CONCLUSION

Mr. Marc Etheridge, President Truman's observer in South-Eastern Europe, is expected there at the time of writing.

My own view is that, whether recognition is given to these Governments or not, the economic agreements they have recently made in Russia should be submitted to an international board.

WITHOUT BIAS

SPECIAL BRAINS TRUST

(IV) WHAT SHOULD NOW BE OUR POLICY TOWARDS GERMANY?

Prof. G. D. H. COLE — Dr. C. E. M. JOAD — LORD RUSSELL — LORD VANSITTART

Dr. Joad: Should we, perhaps, begin by considering whether any policy towards Germany can still be regarded as applying to Germany as a whole? Do we, that is to say, accept the 'curtain', running across Germany and dividing it into two, as a necessary feature, whether we like it or not?

Lord Russell: Not necessary. Unavoidable. Unavoidable by us.

Dr. Joad: Yes, I meant that.

Lord Vansittart: On my part, and I think on yours, with the most extreme reluctance.

Lord Russell: Yes, the most extreme reluctance.

Prof. Cole: I am less reluctant because I have thought it unavoidable for years—though I don't like it.

Is Germany still a potential danger?

Lord Vansittart: I think you still have the uncured spirit. There is no repentance, no realisation of what they have done. The underlying spirit is still there. We have to keep it under control, and we must be very strict in our interpretation of restriction of war material. It has been said that Germany's war-potential is three-quarters intact and could recover very quickly.

Lord Russell: I agree that the spirit may still be there; but so it is in Montenegro. Every Montenegran does things which we all deplore, but it does not matter.

Apart from anything else, Germany will no longer have the men for waging war. The population of Germany is going to be enormously diminished by deaths. Our policy of causing a large part of the German nation to die is obviously going to be put through. When I say 'our', I mean the Allies. It is more Russian, but we agreed to the Russian suggestion.

Dr. Joad: I do not concur in that. I thought, and think, we were doing our best to help the Germans, that is to say, the Germans in our zone, to live. I don't think it was ever our intention or our habit to connive at the deaths of millions of people.

Lord Russell: I agree that we want them to live, but at the same time, in order to avoid friction with Russia, we agreed at Potsdam to a policy which we must have known would not be carried out as it was on paper, and would inevitably result in what has happened.

Dr. Joad: You emphasise the fact that there are going to be fewer Germans, with the implication, presumably, that we need not, therefore, be so much afraid of them?

Lord Russell: Yes—I think that is all completely out of date. It is really like anyone being afraid of France after the fall of Napoleon. I think Germany as a great power is finished, and finished for ever. It is not Germany, but another power we have to fear.

Dr. Joad: I agree; not Germany, which is bled white, and will be helpless for generations to come, but Russia.

Prof. Cole: Could we agree that if Germany ever makes war again, it won't be as Germany, but as an ally either of Russia, or some other major power?

Lord Russell: I think you may take this as a certain fact: that there exists in all parts of Germany a passionate hatred of Russia, so passionate that it causes them by comparison quite to like us.

Lord Vansittart: Temporarily.

Lord Russell: I don't think it is temporary—not so long as Russian power survives. The only thing that would stop it would be the collapse of Russia.

Dr. Joad: I think, then, we are agreed that our future treatment of Germany, though important, is no longer a matter of first-rate importance,

except in so far as it bears by implication upon our policy in regard to Russia.

Prof. Cole: Or on the prosperity of Europe as a whole.

Lord Vansittart: I don't entirely share that view. I think the course of our policy towards Germany *does* have an intrinsic importance of its own and may turn out to have it in a degree which cannot at present be fully estimated. We need, in fact, to be continually watchful. On the other hand, I do, of course, agree that the future of Germany will be greatly influenced by the course of Russian policy, and we must not forget that Russia and Germany repeatedly coalesced in the inter-war period, both under the Republic and under the Nazis: for instance, at Rapallo, and in the early rearmament of Germany by Russia, and again by the Russo-German agreement of 1939, which precipitated the war. History, of course, does not repeat itself precisely, but Russia is in occupation of more than half of Germany and will probably communise it in substance, if not in ostensible form.

Should Russia share in the control of the Ruhr, assuming that it is internationalised?

Dr. Joad: We are continually being told that the Ruhr mines ought to be placed under the control of an International Commission, and that the coal which they produce should be not only distributed over Germany as a whole, but made available over most of Central Europe as it used to be before the war. That presupposes that something in the nature of an International Commission is possible. Now, it seems to me, given the present state of the world, quite chimerical to envisage such a Commission including Russia. Again and again, when co-operation for any purpose is proposed, however large the concession, however generous the compromise which may be offered, they are offered to no purpose; for again and again it turns out that the Russians won't play.

Prof. Cole: I would not regard it as chimerical. It depends on how you interpret the present Russian attitude. Their line today is that they are not going to co-operate until we say we will not interfere in Eastern Europe, which they regard as their sphere of influence. But, once given that assurance, they will be anxious to co-operate in the West, and in the case of the Ruhr they will be particularly anxious to collaborate because they will want to get their share of what can be brought out of the Ruhr industries.

Lord Vansittart: That is rather a one-sided aspect of co-operation.

Lord Russell: I agree with Cole, but I would phrase it differently; that, provided we do not interfere in the East, they are only too ready to interfere in the West.

Dr. Joad: Are you suggesting that we should invite them to come in on a Commission to administer the Ruhr on their terms?

Lord Russell: No. As long as they keep up this monopoly in the East, we ought to refuse them any voice whatsoever in the West.

Lord Vansittart: I agree. There were two great arsenals in Germany before the war: one in Silesia, one in the Ruhr. If they want to come into the Ruhr, surely we should be allowed a say or some measure of control in the other? It is manifestly inequitable that they should hog the whole of the Silesian one and come into the Ruhr too.

Prof. Cole: Is it to our advantage to insist on that? Are we trying to head on for a collision with Russia, or trying to help in civilising Russia as a member of a new world order? I should think that, even where they are unreasonable, it is to our advantage to maintain what co-operation we can. I think it would be to our advantage to let them come in on an International Consortium in the Ruhr. But the terms of that Consortium would have to be drawn up in the West, and if the Russians would not accept suitable terms, they would have to stay out.

Lord Russell: And would you have a majority vote decisive on your international body for the Ruhr? In that case the Russians could always be outvoted.

Prof. Cole: Oh, yes—except that you would have some agreed division of the output to start with, so that the Russians could always claim a share, which would be an incentive to come in.

Lord Russell: Well, I don't agree. You may call that co-operation, but in fact you would be conceding to the Russians on every point everything they want. I don't want that.

Prof. Cole: Then you are getting ready for the next World War?

Lord Russell: That is probably coming in any case. We may as well be ready for it. What you propose is just Munich over again. We tried it out with Hitler and it didn't work. Why should we think it would work next time?

Lord Vansittart: I agree. If we can't have total co-operation, I don't want to go in for a policy of unconditional surrender.

Dr. Joad: It seems to me that the degree to which you will be prepared to play with the Russians over the Consortium or anything else will depend on the view you take of the psychological and political motives which determine their present attitude.

You may say: here is Russia, an enormous territory, one-sixth of the globe, the least densely populated of all the big nations. A lot of it is devastated, a lot more undeveloped; enormous resources are waiting to be developed, and the various plans for reconstruction are all hopelessly behind schedule. With such a terrific job of social and economic reconstruction to be done, it might very reasonably be said that it is quite unlikely that Russia will nourish any imperial ambitions for years to come. Their one objective, so far as foreign policy is concerned, will be to establish a sufficiently wide belt of security on their Western front in order to act as a barrier behind which they can develop their country in their own way and in their own time. If you take this view, you may very well conclude that it is safe to give Russia a share in the reconstruction and administration of the West.

But there is another view. You can say: the first view is much too reasonable, too reasonable at least for the Russians, who are not in that sort of mood at all. If you look back over history, you will find it very rare indeed for a Power to confine itself to the development of its own resources at home when it can embark on imperialistic adventures abroad. What, in this view, the Russians are really playing at is Power Politics on a big scale in the good old-fashioned way, for the good old-fashioned reason: that is, they want to increase and enjoy power for its own sake, and to be, in fact, a Great Power. Therefore, in spite of all the considerations adduced by the first view, the Russians are ambitious to extend their sway over Europe as a whole for the sake of power, and nothing but power. If that is the right interpretation, to permit Russian participation in the West would be definitely unsafe.

Prof. Cole: On the whole, I think the first view is the one that will prevail in Russia. I don't deny there will be two opinions standing against each other, but I am inclined to think the very degree of exhaustion and loss of manpower she has suffered will keep Russia from any external adventures for some time to come.

Lord Vansittart: They have lost a great deal of manpower but they have absorbed and annexed more than they lost.

Lord Russell: I take the second view. There is a great deal of evidence that Russia is in a purely

LORD RUSSELL, *with his attractive wife*

inperialistic mood. They make heroes of their old people like Subaroff, even Ivan the Terrible. You see this imperialistic policy in Manchuria—in Persia. Wherever you look, in any direction, you find the Russians are playing the imperialistic game in the old-fashioned style.

May I raise another point? I am very much in favour of Western Europe Federation, but it seems to me, if it is to be effective, it would have to include Western Germany—not necessarily as a state. I am not interested in it as a state, but I am interested in its resources and human beings.

Lord Vansittart: That would arouse fury in Russia.

Lord Russell: Whatever you do would arouse fury in Russia. I should not at all mind seeing the Ruhr internationalised, but I do want all the resources and the population of Western Germany to be in the Western Federation in some guise; otherwise your federation won't be strong.

Dr. Joad: Is one of the main reasons why you want a Federation of Western Europe in order that we can look Russia and America in the face?

Lord Russell: I am more interested in looking Russia in the face, but I should like to look America in the face too.

Prof. Cole: And I am more interested in looking America in the face, but I should like to look Russia in the face too. But I want it not primarily for either of these reasons, but in order to save the civilisation of Western Europe.

Dr. Joad: I also want it, not for the old-fashioned power-politics reason, but because I believe it is only by this means that we can

VANSITTART, *one of the handsomest men in Europe, in the joyful days of peace. They were not joyful for him, because his warnings about Hitler were not heeded by the Cabinet*

preserve a continuing culture, certain political ideas and a certain way of life which I hold to be valuable.

Lord Vansittart: I think that is perfectly right.

Dr. Joad: I agree with Russell that Germany must come in, in order that that way of life may be preserved. And Italy too.

Lord Vansittart: In that case, that rather militates against having Russia in on the Ruhr.

Lord Russell: I should think most certainly that it does.

Pastoralisation or industrial recovery?

Dr. Joad: It would seem to me that, at any rate as a long term policy, an essential condition of keeping Germans alive is to get the wheels of Germany turning again and to rehabilitate German industries. Their factories must be set going and they must be enabled to produce. I am suggesting, in other words, the opposite of what has been called the pastoralisation policy for Germany. Now, it is perfectly clear that if you set the German industries on their feet again, and enable them to produce—and this applies particularly to heavy industries—you are increasing, for what it is worth, the chance that Germany may again build up a war-potential. Now I am wholly and completely prepared to take that risk. Are you?

Lord Vansittart: I am reluctant to talk of German industry as a whole. I want to take each industry separately and settle what we shall do with it. Some industries you leave as they are. Some, like synthetic rubber and machine tools, you reduce. Others, like coal, you promote. Others, like aircraft, you abolish altogether.

Prof. Cole: I agree we must eliminate those industries which are really dangerous from the war point of view.

Lord Russell: Why? This 'curtain' between East and West, which we all deplore, has at least the result that it makes a unified strong Germany impossible. The Eastern Germans would never be allowed to co-operate with the Western Germans. So I don't see that we need be so frightened about German recovery.

Prof. Cole: But suppose you build up Western Germany into a great potential arsenal; it becomes an immediate spoil of war and the prey of whichever country can occupy it first. Surely you want to prevent that?

May I add another point? At the moment people are talking about only leaving German industry enough supplies for the German home market. That won't work because, if the Germans are going to have this population pouring in, they cannot support themselves without exports to pay for their foodstuffs.

Lord Vansittart: But with exports again, you would not consider German industry as a whole, but by categories. For instance, I feel strongly myself that I. G. Farben should be limited to production only for the German market. If you allow them to grow up again to any dimension, they will be highly dangerous.

Prof. Cole: But the general theory must not be that the Germans only produce for home consumption. That is impossible.

Lord Russell: I agree. German industry must be developed to the point where it can have an export trade.

Is re-education a practicable proposition?

Dr. Joad: Have you seen even the beginning of a practicable and definite scheme for the re-education of Germany? I haven't. There have been no sort of practical proposals.

Lord Russell: No, I haven't seen anything.

Dr. Joad: I have always said—it is not in any sense an original idea—that the problem of educating Germany should not be treated as an isolated problem, but as part of a more general European problem, the problem of trying to produce an international state of mind with the aid of international text-books, perhaps approved international universities, and so on. Schemes of

this kind were sometimes mooted by the old League of Nations at Geneva. Now, with the complete breakdown of any sort of international government, the realisation of educational proposals on these lines seems to be infinitely more difficult than we had ever expected. What seem likely to materialise are educational schemes conducted by the separate nations, each re-educating a different section of the Germans according to its own political opinions.

Lord Vansittart: I suppose our efforts will have to be confined to Western Germany, and Eastern Germany will be educated on entirely different lines. We shall have to say: 'There is nothing to be done regarding Eastern Germany.'

Lord Russell: There is a great deal of difficulty about the personnel to do the re-educating. It is not easy to find people suitable. Obviously they must be Germans. You cannot educate the German youth by foreigners, and it is very difficult to find Germans who are suitable.

Prof. Cole: One small suggestion I would like to make: you have at present in Sweden and Denmark, on a small scale, international colleges, colleges with a definite international outlook, which take students from different countries. I think we ought to do everything we can to stimulate that sort of movement, particularly in the neutral democratic countries, and to take selected German boys and girls and put them there. If you picked them carefully, that might make an enormous difference.

Lord Russell: I agree with that profoundly. I think it would be of enormous importance. This movement of re-educating Germany must start with the *élite,* not the mass. You would have first to train a small number of people, and then send those people to training colleges to learn to become teachers. The teachers who went out from those training colleges would be all right. It is a long and slow process beginning with a very few.

Lord Vansittart: That would work all right in countries that had suffered nothing from the war, like Sweden and Switzerland. But Norway and the Netherlands, for instance, who took in Germans after the last war, would be very reluctant to do so again after their recent experience.

Lord Russell: It would be better, I think, to send them to countries that had been neutral in the war. There would be much more hope of the Germans receiving it in the right spirit.

Dr. Joad: If you are confining your proposals for re-education to what we have talked about hitherto—re-educating a small number of picked Germans by sending them to colleges in small neutral countries, and taking no direct steps at all about Germany as a whole by setting up international re-educational machinery issuing international text-books and so on—the scope of re-education is extraordinarily limited, isn't it?

Lord Russell: But you cannot have anything international at the moment.

Dr. Joad: I am still thinking in terms of a Federated Western Europe.

Lord Russell: Then you could have something that was Western International—international within the zone.

Dr. Joad: That would seem to me to be a tremendous advance.

Lord Russell: There could be no bias as between England, France, Holland, etc.

Dr. Joad: I think that a first experiment in international education, however humble, would constitute a tremendous advance in the direction of an international world.

Lord Vansittart: I agree. If you get something like a Federation in Western Europe, it would be a real beginning.

* * *

Dr. Joad: We seem to have reached a fairly wide measure of agreement.

Lord Russell: Before we go, may I say something that is a bit beside the point? I meant to have said it earlier and did not. It seems to me that it does not very much matter what political policy we adopt towards Germany; the really vital thing, more vital than I can say, is that we should try as far as we can to mitigate the wholesale horror that is there, the starvation, the rape, the spread of venereal disease, the spread of other diseases; what is really the destruction of a nation. And I think I should be willing to adopt any political device that will save people from the fear that Germany is again going to be powerful in the military sense, provided it is linked with food supplies, medical care, lorries. That is the important thing. I should acquiesce in any political arrangement to make them not dangerous, provided that the humanitarian task was dealt with from the point of view of ordinary decency so as to make me not ashamed to be alive. That is the thing we ought to do.

Dr. Joad: I agree. We should make a special point of that—of the actual human tragedy in Germany and the necessity in the immediate future of subordinating all measures to the relief of that, even if this means putting politics behind us, at any rate for the time being.

FUTURE OF THE CONSERVATIVE PARTY

HAMILTON KERR, *Tory Reform M.P. for Oldham (1931–1945)*

WHEN, on the morning of 26 July 1945, the Election returns began to be announced over the wireless, not even the victorious Socialist Party could credit its ears. As citadel after citadel fell to its advancing forces, it became obvious that many new allies must have swelled its ranks, and that only the most powerful Conservative fortresses would be able to resist capture.

The Conservative Party, in fact, had been driven on to its Bataan Peninsula, and even now many of its supporters do not seem to realise how much the political map has been changed. Many argue that it will only be necessary to wait until the blunders of the Socialist Party reveal themselves, and then lost ground will easily be recovered without much fighting. I do not share this view, and believe that—if it continues to find support—the Conservative Party will be pinned to its entrenchments for many years to come. Only if we grasp the lessons of 1945, only if we visualise the contours of the modern world taking shape around us, and master the technique of modern political warfare, shall we be able to move back from base to base until we once more command the battlefield.

Our first task is, therefore, to re-state our principles, and the second to translate them into modern political terms.

Let us examine these principles. Do the principles of Disraeli and Lord Randolph Churchill, the ideas propounded in *Sybil* and in *Tory Democracy*, carry the same conviction today as they did in the closing years of the last century? Or do we now place our trust in antique and outmoded conceptions?

When we look at the world around us, we find that we have been living for the last 150 years or so in the machine age. The Industrial Revolution, starting in Great Britain, then passing to the United States, and now exercising its influence in Russia and in the extreme Orient, has everywhere brought to mankind the same benefits and the same evils.

The living conditions of the average man and woman have been incomparably bettered; diseases have been conquered; life extended; elementary education widely diffused. On the other hand, no religious or moral genius has counterbalanced the advances in material welfare with an inspired code of human conduct. To study one's own interests, to get rich either by one's own efforts or more easily by the plunder of other people's wealth, to believe that material goods alone give happiness and security, has been the characteristic of many nations and many individuals. No Confucius in the East, no Francis of Assisi in the West, has counterbalanced the invention of jet propulsion or atomic power with a condemnation of selfishness, or an exhortation to find happiness in serving others. Thus human nature has been painted in dark and jarring colours.

Many modern political creeds share the view of Hobbes, that man is by nature 'nasty, mean and brutish', and that he can only be restrained from evil by a superior and absolute power. Here, then, we find the basis for Communist and Fascist dictatorships; here, then, we find the influence which Moscow exercises over the intelligentsia of Eastern Europe. Better—these men say—serve an autocratic and authoritarian state, than submit oneself to the anarchic materialism of the West.

Our modern Socialists, in less violent and more limited terms, proclaim the same outlook. 'Left understands Left,' said Mr. Bevin in a recent speech. But surely the proposed remedies are worse than the evils themselves? An ancient heresy is revived, and we find the same arguments employed to defend the divine right of the 'state' which Hobbes used to defend the Divine Right of Kings.

We as Conservatives, or anti-Socialists, or call us what you will, must inevitably hold different views. For centuries Europe, small in area and population, has dominated the world with its thought and invention, and more genius has been found within its territories than in the rest of the world since the beginning of time. To what cause do we owe this prodigious phenomenon?

Surely to the fact that the moral and intellectual climate of Europe has been more favourable to the individual than that of the other continents.

Two great rivers of thought, like beneficent Gulf Streams, have bathed its coasts. The source of one was in Judæa—the sublime doctrine of the New Testament. The other welled up among the marbles and sunlight of Greece. The marriage of the Christian 'Love God and Thy Neighbour' with the Greek 'Know Thyself', the unison of

'BALFOUR MUST GO!' *A long campaign was waged to drive him from the Conservative leadership*

'BALDWIN MUST GO!' *The same thing happened to him a few years later*

heart and brain, has been the most fertile and creative conjunction in all history. For observe particularly that both systems emphasise the value of the individual.

The state, however strong, however well-organised, however crushing its penalties, can never reform man; man alone can reform the state, and find not only happiness, but his highest form of expression, in his twin duties towards the state and his neighbour. Thus, the individual, even in a period of increasingly planned society, still remains the vital cell.

Without him the state cannot prosper, but he can only express himself within the four walls of the state.

If the social and economic trends of the twentieth century compel the state to evolve its long-term strategy, it is the individual—with his resource, his initiative, his creativeness—who must work out the tactics which serve that strategy. He is the Commander on the spot, free to act as he thinks fit. This point of view thus differs fundamentally from the Communist and Fascist, and to a lesser degree the Socialist, which seeks to invest all authority in the Commander-in-Chief, and makes his detailed and written orders binding, even on the most junior Corporal.

Surely, here is a creed which can unite all those who differ from the Socialist doctrine. What fundamental principle now separates Liberals from Conservatives? The names of parties can easily be changed, but do names really matter when principles are held in common? For, make no mistake, unless all anti-Socialist forces unite, the Socialist Party will bind its bonds upon us for the next half-century.

What, then, do these principles mean when translated into political terms?

1. The state evolves the national strategy in foreign affairs, in social and economic policy.

2. Within the limits of these directions, its citizens, not state servants, but capitalists both great and small, make their contribution from mine, mill, field and office, and receive the rewards of work and ability.

3. In this nation of capitalists, while the star runner is not handicapped, the last man home receives a fair share of the prize.

4. A nation, welded by a common purpose, by social justice, by work and comradeship, is virtually indestructible. It withstands the assaults of its external enemies and the Fifth Column activities of the class war.

We therefore do find that the principles of Disraeli and Randolph Churchill belong to the great traditions of European thought, and that the experience of twenty centuries has proved

their vitality. They belong to today, and tomorrow, as much as yesterday.

If we find that these principles still obtain conviction, our first task is to rally all anti-Socialist forces under their banner. Our second task is to express them in a policy.

It is no use, when in opposition, merely sniping at the Government, and exposing its errors: we must have an alternative plan. Unless we have a constructive policy to offer the people of this country, when the time comes for a change, they may easily turn in their perplexity to other alternatives, either to Communism or some form of Fascism.

I am now going to do an unorthodox thing. I know that a reader usually experiences a sense of anti-climax and disappointment when a writer, having stated first principles, alights from the stratosphere on to the solid earth of their daily application. But unless he does this, he lays himself open to the charge of being abstract and unpractical. So I proceed to the day-to-day application of these principles.

Now the main lesson, to my mind, of the 1945 Election, was the rich dividend paid to the Socialist party by its day-to-day propaganda. Throughout the entire war, in workshop, mine and street, the work never ceased. The other political parties, believing the political truce to be in existence, limited their activities, and the mind of the country was virtually decided before the first election posters caught the eye. Even the Socialist leaders, astounded by their victory, seemed to have underestimated the effect of this day-to-day propaganda. The floating vote, which appoints and dismisses governments, had been completely won over, and the Socialist ranks were swelled by professional men, service men and shopkeepers.

We must understand the implications of this new political 'total war' and organise our activities on a day-to-day basis. The rank and file of the party must not leave policy to committees in faraway London, but help to form it themselves. The men and women in town and countryside know the lives of their fellow citizens, their problems and their needs.

Thus in every constituency I would like to see committees formed to study topical questions such as Housing, Labour Problems, Health, Pensions, and their members drawn equally from the Local Association, the Women's and Junior Branches. Women can make invaluable contributions, particularly in housing and social policy, while the future belongs to the young men and women. Unless we interest them now, and invite their help, we shall have lost them for ever.

'CHURCHILL MUST GO!' *Progressive Conservatives think that the Party again needs a new leader.* 'BOB' HUDSON *(above) has been suggested. But he is also thought too 'Right-Wing'*

If I can use an Air Force simile: these local committees resemble the scattered Observer Corps posts which send their reports to Group Headquarters. At Group Headquarters, in this case the Area Political Headquarters, reports and observations are classified and analysed, and the information sent out to the central political operations room in London, where the main dispositions of the 'battle' are evolved, and appropriate instructions are sent to the areas. Every man, woman, boy and girl thus plays a part, masters a certain subject, can talk with authority to neighbours, and senses the excitement of a common effort. Believing, as we do, that we serve better principles than our Socialist opponents, we should not hesitate to copy their methods, where these are effective. The Conservative Party will not fight its way from its Bataan Peninsula unless it re-states its beliefs, evolves a constructive policy, rallies all anti-Socialist forces to its flag, learns from the methods of its adversaries, makes each one of its followers feel the impulse of a cause, and dedicate himself to hard, unremitting daily work.

If we examine the history of great individuals or movements, we find that they have not been immune from mistakes. What distinguishes them from their less successful rivals is the capacity to learn from those mistakes. Let us start our education this very instant.

A THOUSAND MILLION PEASANTS ARE AT OUR GATES!

GEORGE PÀLÒCZI-HORVÀTH, author of *In Darkest Hungary* (Gollancz)

A THOUSAND million backward rural people, nearly one half of mankind, is on the point of entering the 'civilised' community of the other half. The hundreds of million of peasants, landworkers and semi-nomads of the Eurasian continent, and the Colonial populations of the world, are on the road towards 'civilisation'. Whether this tremendous process will contribute —as it should and could—to *global full employment, to a new world-wide civilisation based on garden cities, electrification, decentralised industry and collective farming*, or to a chaotic period of famines, epidemics, revolts and wars, depends on many factors, one of which is a true understanding of the situation.

The inevitable 'coming of the thousand million peasants' is a long, and not at all integrated, process. The vanguard has arrived gradually during the last fifty years. About fifty million 'arrived' this year through the land reforms in Poland, Hungary and Roumania, and through the change of social structure in Yugoslavia. Nearly one quarter of the Chinese population, about 100 million from the northern provinces, are well on their way, while the rest of the rural masses of China, India, South-East Asia and the Colonial world are being *dislocated* now.

The last migration on the Eurasian continent was a migration on the map. The next period will see the great migration within human society. The agrarian population of the world is pushed and pulled by inevitable processes, and at the same time has a growing desire and determination to move. What are the 'pulling and pushing' forces? Where do the 'peasants' want to move? What will be the effect of this migration on our civilisation? Who are 'we' and who are 'they'?

Starting with the last question: Who are the 'peasants'?—although 'civilised city people' know about the differences between the American farmer and the Chinese coolie, the French *rentier*-peasant, the Eastern European *kulak*, and the Egyptian fellah, nevertheless 'we' are in the habit of looking at 'them' as the jovial, trustworthy, hardworking, a bit backward, but still salt-of-the-earth, peasants. 'We' live in morally and physically dirty cities. 'They' live in clean villages. They are near to the decent good-natured Mother Earth, near to kind nature, while we have to put up with drab streets, glaring electric lights and 'evil' machines. 'We' think that land reforms should break up the remaining big estates of the world and produce millions of independent farms. 'We' also seem to believe that, by giving land to a landless rural labourer, we change him into such an all-round genius and expert as we assume the independent farmer-peasant to be—that is, a combined genius and expert in agricultural chemistry, weather-forecasting, livestock-biology, general zoology and botanics. But as the farmer-peasant is also a business man, we assume that, somehow, rather by divine miracle, the ownership of a piece of land does not only produce overnight geniuses in all the agricultural sciences, but also makes this idyllic farmer-peasant a wizard in finance, commerce, in accountancy and transportation problems. 'We' also seem to believe that millions of such competing small farmers (again by miracle) will produce the right kind of food in quality and quantity for all humanity.

Though this caricature is rather extremistic, it indicates the general attitude of Western city people towards the agricultural problems of the world. Needless to say that 'Mother Earth' and 'Nature' are anything but kind; that well-built roads, 'evil' machines and electrification are human achievements with which the 'peasants' would gladly put up.

A somewhat more realistic generalisation differentiates between the landless landworkers and the capitalist-peasants, between the American farmers and the migrating rural labourers, between the *mujhiks* and *kulaks* of Russia, between the dwarf-holders and the coolies of China. According to this generalisation, the word 'peasant' is used as a derogatory label for the stupid and mean village 'capitalist' who is very close-fisted (*kulak* in Russian means: fist; second meaning: village usurer) and does not care for the land any more, only the money profit. This *kulak* carries on the tradition of the Western country squire, or the *pomestnoe dvoryanstvo* (landed gentry) of Russia. Both of these cared only for money profit, and sabotaged the

Peasants. *The Hungarians still take pride in their beautiful national costumes, though they are beginning to yearn for the joys of the town*

development of world agriculture when they discovered in the sixteenth century that 'the serf is shorn also by the King and State, while the sheep is shorn only by the owner', and as a result transformed arable land into pasture, and drove their tenant-serfs into the wilderness of '*lumpen-proletariat*'. (It is one of the great *ifs* of history, how our modern world would have developed *if* arable land, an independent peasantry and a producing tenantry had not been destroyed during the age of enclosures before the Industrial Revolution. *If* the new industries had found less 'surplus workers' and more internal markets. *If*, consequently, industrial and agricultural development had progressed more evenly. *If* the great industrialists had been forced many decades later either to create unemployment and poverty at home, or go out and fight for external markets.)

The thousand million 'peasants' of 1945 cannot be divided and labelled only as 'bad, reactionary *kulaks*', and 'good, progressive landworkers'. In one-sixth of the globe, in the Soviet Union, the *kulaks* and the *bednyak* (village proletarian) disappeared into collective agriculture. In other places the number of small and medium-sized, simple family-peasant-holdings decreased greatly, to give way to finance-capital-owned big estates (U.S.A.), or to such big farmers who took up the country squire way of life, while on the Eurasian continent outside the Soviet Union a similar disappearance of the small medium holders occurred. In the ten years between 1930 and 1940, two-thirds of Lower Burma's peasant proprietors became landless landworkers. Hitler in Germany, and later in Axis Europe, deliberately set out to destroy the small holdings, in order to drive the agrarian masses into his war factories

In China one-wheeled transport is still much in evidence

and armies. In Germany alone nearly half a million independent small farmers lost their holdings between 1933–1941. In East Asia the war dislocated most of the small holders. A great number of landworkers in Eurasia fought in the regular and partisan armies. Of the still ten million displaced persons of liberated Europe, the majority are likewise landworkers.

So, one of the effects of the war, and the pre-war period, was the great decrease of the *kulak*-peasants, and increase of landless landworkers. For many centuries the landworkers wanted to become peasants themselves. They craved basic security, which only a little house of their own could provide, with the small surrounding piece of land, where they could produce the prime necessities for their families. In the twentieth century new landworker movements appeared everywhere. While some members of the intelligentsia in Europe and Asia started 'to go to the country' or 'to explore the village', like the last century Russian *narodniki* (romantic agrarian socialists or supporters from above), the landworkers produced their own landworker-born leaders, writers and scientists. The reports given by the village-exploring intellectuals and the authentic landworker-leaders indicated the same —very natural—tendency, both in Europe and Asia: the 'peasant' is not satisfied with the famous 'peasant-way-of-life' idealised and romanticised in the cities! The agrarian population of the world does *not* admire or crave the non-existent idyllic village existence. They want to have the *good things in life*. And by good things they mean the achievements of technical civilisation, machines, electricity, schools, hospitals, theatres and sports grounds. The young Chinese landworkers who, according to Hogg and others, want to become 'functional men' (their own expression), and want to see the 'village

Roumanian peasants of Tirgovisht, in a cart still typical of the Balkans

backwardness' disappear, express the same idea as the Hungarian peasant leader, Imre Kovács, who dreamt about a future when industrial and landworkers would change into dinner jackets for concerts and theatres.

The fact is that the rural people, even before this war, demanded their share of 'civilisation'. They want to see their countryside *urbanised*. They want to wear the same clothes, read the same newspapers, listen to the same broadcasts and be cured by the same medicines, as their city brethren. *They know that 'the peasant way of life' is bad, unhealthy, backward and inefficient.* All their vague cravings and clearly-formulated demands, all over the world, point in one direction. This happens to be the only direction in which humanity has to move if it wants to avoid catastrophe. On this direction all realists of the economic, sociological, and agricultural sciences agree: the direction towards planned economy, a world of decentralised industries, garden cities, a world of electrification and co-operative or collective farming.

Just as the romantic-happy villager exists only in the imagination of some city people, so does the dread of the landworkers for collective farming. In Spain, Poland, Hungary and China, official propaganda warned the landworkers for decades against the horrors of collective farming. It was pointed out that collective farming is bad for national economy, and makes the peasants into slaves; that on the huge collective farms the peasants lose ambition, work badly, produce less. The landworkers had enough common sense to see that, according to this argument, planned agriculture on a big estate is good for national economy if the estate is owned by an individual landlord, and very bad if it is a collective farm. The peasants lose ambition if they are co-owners of the estate, but work enthusiastically for a landlord! And besides, in our ideologically muscle-bound age, many Westerners disregard the fact that *co-operative and collective agriculture existed before the Russian Revolution;* that the *artels* (co-operative guilds), the *obshchinniki* (members of the land commune) have a centuries-old history in Russia, and that under the most 'reactionary' Czarist rule a lot of work was done *collectively* by the whole village (*mir*). They also disregard the existence of millionaires among the Soviet collective farmers. There are millionaires because the *kolhoz*-system builds a lot on the deeply-rooted instinct for individual possession. Each member of a collective farm, or *artel*, has his own house, his own land (which is between one half a hectare and one hectare, and he has his own 'private' livestock and poultry. As a member of the collective farm, he gets his share (roughly about one-third of the total output is divided up; from the two-thirds the tax and the milling is paid; some goes into the fund for seed and into the educational fund). In 1942 the collective farmers of the Soviet Union had nearly twice as many cattle, pigs and poultry in *private possession*, as all the collective farms.

Apart from the obvious economic factors, from the spread of literacy and from the general political trend towards the elevation of the common man, the war caused such a situation, both in Europe and Asia, that governments and occupying powers were compelled to do *something about agriculture*. The general form of the problem is the same in Europe and China. There is an urgent need for food; cities are in ruins; great strips of land are left without owners and cultivators; millions of the agrarian population are leaving the armies; other millions of 'displaced' rural people are wanting to work; there is a serious decrease of livestock, and there exists a very great need for the replacement of huge masses of destroyed agricultural implements.

While plans are being made for the rebuilding of the big cities, necessity compels all concerned to use some of the less destroyed smaller cities, thereby restoring some of the balance between town and country. *Instead of big cities suffering from urban elephantiasis, city-civilisation will have to be more evenly distributed over the countryside.* The same forced decentralisation of industry will make the co-ordination of industry and agriculture easier, and will make it possible for the politically more active industrial labour to give political and educational help to the landworkers.

Land reforms are likewise dictated by reality. The majority of great landowners in Europe and Asia were 'collaborators'! A great number of their estates, and millions of former medium and

small holdings, are left without owners. These lands must produce food as soon as possible. There must be some centralised planning to tackle this tremendous task. The livestock resources of the Eurasian continent were, and still are, enormously decreased. Europe lost roughly sixty per cent of its livestock (this is based on the more optimistic reports). The situation in East Asia is no better, and we do not know the extent of destruction caused by the last phase of the Japanese war. (Most of the destruction in Europe was caused during the six months preceding VE-Day.) It is obvious that the restarting of cultivation and livestock production must be a scientifically planned and a nationally (if not continentally) co-ordinated effort. This task cannot be left to the mercy of millions of competing estates and farms, managed by agriculturally-uneducated or half-educated peasants and landowners.

In Yugoslavia, Hungary, Poland and Roumania, the land reforms are in various stages of completion, and the governments try to deal with the emergency situation by educating the agricultural workers as work goes on. Agricultural secondary schools and colleges, with many specialised departments, have been, or will be, started. The situation in Germany and Austria will compel the occupying powers to take similar measures.

In Northern China 100 million Chinese have on the average two to eight years' experience of co-ordinated industrial and agricultural co-operatives. The Northern Chinese *Indusco* was, and still is, the greatest educational factor for the Chinese partisan-peasants. Here the emergency situation, caused by the tremendous hardships of partisan-warfare, compelled a hundred million people to take part in one of the biggest industrial-agricultural laboratory experiments of history. The success of the experiment was proved by the fact that these hundred million people, almost completely isolated, without outside help, waged war for many years against the Japanese armies, which could never beat them.

The 'peasants', whether they were smallholders, landworkers, coolies or colonial natives, played an admirable rôle during the 'Fascist period'. The original partisan-peasants of Manchuria started their fight against the Japanese invaders long before the 'proper' China war started. Then the rural masses of China, Abyssinia, Spain, Poland, Yugoslavia, the Soviet Union, France, Italy, Burma, Malaya, and the Phippines took a hitherto not sufficiently recognised part in the resistance fight against their Fascist oppressors and enemies.

The appearance of the partisan-peasant on the world-scene indicates that in the present situation the awakening rural masses, perhaps for the first time in history, have, or are going to have, some political power. If they form alliances with industrial labour (as in most cases they do) led and helped by the workers, they will play a great rôle in the political scene.

The Ruthenians, the most 'backward' people of Europe, were part of Czechoslovakia. Have just been taken by Russia

The 'peasants' of Africa, India, Burma, Malaya, Ceylon, Java, etc. are also *Colonial natives,* but they, too, are on the move. Even the colour prejudice of the white world is slowly breaking down. A *yellow* people, the Chinese, emerge from this war as an adult world-power and one of the Big Four. There are territories in various parts of the world where the *pigmentocracy* of the *pukka sahibs* is rapidly disappearing. But there are also territories, chiefly in Africa, where scientific planning and region-wide, co-ordinated effort transformed backward-semi-nomadic populations into communities well on the way towards modern co-operative agriculture. The Gezirah scheme in the Sudan showed that an irrigation-project, if fitted into the framework of a large-scale economic and agricultural enterprise, can produce a surprisingly efficient co-operative farmer class from the backward Sudanese natives. This British scheme was often called the Tennessee Valley Authority of Africa. The natives of Kenya and Uganda learnt from experience that the 'British' can be a real blessing, if they are agricultural, forestry and live stock experts of the Colonial Service as in Uganda, and a curse if they are settlers believing in catch-as-catch-can private enterprise as in Kenya, who not only hurt the interest of the country and that of the natives, but in doing so, hurt their own interests too. The often-mentioned Kenya-Uganda antipole is just a further proof that co-ordinated effort, based on scientific planning, is the only road forward.

In many territories of the Colonial world it is realised that there is an identity of real interest between the whites and the 'natives'. In some places, where the dead hand of the past is still operating (the Union of South Africa, Ceylon, Burma, etc.), there are influential groups who share Professor Frankel of Witwatersrand University's view. He said about South Africa, 'Either we will be prepared to divert resources to, and to open wide the gates for, the full economic development of our backward peoples or, far from assuming the leading rôle in the development of Africa, we shall remain cursed with the poverty of our own deliberate creation—achieving fame as the surviving representatives of an economic epoch that elsewhere has passed away.' (Quoted by Alexander Campbell in his excellent book, *It's Your Empire.*)

The fact remains that in parts of Africa and Asia the native 'peasantry' is on the point of entering our civilisation. The examples of the Soviet East, of the Sudan and Uganda solutions, of the Histraduth in Palestine, and the Tennessee Valley Authority, could not be ignored, even if scores of historical and economic processes were not taking the same direction.

Among the factors 'pushing and pulling' the rural masses, the present situation of world-industry is an important one. World-agriculture needs 'motorisation' and electrification. It needs millions of agricultural implements and machines, and gigantic masses of other industrial products. A thousand million people could be new consumers for the textile, shoe, and scores of other industries. And during the war the number of people in the world employed in industry was nearly doubled. New factories were built by the ten thousand in the Americas, in India, Australia and Africa. The industrial workers and employers, and the industrial countries as a whole, *need the thousand million brand new consumers very badly.*

In the United States a public debate is going on about whether there will be ten or twenty million unemployed next year. Should there be twenty million unemployed in the States, and God only knows how many more millions in other countries, when three continents need construction and reconstruction, when a thousand million people need motorisation of agriculture, urbanisation of the countryside, and electrification of their territories? Half of mankind needs, and wants, things which it never had before. And this half of mankind (all the agricultural experts have been repeating for decades) *could easily produce enough food for three times as many people as inhabit the globe now.*

Both the industrial and agricultural capacity is at hand *now*; industrial technique and agricultural science is at hand. The problem could be solved within the scope of a ten-year plan—*if we could look upon the globe as a human household which needs proper reorganisation.* The factual situation should cause unbounded optimism. And there is instead fear of want, fear of chaos and insecurity, fear of epidemics, famines and future wars. This situation is a good illustration of Steele's statement: 'Unity is simpler than fraction. Partitions are elaborations. The problem of mankind, considered as a whole, is a thousand times clearer than the problem of any partial community, any creed, tribe, nation or empire whatsoever.' (W. B. Steele: *The Anatomy of Frustration.*)

Though co-ordinated world-planning seems to be an unusual dream (in spite of the demonstration of the atomic bomb of the crying need for world-government), concrete reality makes the accomplishment of some of the tasks ahead *unavoidable.* Whatever we do, the thousand million peasants are at our gates! Some of them have already entered our civilisation. Others will enter it within the next decade. Their entrance will bring greater changes than the Industrial Revolution of the last century, the effect of which caused Ortega Y. Gasset to write his famous book on 'the appearance of the masses'. Greater masses are appearing on the scene than the roughly two hundred million industrial workers who were pushed within the outer bastions of Western civilisation during the last century.

How will civilisation change them, and how will they change civilisation? These new masses want education. Their instinctive desire to be *led out* of their backward, illiterate, unhealthy existence is a good reminder that *education* should not be *stuffing in* but *leading out.* The Western world has forgotten the original meaning of the word ('e-ducere': to lead out).

In what direction is the civilised other half able to lead the thousand million newcomers?

This question also reminds us that we live at the beginning of the global period, a period of human interdependence; when all the great questions of economics, industry, agriculture, education and public health are inter-related and inter-dependent. The thousand million newcomers speed us on. The impact of their appearance will force us to put our global household in order. The forces of reaction, stupidity and muddle are heavily outnumbered. So, from a general human standpoint, the news that 'a thousand million peasants are at our gates' is good news!

ZEST OR APATHY?

A PSYCHOLOGICAL INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE OF INCENTIVE

EDWARD GLOVER

THOSE whose memories can stretch to the beginning of this century may recall that it was then scarcely possible to discuss the nature of incentive without arousing perturbation in the minds of political extremists. Although at that time Socialism had not yet passed from its propagandist phase to the exercise of power as a small political minority, vigorous debates between Socialist and anti-Socialist societies were the order of the day. On these occasions one could listen to acrimonious discussion of the very issue which Herbert Read has now revived in a less inflammable form: namely, what form of society can, by promoting incentive or zest of living, further the development of culture without restricting the material benefits that can be provided by an organised community. That it is now possible to discuss this issue, without too much concern for the sensitiveness of political Lefts and Rights, is due in large part to the social impact of two world wars. In the second of these, waged ostensibly to destroy the Nazi system, democratic countries have found themselves compelled to accept with a reasonably good grace doses of totalitarian state-control that would once have warmed the heart of the Social Democratic Federation or turned the stomach of the Primrose League. No doubt, left to themselves, politicians could easily revive their old and passionate war-cries. But it is to be hoped that they will not be left to themselves. Feeble as may be the political authority of psychology and sociology, their scientific aims are more in keeping with the temper of a peace-seeking but inarticulate, not to say disillusioned, electorate than the ding-dong exchanges of the political arena. At least no harm can come from trying to apply the techniques of these comparatively young sciences to the problem.

Now what exactly is Herbert Read's argument? It is briefly this: societies, like human beings, have a cycle of life. In their journey from life to death, they alternate between zest and apathy. Zest in life is marked by adventure, expression and creative activity in the arts. A good live culture itself depends on spontaneity, variety and freedom. Material security, on the other hand, may lead to satiety, boredom, apathy and, ultimately, decadence. If security causes satiety, it will destroy incentive and the will to live. So we need some principle of strife and rivalry, some peacetime substitute for war which will give the *tone* of war without destroying the natural principle of co-operation by virtue of which societies cohere. Herbert Read says perhaps this vital tone is to be found in the pursuit of cultural aims. Can, he then asks, cultural spontaneity, which depends on the free circulation of ideas, images and forms, be obtained under a democratic system? Being dependent on majority rule a democratic system *may*, by giving priority to the aim of material security, stultify culture which, he thinks, is often instigated by a minority. If so, what form of society should we seek to create?

WHAT IS INCENTIVE?

Anyhow it is clear that we cannot get very far with this quest until we have discussed the nature of incentive, and whoever talks of incentive is, whether he knows it or not, talking dynamic psychology. The time is long past when we can rest content with vaguely defined biological postulates such as the 'life-force' or the *élan vital*. If we are to understand mental function—and what else is social activity but a function of mind?—we must use psychological concepts of energy. I propose, therefore, to start with a psychoanalytical postulate, namely, that incentive, whether subjectively experienced or merely inferred from the behaviour of individuals and of groups, is a derivative of instinct or, more accurately, of ungratified instinct. Instinct, in the Freudian sense, is a basic concept. Derived ultimately from bodily sources, instinct energy is a stimulus to the mind that ceases only with death. Acting on and through the mental apparatus, it gives rise to those end-products of mental



When life was fun!

The Wedding Dance—by Brueghel. In those days of social unity the whole business of living was fun—in an integrated society which was full of vitality and zest. What has happened today?

activity which are recognised in consciousness as feeling, thought and action (or behaviour).[1] Admittedly these end-products vary enormously in complexity. The *feeling*-incentive to eat, i.e. the appetite for food, is a derivative of instinct: the *thought* that one would make an excellent Prime Minister is a derivative of instinct, and can provide an incentive to becoming a Parliamentary candidate; the manufacture and despatch of a rocket-bomb is a derivative of instinct, and can express in *action* a dictator's desire to gratify (incentive to gain) power over others.

The definition of incentive in terms of instinctual desire may sound strange to those accustomed to regard it simply as an external inducement, a sort of environmental bribe or decoy. They may feel, for example, that if appetite can be whetted by the smell of roast turkey, this savoury odour should be defined as an incentive to eat. In which case we are at a loss to explain why the same odour may produce no effect on, or actively stimulate repugnance in the mind of a vegetarian; or, for that matter, why we are prepared to drink unappetising aperitifs in order to produce appetite. The case of the sufferer from melancholia, who may refuse food altogether, also goes to show that incentive is a subjective factor. The difficulty can be resolved if we remember that the *aim* of any instinct, i.e. the desire to secure gratification, exists whether the *object* on which it is gratified is recognised or not. No doubt a suitable object provides more complete gratification and is, for this reason, more highly valued than an unsuitable one. A perfect love object gratifies the heart's desire more than an imperfect one. In that more limited sense the object of an instinct may be said to act as an incentive. But the real dynamic *urge* still comes from within, viz., to secure gratification and avoid frustration of instinct.

[1] I am well aware that the validity of this concept may be, indeed is, already challenged by other schools of psychology, but I am concerned here not to argue the evidence for the Freudian concept, rather to see how far its application to social problems throws any light on their admitted complexities.

An Early Belsen
Victorious death—Brueghel's comment on the horrors of man's inhumanity to man

Fortunately for the psychologist, the instincts giving rise to incentive are not so numerous as their end-products. Some observers have postulated as many as a hundred. But when, for example, they talk of an 'instinct for fishing', it is clear that they are using the term in a popular, rather than a scientific, sense. In Freudian theory the *primary* instincts are reduced to two forms—the instincts of love (using the term in a very wide sense) and the aggressive instincts. Even the instincts of self-preservation have come to be regarded by the Freudian as a variety of the primary love-instincts. It is certainly significant that, when the mental disorders of mankind are analysed to their deepest level, they are found to be due to conflicts over one or other of these primary instincts. And since the aim of all instincts is gratification, it follows that incentive is capable of a fundamental division in terms of love and aggression, in other words, of *creation* and *destruction* respectively. Strictly speaking, the 'zest of life' includes both varieties of incentive, although the term is commonly limited to the incitements (desires for gratification) associated with the love-instincts and their derivatives.

INCENTIVE AND CONSCIOUSNESS

Another, and in its way equally important, division of incentive is in terms of its *relation to consciousness*. The fact that by far the largest part of our instinctual life is unconscious (and so under ordinary conditions inaccessible), and that the feelings, thoughts and actions with which we are familiar in everyday life are the *end*-products of *highly modified* instincts, compels us to distinguish between conscious and unconscious incentive. Not only so, it compels us to suspend udgment (valuation) of conscious incentive until we know, in any given case, how much unconscious incentive has contributed to, or subtracted from, the conscious motive. An over-conscientious person, for example, passionately dedicated to the abolition of all abuses, may be incited to action by an unresolved sense of unconscious guilt. As for a distinction between *individual* incentive and *group* incentive, a distinction which many social psychologists base on the postulate of a group—or herd-instinct, the psycho-analyst takes the view that group structure is an extension of the structure of the individual mind calling for no addition to the list of

primary individual instincts. The fact that there is an apparent opposition between some individual motivations and some of the codes enforced by the group does not call for the postulation of a distinct group-instinct. Opposition between the primary instincts is characteristic also of individual life. Indeed, the formation of groups depends on such individual conflicts. Group structure and function could not have developed beyond the stage observed amongst the apes if man had not, as the result of characteristically personal problems, developed a *group faculty or institution* in his mind and, both wittingly and unwittingly, fostered its development in his offspring.

Now it may be argued that all this is of little practical importance; that if we were to base our social policies on such bare generalisations, we would end by making every mistake under the sun. To which I would reply that we already make every mistake under the sun simply because we neglect to base our social policies on fundamental understanding of the nature of man. We may not indeed, by taking thought, do better than our forbears but, looking back over the past thirty years, it is easy to see that we can scarcely do worse. Fortified by this conviction, we may return to the consideration of incentive order to establish the significance of an apparently *antithetical relation* between the respective aims of the love (or in a special sense the life) instincts and the instincts of aggression (which Freud regarded as in theory representative of what he called the death-instinct). And to anticipate one of the relevant conclusions, it may be said here and now that *the eternal problem with which man is faced, the problem that lies behind all other problems, both individual and social, is how to distribute these antithetical instincts in such a way that the creative impulses will exercise a decisive mastery over the impulses to destruction.*[1]

LOVE AND AGGRESSION

Of the many ways of approaching this problem, two are of particular value: to observe what modifications these primary impulses undergo from birth onwards, and to study the disorders to which they give rise in adults and in adult groups. In both cases the evidence points in the same direction, namely, that, owing to the peculiar conditions of psychological domestication experienced by the child from birth to puberty, the antithetical instincts of love and of aggression run throughout life in a permanent and close association. The nature of this association varies. For example, hate and love for one object may exist simultaneously, or they may run in alternation. More important, however, is the fact that the two instincts may become so intimately commingled as to form what is called technically a *fusion*. Biologically regarded, this fusion has some survival value for the adult: it provides in a convenient form the combination of aggressiveness and sexual urge necessary for reproduction. But it also constitutes the chief obstacle to the expansion of reason and to cultural development. The evidence of mental pathology is definite on the point. From whatever angle we approach the mental disorders, we arrive always at the same conclusion: that the mind is more readily injured by unmastered charges of unconscious sadism (as the fusion of sexual and aggressive impulse is termed) than by the most desperate strains that may arise in everyday life. *By far the largest part of mental activity is secretly devoted to establishing an effective compromise between the love impulses and the impulses of aggression.*

It would take us too far afield to describe by what unconscious means this *modus vivendi* is established. The familiar (but often incorrectly used) term *sublimation*, for example, denotes an unconscious mechanism that helps to preserve balance of mind by actually de-sexualising those primitive sexual impulses which, if left in a state of active frustration, would set up dangerous charges of aggression. This de-sexualised energy can then be diverted to increase the strength of impulses which have received the sanction of the unconscious ego. Primitive sexual curiosity can by this devious route end by augmenting our interest in social research. Again, the term *reaction-formation* refers to an unconscious mental process whereby social reactions are consolidated and erected as a kind of mental barrier to prevent the break-through of unconscious aggressive impulses. The over-solicitousness of young children regarding the health of their parents, for example, serves to stem any uprush of family hostility. These, and many other mechanisms too complicated to describe here, play an important part in building up our cultural ideals. But what is of more importance, they indicate that there is yet another way of classifying incentive. Incentive can be either *positive*, where the instinct concerned is not modified, or *reactive*, where another instinct having an antithetical aim is called in to modify or defend against a tabooed impulse. Thus the incentive to reform may be the desire to gratify a positive love impulse by

[1]The reason why this problem is so hard to solve is, nevertheless, comparatively easy to indicate. The desire for power and mastery is largely derived from the aggressive instincts. Love itself is compelled to borrow a quantum of energy from the aggressive instincts in order to establish its own power. Before love can master aggression, it must be able to filch from aggression one of the main aims of aggression, namely, mastery! Love must, therefore, learn how to disarm aggression: no easy task.

seeking for perfect order, or it may be the desire to obtain peace of mind by blotting out any subjective impulse to induce disorder, in which case it is an incentive of a reactive type.

THE GRIT IN THE MACHINERY

All this may appear to be mere armchair psychology, yet its bearing on the problems of cultural development, social organisation, social and individual ideals, and finally on the conversion of ideals into action is of the utmost importance. The greatest mistake we can possibly make is to regard all incentive as a 'natural' drive or urge or incitement or inducement or motive, as something merely positive, that can be encouraged or discouraged according to taste. Our most important cultural incentives are as much reactive as they are positive. Indeed, if we can but realise that a great deal of our cultural incentive is the result of early conflict over tabooed impulses, we hold the key to one of the problems that have baffled social reformers of all times. The ardent social reformer is often hurt as well as puzzled by the fact that his most rational schemes fall on stony ground, that between good intentions and their achievement lies too often an apparently fathomless gulf. This disconcerting observation is capable of a quite simple explanation in psycho-analytical terms. Apparent absence of incentive is due not to *lack* of incentive but to the fact that the urge to action can be paralysed by unsolved conflicts. Behind the apparent lack of drive there exists a strenuous and energy-consuming conflict between the antithetical claims of love and aggression. *If we would understand lack of incentive, we must grasp the fact that it is for the most part a sign of internal disorder.* The mental machine has been slowed down and may even refuse to function because, to put it quite simply, there is grit in the machinery.

Having committed ourselves to the view that lack of incentives is for the most part a disorder, a disturbance of the normal function of instinct, the next step is to examine more carefully the concept of disorder.[1] For most practical purposes mental disorders can be divided into two groups —the obvious and the unobtrusive. One of the most obvious varieties is that form of schizophrenia or 'precocious dementia' in which the individual exhibits a marked degree of mental and physical retardation. He may remain for prolonged periods in a catalepsy or stupor apparently showing no interest in life whatsoever. It would seem that he has completely lost both zest and incentive. In another group of disorders—the melancholias—mental retardation is also a striking feature but it is frequently associated with an unusual form of zest—the zest of death. Attempts at suicide are not uncommon. Apart from these disorders of individuals, there are certain group disorders which are also extremely obvious, as witness the well-authenticated waves of suicide occurring in communities where ritual suicide is not recognised. By way of contrast, the unobtrusive disorders bear such a close resemblance to 'normal' forms of human behaviour that they are often ignored even by experienced physicians. Amongst them we can distinguish diminutions of interest, emotional feeling or sense of reality, diminution of powers of concentration, of mental and physical capacity, of what is popularly called mental stamina and so on. If any one individual were to present *all* of these features he would pass into the group of the 'obviously' disordered, but should he present only one particular form of inhibition, he runs the risk of being called lazy or callous, spineless or scatter-brained, slow-witted or good-for-nothing by those more active persons who are quick to censure deviations from their own accepted norms. Now, examination of these unobtrusive disorders shows not only that they are due to the same varieties of unconscious conflict as are to be found in the obvious neuroses and psychoses but that, given favourable circumstances, they can be cured by appropriate psycho-therapeutic means. The grit can be removed from the machine. The same applies to many forms of disorder that are not recognised because society approves of them on moral or social grounds. Many sexual inhibitions come under this heading. Based on secret and essentially superstitious 'avoidances', they are often readily amenable to psychological treatment.

Here we reach the crux of the argument about incentive. If on the one hand mental disorders, however unobtrusive, can be traced to unconscious conflicts, and if even in the unconscious of so-called normal persons there is present latent conflict between love and hate that may be activated under conditions of undue stress, it seems reasonable to suppose that *the apathy of which social reformers complain is due to the fact that an excessive amount of mental energy has to be spent in preventing the irruption of conflict into consciousness.* There is a good deal of evidence to show that the frictions which prevent smooth social functioning, the inertia and lack of incentive that impede social progress, the emotional resistances or negativisms that paralyse

[1]Space does not permit a collateral examination of the concept of normality. I have therefore been compelled to restrict my extension of the term disorder to such instances as do not prejudice existing definitions of normality.

the application of reason to human affairs, are due to the fact that man has not yet mastered the art of liquidating his inner aggression, and that an unliquidated surplus filters through to damage (however unobtrusively) his efficiency, his imagination and his reason. Even when he does succeed in controlling his unconscious aggression, he may have to pay a stiff price in depleted creative energies. These, at any rate, are the conclusions that force themselves on the psycho-analytical observer.

DOES SECURITY BRING DECAY?

Armed with these formulations, we can now return to Herbert Read's main preoccupation. In his opinion social security alone, if we achieve it, may prove detrimental to both individual and group; to promote zest of life man requires the stimulus of competition and rivalry. Cultural pursuits may provide this stimulus without any risk of loosening destruction. In an earlier article I argued, on the contrary, that the stress of insecurity interferes with cultural output (itself a variety of sublimation), but I did not go so far as to say that material security *never* diminishes cultural incentive. In favour of the view that it does reduce incentive, Read quoted the case of those mediæval monks who, owing to the stagnant conditions of monastic life, developed a strange disease of the will; and he suggests that something of this sort also happens in those societies which, after reaching through adventure to security, begin to perish of spiritual inanition. Now these are stimulating speculations. It would be quite in accord with psycho-analytic thinking to suppose that excess of destructive forces either in the individual or the group would tend to promote disintegration and decay. But it must be confessed that, although pre-analytical interpretations of group-history are now in the melting-pot, as yet no adequate psycho-analytical researches on this subject have been carried out. In the meanwhile, therefore, we must treat such generalisations with the utmost reserve. Even in the case of the mediæval monks it seems more likely that the disease of the will was not so much the result of security of life in the monastery as a sign of antecedent disorder already hinted at in the choice of monastic life. In mediæval times many states of mind that we would now regard as neurotic in type, e.g., states of 'possession' were, according to the social and religious standards of the period, rated as normal and often as laudable. In any case, man has survived and flourished under domestication. Had comparative security spelled extinction to prehistoric man, we would not be here to record the discovery.

THE BUGBEAR OF ANXIETY

All this can be summed up by saying that, *before we attribute deterioration or absence of incentive to the factor of material security, we must first exclude internal causes of such deficiencies and in particular the existence of a faulty balance between the unconscious forces of love and of aggression.* This is by no means a pessimistic conclusion. Although these faulty balances lie in the unconscious mind and are therefore ordinarily incapable of direct influence, they are capable of indirect influence. It is well established that reactions of hate and aggressiveness are readily increased by anxiety; also that if we can reduce the strains that cause anxiety, we can thereby reduce both conscious and unconscious reactions of hate and aggression. It follows, then, that one of the main tests of a healthy society is the degree to which its educative and material organisation succeeds in reducing the anxieties (both realistic and irrational) of its citizens. But it cannot be too often emphasised that, whereas real anxieties can be relieved at any period of life, irrational anxieties can be effectively modified only during childhood and in particular during early childhood. Anxieties, like culture, incubate in infancy and are most accessible to influence during that period.

Obviously this problem is one to be dealt with by the combined efforts of nursery and educational psychologists. (I understand that articles on these subjects will follow in this series.) But we must be quite sure that, in seeking their assistance, we do not pass from the rule of King Log to that of King Stork. The issues at stake are not simply those of scientific regulation of upbringing: they touch very closely on human liberty. It is too little recognised that both upbringing and education are tendentious processes. It is a mistake to assume that they are concerned solely with drawing out and adding to the original capacities of the individual. On the contrary, deriving their authority from group interests, our modern pedagogues repay their masters by exercising illegitimate, as well as legitimate, pressure on the individual to make him conform to existing social codes. In so doing they not only damage the capacities of the individual but damp down his incentive. The worship of efficiency, for example, may be good business, but it is bad psychology. Already we are threatened by our industrial bosses, whether private capitalists or state bureaucrats, with the application of techniques of occupational selection. On the twin plea of efficiency and of finding suitable vocations, both public and private authorities are about to arrogate to themselves

The family must be the foundation

La Charité—by Cranach. The family is the basic group, and the psychological domestication of the child gives the deep mental background to the adult throughout life. 'Only in the formative period of family life can mental conflicts be readily resolved'

the power of blocking choice of occupation. Not only does this constitute a flagrant breach of the liberties of the subject; it assumes that our existing social patterns and needs have the authority of absolute value, which is tantamount to saying they have divine sanction.

THERE ARE DIFFERENT INCENTIVES

Here we touch upon the last of the main approaches to the problem, namely the *comparative* (individual and social) *value* of different varieties of incentive. We have already discussed at length the incentive value of material security and comfort: but what shall we say of other values—of rank, wealth, knowledge or artistic creation? How shall we classify incentives, and in what order of cultural value shall we place them? Holding fast to our basic definition, viz., that incentive is a subjective expression of the need to secure gratification of instinct, it is not hard to classify special varieties of the zest of life. We have only to trace each form of incentive back to the particular component of instinct from which it is derived. And if we wish to take a rough measure of its human value, we have only to ask what part gratification of that particular component of instinct plays in bringing about a harmonious adaptation to life. This estimate can then be checked by observing how far the gratification of the particular urge interferes with the harmonious adaptation to life of other individuals or groups.

Following this line of approach, we soon rediscover the truth of the adage: the nearer the bone, the sweeter the meat. Provided an instinct does not arouse too much unconscious conflict; provided, that is to say, it conforms to the requirements of the ego, the more primitive it is, the more powerful the incentive to action. Consider, for example, the powerful incentive to acquire riches and the equally vigorous drive to acquire rank. Both originate in early childhood. The desire to amass and retain wealth and property, implicit during the sucking phase, becomes increasingly explicit long before the child is able to put a penny in its pocket. The desire for rank, implicit in the suckling's desire to be the sole claimant to the mother's pleasure resources, takes definite form from the time the child experiences the first pangs of family rivalry. When the more primitive expressions of these desires have been toned down to an

appropriate social level, the child is equipped with incentive which, however disguised as love of property or rank, can provide a fixed lodestar throughout life. By comparison, the more ethereal joys of acquiring knowledge and the spiritual satisfactions of artistic creation are usually but feeble and intermittent instigators of action.

As to the comparative value of these and other incentives, this can be usefully estimated by one or other of two standards; their adaptation value and the part they play in maintaining what might be called the 'total zest of life'. Many people are inclined to look down their noses at much of man's behaviour, regarding it, not without right, as babyish. But there is a good reason to suppose that, without ample satisfaction of babyish zests, man is inclined to withhold any effective interest in more adult activities. Using a spatial metaphor, the total zest of life might be regarded as a pyramidal arrangement, the bottom-most layers of which consist of a multitude of childish zests, mostly of a private, even if innocent, nature. Unless these can be satisfied, some degree of depression and lifelessness is almost certain to ensue.

But this is only a preliminary step in the classification of incentive. We must remember that, while the essence of power lies in the capacity to gratify instinct, the search for 'power over others' can acquire the strength of an independent urge. So we must examine our 'wealth' and 'rank' incentives once more to see whether they include the desire to exercise power over others; and at this point society may legitimately step in to inquire whether or not the power sought is a derivative of aggression, the exercise of which will infringe the social rights of others. A Home Secretary no doubt enjoys power over others, but in peacetime, at any rate, we see to it that he does not infringe the law of *Habeas Corpus*. Some day, it is to be hoped, it will be regarded as an offence against decency to exercise more power over the lives and aspirations of individuals than is necessary to protect the lives and aspirations of their fellow men. At present, on the extremely dubious ground of expediency, we seem to be headed in the opposite direction.

THREE QUESTIONS

Nevertheless, having committed ourselves to the view that some incentives are more primitive or, to use a more descriptive term, more infantile than others, we cannot avoid expressing an opinion on three issues: first, should the community exercise its influence to encourage certain incentives and discourage others? Second, if there should prove to be a clash between individual and social incentives respectively, to which form should we give the preference? And, third, what form of society is least likely to interfere with incentive? The answer to the first question is, of course, that society, despite the popular view to the contrary, cannot create incentive; incentive is not a bribe from without; it arises from instinct within. To increase incentive it is necessary to harness other instincts to a common aim; to decrease incentive requires the opposition of antithetical instincts. What society can do is to provide adequate *means of expression* for every variety of 'assented' instinct. It can also seek by every means in its power to remove or minimise not just the material anxieties that compel us to fritter away creative urges, but the *internal frictions that diminish legitimate drives of instinct.* And this, as has been suggested, will require a revolutionary change in our present modes of education and upbringing. Society must take a leaf out of the book of psychotherapy. The rôle of a good psychotherapeutist is not to guide and direct his patient, but by resolving his conflicts to render the patient capable of directing his now augmented energies. To effect this revolution, however, society must be prepared to put the development of the family before all other aims except that of immediate preservation of the group. For only in the formative period of family life can conflicts be readily resolved.

This formula helps us to answer the second question. The issue as between individual and group incentive is to some extent an artificial one. Otherwise there could be only one answer: encourage individual incentive and in return society will get from the individual all the support it needs and more than it deserves. The truth is, however, that to give adequate freedom of expression to the individual we must also give adequate freedom of expression to the social groups in which the individual flourishes best. And that again involves giving priority to family culture.

To the last question the answer is even simpler. The society least likely to interfere with incentive is the society which has come to recognise that social organisation is an extension of the faculties of man, an instrument of man's mind, having neither the right nor the capacity to function as his master.

POLAND TODAY

THE INSIDE STORY BY AN EX-MERCHANT SEAMAN AND FOREIGN OFFICE SERVANT

AMBROSE BERNARD DOYLE

During my whole experience of 31 years' travelling, I have never seen ways of treating people such as I saw while in Poland. I am an ex-Merchant Navy man, and have been to practically every country in the world. I went over to Warsaw on 13 July 1945 as a Messenger with the first six or seven of the staff to form the British Embassy there. We travelled by air, first to Berlin, and then on to Warsaw. On arriving there we were taken into the Hotel Polonia, after which I started my work. For the first seven days I had to stay indoors from 8 a.m. till 10 p.m. I was then able to get out and tour round the town. During my visits I came across certain things which lead to me say that, although the Germans were very bad, in my opinion our Russian Allies are just as bad, if not worse. The Polish people, I think, have a right to stand firm and to refuse to surrender to their so-called 'Liberators' who are committing some most terrible actions in their country.

Poland is a land of large spaces, and equally large opportunities, if only given the chance of ruling itself and not being dominated by its 'Liberators'. The present 'Lublin' Polish Government has so far failed to gain the confidence of the people entirely. Are we aware in this country of what is happening over there? I suggest that we are not, yet I think that we should be told precisely what could, or should, be done so as to establish a firm and lasting peace for Poland. If only this could come to pass, she might one day equal her pre-war standard. So far there is no rate of exchange, and nearly everything is run by the Black Market. For a one-pound note you receive 600 zloty, or for a 5-dollar note you can get 1200 zloty. In the restaurant of the Hotel Polonia, for a breakfast consisting of two fried eggs, 3 slices of bread and butter, and two cups of coffee, the cost was 540 zloty. Just reckon up what the amount would be in English money —nearly a pound—far more than you would pay in the Savoy, or any other expensive restaurant. Yet the poor Polish people have to work one month for 1000 zloty, and the cost of one loaf of bread is 50 zloty. How much, then, can those people have left to buy anything else? Many Poles, who think that the English people are the finest creatures on earth, have asked me in heart-felt tones, 'Why does England not take us over, and give us our chance to start again?'

Can anybody imagine how the people over there are made to clear the rubble away with their bare hands (only a few have shovels) while the Russians walk past and watch them with rifles and revolvers? Moreover, you are not safe to go out after dark, and all night long you can hear automatic rifle-firing and other explosions. The latter, I was told, was the blowing up of rubble on the river where the bridges were, as by so doing they are clearing the way, but I never noticed any difference in the morning.

Here are some other things I noticed. One is how fond the Russian soldiers are of raping. For instance, I actually saw an old lady of 72 years of age raped to death in a cellar by eight soldiers in succession—a thing I was powerless to prevent. Then, passing further up the road, three Russian officers stopped two young girls of about 17 or 18 years of age. The one who resisted was shot through the thighs and then raped there and then on the ruins. If this is supposed to be Liberation I think the public over here should be told about it.

Another thing: why are the Russians allowed to take away from the Poles their furniture, clothes, household goods, machinery and livestock? I have seen with my own eyes, hour after hour and day after day, convoys three miles long passing through Warsaw, and across the Vistula—going East! Another thing they are fond of doing —a Russian will ask you the time, and as soon as he sees you have a watch, he will take it from you. If you resist, you are shot. The same thing happens if you have a good pair of shoes on your feet—they will be taken off you in the street.

There is something else I cannot understand.

The first two ships to arrive in Gydinia came from Hull in this country, and arrived with Russian refugees. Why were they repatriated to Poland, and not to Russia, via Murmansk? There is very little rail-communication between Poland and Russia; so why were they sent to Gydinia instead of being taken up north to Murmansk, where by so doing they would arrive in their

Warsaw: the Alexandrovsk Bridge. The Praga suburb (foreground) was the scene of heavy fighting during the patriot rising in the summer of 1944

own country? The answer, obviously, was that the Russians don't want 'Westernised' refugees in their own country, and prefer filling Poland with them.

Now I will give you my own opinion about what I think should, and could, be done. First of all, why are we doing so much for our enemies, yet Poland, who fought so heroically by our side, and was our first Ally, is left in despair? The way in which Poland is being treated should be brought to light in the House of Commons, and in the daily press throughout the country, not only in a few courageous journals such as World Review.

For instance, why not allow the Poles, first of all, to chose their own Government of their own free will, and by so doing, stop the mass arrests which are still going on in Poland by their so-called 'Liberators'. These, to all intents and purposes, are being made so that Russia can make Poland a 17th Soviet Republic.

There has been general comment on how wonderfully Polish soldiers fought in this war. But now it is finished, what is said or even thought of them? For example, we celebrated the Battle of Britain without paying any tribute to the Polish squadrons, although nearly half the pilots who fought in it were Polish. But not one word either of thanks or appreciation was shown or uttered.

The reason I came back to England was that I was taken ill and invalided home by air, first to Berlin, and then to Croydon, by orders of the American doctor who was attached to the American Embassy there, for we did not have a doctor with our Embassy. Frankly, I managed to get myself invalided home because I did not like the spineless attitude of our officials to help the Polish people in any way, or even to stand up against the domination of them by the Russians.

Here are some more things I saw in the streets. On the main road leading down to what was once a fine bridge across the Vistula, but is now blown up, often 12 to 15 people would be arrested and taken away. This was a regular daily occurrence, and often five or six times a day, not only in one street, but in several, and also from houses of which, of course, only the shell of the building stands (except in very few cases, where the floor has been put in by the people themselves) but the majority still have to live in cellars.

After seeing this, I decided to take a walk over

Warsaw today

to Praga, which is a suburb of Warsaw. On my arrival there I had a look round, and found it was not all down like the city itself, but was in a very dilapidated condition. I walked round until I came to a street corner at which was standing a young lady who, to my surprise, spoke five different languages, including English, which she spoke fluently. It happened that she was employed on the Broadcasting Station in Warsaw. I had tea with her and also her sister, who had just been released from a prison camp in Germany. After this we went for a stroll. On coming to the railway terminus I saw several trucks loaded with civilians. I asked her who they were, as I thought this was rather peculiar. To my amazement she replied, 'Why, they are Polish people being sent to Russia for slave-work.' That greatly upset me. To think that Poland was supposed to have been liberated, and yet such a practice was allowed to be carried out by one of the United Nations!

After my visit to Praga, I returned to Warsaw, and on reaching the hotel where the British and American Embassies and Russian Military Mission were lodged, got into conversation with some Russian Army officers. I asked two of them to come and have a drink with me, and paid for three Vodkas. The result of my talk with them was, first, I noticed they were never short of cash, this being due to their printing their own notes which are not signed by anybody, and have only the numbers of zlotys and something printed in Polish on them. This, of course, suits the Black Market very well. After that, I asked them why they were so slow in moving back to Russia, and if it would not be quicker to send their stuff by motor transport? Their answer was: 'We collect all our stuff on our way back.' I asked, 'What do you mean? Do you have to leave all that machinery behind?' They said most of the loot being sent back was taken from Poland as a tribute for liberating them. It is astonishing how much you can get out of a Russian when he is intoxicated! They were also rather abusive about the 'capitalist West' and said quite confidently that their next stopping-place was London.

Now, lastly, I should like to say that it would be much better for us, as well as other nations, if an international occupation of the whole of Poland were agreed to. First, it would stop the mass arrests and deportations which are now going on. Secondly, it would stop Russian refugees coming in to occupy Poland—something which is now happening on a large scale. If this is not all stopped, then there will be hundreds of thousands of Russians in Poland and millions of Poles imprisoned in Russia.

THE DANGER OF THE CINEMA

'PSYCHOLOGIST'

THE cinema has become a part of modern civilisation. Yet up to the present its benefits, very debatable, and its evils, much less debatable, have been considered mainly in connection with its ordinary commercial use.

It is now proposed by earnest and well-meaning educationists to bring the cinema projector into the schoolroom. What effect would this revolution have on the personality of the child?

The cinema can be looked at under two aspects: (i) the informative film, and (ii) the film of fantasy.

The informative film is a short cut towards either the mastery of a given subject, such as zoology, or the construction of an object, such as a table.

The first case suffers from the disadvantages of all short cuts. For the mind reaches a conclusion, without making any effort; and the 'muscles' of the mind are therefore not exercised. This lack of mental strife also deprives the child of the joy of achievement (which is a necessary joy). The child, moreover, is deprived of initiative, and therefore of an original act of will. Since he knows without effort the result, he becomes master of a problem which he has not really solved.

Let us now analyse the psychological implications of this last statement. The child has arrived at the solution of the problem without any act of will issuing from his own intelligence. Also, he feels that the solution must be correct, since it is supplied by authority. The solution is therefore not the child's own responsibility, but the responsibility of the teacher—or perhaps even of the persons unknown who produced the film.

Returning to the child making a table by these methods: since he has only used the fairly automatic part of his memory, there will be unused energy left over, which will be turned to fantasy-thinking. After all, the only reason for inflicting this manual labour upon the child was to try to sublimate his instinctual drives, which must be sublimated if he is to become a social being. If, however, he is permitted to construct a fantasy world, this world may in time replace the factual world, and he may become utterly useless to society.

In connection with such a subject as zoology, it could well be argued that in any event the child would not be called upon to make an act of will. Of course he would never have to construct a bird! And it can thus be said that the film merely replaces, and is far more efficient than, the old-time picture book. The question remains whether visual education in general is sufficient exercise for the brain, and up to what age, or to what extent, it should be employed.

Primitive peoples used symbols, or images, in order to try to understand abstract ideas; and the more advanced a people becomes, the more it is able to comprehend these abstractions without making use of images. A proof that we are still comparatively primitive lies in the fact that we can still be so stimulated to emotion by such a symbol as a national flag or coat of arms.

Without digressing further, the question might be asked: 'Should education be academic or visual? Or should it be both, and if so, to what degree?'

Another question is whether education is really designed merely to fill up our minds with knowledge, or in order to *exercise* our minds, so that they may perhaps grasp the difficult problems of adult life. To the extent that we require knowledge, the short cut, that is the cinema, is no doubt by far the most efficient.

If, on the other hand, we require exercise for the brain, academic teaching, just because of its very difficulties, is infinitely more valuable.

In the probable case that both exercise for the mind and information are required, educationists working together with psychologists should select the films to be used for these purposes.

We come now to the fantasy film. This is not really an educational film. Yet it is necessary to direct the leisure of a child into the right channels. Further, the dry-as-dust atmosphere of the old schools was not successful. Neither did the Continental insistence on academic education, to the almost total exclusion of character training, always produce very favourable results.

The fantasy film is thus essentially a part of the leisure time entertainment of the child. Obviously, if fantasy films were to be used for character formation, suitable subjects and characters would be selected, in order to set good examples to the child.

Let us examine the attitude of the child sitting passively in the cinema in a comfortable seat,

An historical film: Mr. Rank's Henry V, *an excellent film, which was, however, accompanied by ridiculous sales literature*

and following the deeds of the hero. He identifies himself with the hero, without feeling responsibility for the hero's actions. And this shrinking from responsibility may lead to a subconscious desire to return to the womb (within which contacts with the world were only experienced through a protective organism, without any danger to the self). This desire would be a form of the Narcissistic attitude, the most dangerous attitude for social man. This attitude could perhaps be illustrated by the recent attitude of the bus conductors who, having elected a Socialist Government, and identifying themselves with it, shirked their responsibility to the community, and indeed undermined the Government which they had elected.

Another attitude which it may create is the perfectionist attitude, where the censor or super-ego (vaguely equal to the conscience), tries to point the ego towards too perfect a goal. This split between the super-ego and the ego could be a cause of many neuroses.

A few words might be added about the historical film. This, according to some people, does not belong to the fantasy film at all, and is by far the best way to push the dull child into the atmosphere of the period in question. Yet it would appear dangerous artificially to create a ready-made atmosphere which would merely provide, as it were, a stage for more intense fantasy-thinking. It could also be said that, although a knowledge of history is vital for the understanding of the present and the plotting of the future, the child should not be given too great an affection for the past—should not be taught to live in the past, as the saying is.

Essentially there are two ways of thinking—fantasy-thinking and directive thinking. Fantasy-thinking consists of obtaining satisfaction from a world of fantasy, not being able to get it from the world of reality. At the cinema one identifies oneself with a personality, and thus obtains a thrill, though making no act of will oneself. Fantasy-thinking produces thoughts which have no effect upon the world, and lead to nothing; and the cinema seems to encourage this.

Directive-thinking, which is the method of thinking of a useful member of the community, has as object a definite change or addition to the present condition of the world. It is a constructive act of will, proceeding from the working of the mind, and having as its object a definite goal, either immediate or more remote. It is towards thinking of this order, and not towards a world of fantasy, that the future citizens of the country should be directed.

WHAT IS THE FUTURE OF ENGLISH PAINTING?

R. H. WILENSKI

LARGE sections of the public are now much interested in English painting. They are interested, in particular, in the works of 'coming' men; and for this reason I am often asked what sort of pictures the post-war artists are producing, or are going to produce. The question, put in that way, is, of course, impossible to answer, because the post-war era has barely started, and because the post-war artists have not yet appeared. It is true that such of the London art-schools as have already been able to re-open are crowded to capacity (and the same I assume to be the case in provincial art-schools), and it is also true that in a year's time still more art-schools will be open, and will doubtless be filled with young people released by then from war services; so that a new generation of producing artists will very soon be here. But these young artists are not yet producing, and what they will produce no sensible man can pretend to the power to say. As spectators, our part, for the moment, is to wait and see. But we can answer another and most relevant question: 'Where does the new generation start from in its high adventure?' because that question deals not with art not yet created, but with art already here. And it was, indeed, with just this question in my mind that I chose the colour plates which accompany these comments.

Thus I chose the *Laocoon* by El Greco (1545–1614) and *The Spiritual form of Nelson guiding Leviathan* by William Blake (1757–1827) as symbols of the National Gallery and Tate Gallery artists; the *Bathers* by Paul Gauguin (1848–1903) to represent the Post-Impressionist Movement of the last decades of the nineteenth century; the *Sleeping Gipsy* by The Douanier Rousseau (1844–1910) and *Environs de Delphes* by Jean Lurçat (born 1892) as original Surrealist pictures; *Cliffs and Boat* by Georges Braque (born 1881) as the work of the man who, with Picasso, founded the Cubist Movement between 1907 and 1914. With these I put *Swan Upping* by Stanley Spencer (born 1892), the leading present-day exponent of the English Pre-Raphaelite tradition; *St. Paul's* by Duncan Grant (born 1885), a leading English interpreter of the French 'Fauve' Movement (created by Matisse and Derain (1903–1906); *Sunny Devon Fields* by Ethelbert White (born 1891), exponent of the English outdoor-life æsthetic; and lastly, *Encounter in the Afternoon* by Paul Nash (born 1889) who, in my judgment, is the greatest English artist of my time.

Taken together, these works stand for nearly all the aspects of art production which have fired the recent generation (because a part at any rate of Cézanne's achievement is contained in the picture by El Greco); they represent enormous contributions to art-history, enormous enlargements, that is to say, of our experience of art and of our perceptual powers; and these contributions, with all they imply, are so familiar to the young people now in, or about to enter, the post-war art-schools that these about-to-be creators must start with these experiences as a matter of inescapable routine.

This is a great advantage to these young people, because it brings home to them that art, as we understand it in the twentieth century, is essentially a creative activity, independent of the camera, concerned, like research science, with the discovery and revealing of something hitherto not discovered or revealed. But it is also a burden, because the achievements which form the young men's springboards were so magnificent, because the originality of the artists was so striking, their sensibility so subtle, their creative energy so glowing, their courage so admirable, and the pace with which they made their discoveries so swift. The burden of these precedents is, indeed, so heavy that since the Baroque artists began work, at the end of the

fifteenth-sixteenth-century Renaissance, no such situation has confronted creative art.

The situation for the newcomers is further complicated by the fact that the contributions made by the creative aspects symbolised in our examples are almost as well known to the new public interested in the coming artists as they are to the newcomers themselves. The days are past when an ill-educated commonplace young painter could gain applause and wealth by painting obviously descriptive or timidly derivative concoctions. The days are past, too, when a measure of applause and a modest income could be captured by playing locally for safety and painting tame derivative landscapes or *genre* pictures, 'in the manner of' some earlier painter, (Constable, say, or Cézanne, or Bonnard) to the taste of tame informed people in Bloomsbury, or of tame uninformed people in Nottingham or Wigan. For the meaning of my opening sentence is simply that the younger generations of the public all over the country (who are far from tame, and who are much better educated than their parents and grandparents) have considerable acquaintance with the aims and achievements of original artists from Blake, the Pre-Raphaelites and the Impressionists to the Cubists and Surrealists; that they regard art as a form of creative action; and that they look to the new generation not only to enlarge their perceptual experiences but to do so in the degrees, and with the speed, which they have grown accustomed to expect. It is not, of course, the business of the original artist to concern himself with the taste and standards of the public. It is his business to supply without reference to demand. But I mention the situation because it may be useful to some young about-to-be producers to be reminded that as things stand they will not, as the phrase goes, 'get away with' anything but truly original creation (unless they are out to be merely Royal Academy painters).

In setting down some aspects of painting from which the newcomers will start their own adventures, I recognise (and the new public will also recognise) that each individual artist will make his own selection. No truly original artist could be equally thrilled by all the aspects represented—because such artists are only veritably moved by contact with originality analogous to their own. The truly original artist is always a prejudiced, and therefore a bad, critic of all types of art except the type which he can himself create. In that particular corner he is, however, not only the best, but possibly the only reliable, guide. It is arguable that a great work of art can only be fully comprehended by the artist who made it and by such other artists as are equipped to create on the same lines, or in the same mode, or in the same mental attitude, or in the same spirit, or in the same æsthetic. It may be, for example, that no one has really understood El Greco (who throughout the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries was looked on as a fantastic failure) except El Greco and Cézanne; that Mantegna has only been fully comprehended by Mantegna and Stanley Spencer; Jan Van Eyck by Van Eyck and Seurat; Blake by Blake and Leon Underwood, Cotman by Cotman and Paul Nash—and so on. And thus all who care about these matters are immensely curious to see what points of departure the most gifted and valorous of the newcomers will take.

There are signs that the younger men (especially those who hardly knew it before) have been much impressed by the re-opening of the National Gallery: some, doubtless, will be excited by El Greco, but others, it may be, will be captured by the more matter-of-fact Baroque of Rubens, or the fettered passion of the artist called for convenience Robert Campin (though no one in fact knows who he was). Others, it may be, will be fired by the charming colours in Sassetta's pictures as we see them, and by the new panels ascribed to the Sienese primitive Giovanni di Paolo. Or take the Tate Gallery. There Blake, especially in his later drawings in illustration of Dante's *Divine Comedy*, has long been a dominant influence. Will the new generation be as gripped by these drawings, and by Blake's concept of *Nelson guiding Leviathan* (the War by Sea) as their predecessors have been? Or will one of them perhaps see what Turner with his bad taste and gigantic floundering was after, and go after that also? Or will Hogarth be selected by someone, or Whistler by someone? Or Ingres, or Manet, or Seurat, or Degas? We have not, unfortunately, in the Tate Gallery a

representative array of works by Matisse, Picasso and The Douanier Rousseau. But if we had the Douanier's *Sleeping Gipsy*, it would, I feel pretty certain, stir more than one of the youngsters in some way—and I say 'in some way' here and mean it everywhere, because, as I have tried to indicate, the truly creative artist does not *imitate* the artist whose works especially appeal to him, but uses those works as points of departure for his own adventures in his own particular world.

So the stage is set for the next act in the history of painting. We await the playwright-players. We know that there are as good fish in the water as ever came out of it and that, technically speaking, there is nothing in the National Gallery which cannot be done today (witness the Dutch gentleman who has just painted 'a Vermeer' which deceived half the experts in Europe). We know that the war has had deep effects on the men who fought in it—effects which, probably, will not be ordered in the spirit and exteriorised in paintings for some time; we know that the timid and obvious-minded will give nothing of value; but we also know that the valiant and curious-minded will think and see for themselves, and reject all ready-made solutions, and surely give sooner or later the further enlargements of experience which the new and eager public are demanding.

When these gifts are made, how will they be greeted? There will be those, of course, who will revile the artists because their work shows independence and is not designed to serve this doctrine or that school. But such denigrations will come only from inferior artists and political or other propagandists. Except from these quarters, any new artist, who is really original, is likely to receive more lip-service than any such newcomers have ever received before. Lip-service, however, will not suffice to keep these men alive and working. To whom can they look for money? Can they expect to be supported, as they have been supported all through my time, by dilettanti and collectors, discreetly encouraged by dealers and critics? Or can they expect material support from the new public who, though very numerous, are all of restricted means?

The questions, I submit, are important. Because, as I see things, the dilettanti and connoisseurs are likely to be considerably impoverished and so likely to play a decreasing rôle; and if sections of the new public, in large numbers, come forward to buy pictures by original artists, the demand will at once exceed the possible supply. For original artists, of the calibre I have been discussing, are rare birds; and each of the rare birds can only lay a limited number of eggs. At the present time, for example, if Paul Nash could provide a dealer with a thousand pictures at the price of books by Bernard Shaw, the dealer could sell them to the new public in a month. But neither Nash nor any other great artist could produce that quantity of original pictures; and, generally speaking, the finer and more original the artist, the less he produces—or at any rate the fewer are the pictures which he himself considers sufficiently 'good' by his standards to be passed and signed and offered for sale. He cannot live by the sale of a *few* works to the new public at book prices.

The problem is one that has never arisen in the history of art, because there has never before been so large a public desiring actual works by original artists at very low prices for their homes. Neither Van Eyck, nor Botticelli, nor Watteau, nor Seurat was called on to meet a demand for mass production of their pictures at mass production prices. Never before have large sections of an educated public desired to buy artistic rarities—the real things hitherto desired only by dilettanti and connoisseurs. Never before have a large public demanded, as it were, the finest illuminated manuscripts at the price of printed books.

What is the solution of this problem? I confess, quite frankly, I don't know—unless it be in very good facsimile reproductions. But that solution is not really a solution, because a work of original art is one thing, and a reproduction is another. But it might be better than nothing for both sides. Popular Victorian artists made lots of money from black and white engravings from their pictures. Perhaps original modern artists can now do likewise by royalty arrangements with publishers of coloured prints?

4 *

EL GRECO
Laocoon

WILLIAM BLAKE: Spiritual Form of Nelson guiding Leviathan *Tate Gallery*

STANLEY SPENCER: Swan Upping
Collection of H L. Behrend, Esq.

courtesy Soho Publishing Co.

GEORGES BRAQUE: Cliffs and Boat

courtesy Soho Publishing Co.

ETHELBERT WHITE: Devon Fields

courtesy Soho Publishing Co.

DUNCAN GRANT: Waterloo Bridge

courtesy Soho Publishing Co.

JEAN LURÇAT: Environs de Delphes

THE DOUANIER ROUSSEAU: The Sleeping Gipsy

Museum of Modern Art, New York

PAUL NASH: Encounter in the Afternoon
Collection of Edward James, Esq.

courtesy Soho Publishing Co.

MANNERS MOULD MANKIND

PART I

'To revive civilisation, wisdom may lie through beauty, with a revival of manners'

B. H. LIDDELL HART

THE most important post-war aim is the restoration of civilisation from the damaging effects of two great wars within a generation. The first produced a universal degeneration, and widespread abandonment of civilised standards and historically based values in thought, taste and behaviour. During this period the collapse of restraining influences opened the way for a second great war. Although there was a turn of the tide after a decade, it came too late to check the impulses that were making for an outbreak.

What will be the sequel to the second war? There is some recognition of the ill-effects that followed from the pursuit of pleasure and comfort as ends in themselves. There is some realisation of the deepening danger ahead if nations,classes and individuals continue to pursue their own way without consideration for others. But there is confusion as to how we can climb out of the swamp. The Great War is deepening into the Great Chaos.

I

There is no firm ground for confidence in political measures. Their prospects are handicapped from the start by the widespread cynicism about 'politics' that has developed from bitter experience. The people's loss of faith in 'democracy' forms a major difference between the aftermath of this war and of the last. It is palpable in this country, where democratic government has worked better than in most, but much more marked on the continent of Europe. Political activity is likely to 'make confusion worse confounded' if its dynamism comes merely from self-interest. For any good effect, it needs a dynamic current of spirituality, controlled by a clear grasp of moral standards.

The economic approach to contemporary problems may avoid many of the difficulties that are bound to arise in the political sphere. But it may become more sterile, because of its nature. It is a means, not an end. 'Economics' are even less inspiring than 'politics'. The path it opens may appeal to the reason, but creates no adequate channel for emotion to develop the tidal force that can sweep away prejudices and short-sighted ideas of self-interest—obstacles that always tend to deflect or dam the stream.

Religion, in its widest and deepest sense, could solve the problem—by generating a spiritual dynamic. But can we anticipate any revival of religion wide enough to carry a promise of meeting it? The Christian Churches have too many points of difference for easy co-operation between them. Their dogmatic creeds have become unacceptable to a large proportion of thinking men, who are apt to find intellectual difficulties in a symbolical interpretation. The Churches no longer command the obedience, nor stir the emotions, of a large proportion of the masses within the nominally Christian countries. Whatever dispute there may be as to the *causes*, the facts are plain. Practising churchmen are now a minority, both among intellectuals and among the masses. Moreover, the peoples within the Christian orbit are only a minority of the world's population.

Those who hope for a revival of religion must reckon with present facts. A restoration of civilisation in this way is likely to be a slow process—and time is precariously short in view of the dangerous complications caused by the contraction of space. In any case, religion has been an intense spiritual force only for the few; for the many, it has been mainly influential as a form of thought and behaviour. 'Many are called, but few are chosen.' This truth is discouraging to immediate hopes, but provides indirectly a ground for hope—by showing us an alternative way of approaching the problem of restoring civilisation.

The code of behaviour that developed in Europe through the Middle Ages into modern times emerged from a composite mould. The influence of the Christian gospels was blended with those of classical philosophy, Celtic tradition, the Catharist heresy, and Provençal poetry. From the lyrics of the troubadours, perhaps Arabic in origin, flowered the cult of chivalry, which in turn germinated an idealisation of women, that eventually produced an elevation of their status to a level which has not been reached in any other part of the world. The Early Church had taken a severe view of sex,

June 1902, *with severe tight-lacing*

1920. *The high, tight collar is temporarily revived*

March 1928. *Skirts reach their shortest, and there is no waist*

and a line hostile to women, with damaging effects on their status during the first thousand years of the Christian era. The troubadours corrected the balance. After a spell of resistance, the mediæval church was wise enough to accept the trend, and adapt this to its own spiritual aims. Here, it could go back beyond the Epistles, to the Gospels, through which shone a light more favourable to women. The new cult of 'Our Lady', the Virgin Mary, came to exert an influence approaching that of the Mother-Goddess in Minoan and other civilisations. Grafted on to the cult of chivalry, it produced not only an improvement in women's position, but a civilising influence on the general standard of behaviour.

A realisation of the abundant lapses from that code of behaviour, and also of its limitations, should not blind us to the value of its influence. In recent times there have been not merely lapses, but definite rejections of that code—and we have seen a difference for the worse. Nevertheless, an influence transmitted from generation to generation down the centuries is not easily eradicated within a single generation. It is inbred in a much wider circle of people than are likely to be affected by any revival of religion that can be foreseen. The code has been cracked, but is not beyond repair.

Hence the most practical approach to the problem of restoring civilisation may be by way of a revival of *manners*. The motto 'Manners makyth man' contains a profound truth. Manners constitute a restraint. They imply an attitude of consideration for others. 'Externals' have a beneficial influence upon 'internals', creating a favourable environment for the development of a better spirit. A revival of manners is only a beginning, but it seems the most promising way of beginning to tackle the problem. It follows the course indicated by that deep truth of experience, the principle of indirect approach.

II

A revival of manners depends on women—who have most to gain from it. Biologically, they represent the anabolic element in nature, concerned with the conservation of life. They are the home-makers. Manners go far to preserve the home from dangers within. A collective rise in the standard of manners helps to preserve the home from dangers without.

It is significant that the growth of manners in the Middle Ages under the code of chivalry produced a moderating influence on the violence of warfare. Its effect can be overrated, but is more often underrated. These restraints only applied within Christendom, and broke down when a cleavage occurred within the pale of Christianity,

The Courtesies of Transport, 1906. *A lady is helped out of her carriage by the footman*

The Courtesies of Transport, 1929. *The driver remains seated, while the lady struggles with a tight skirt*

allowing the passions unlimited licence in the so-called Wars of Religion. Another good lesson came when the very marked development of manners in the eighteenth century was accompanied by the most remarkable limitation of warfare yet seen in history—especially in the care shown to avoid injury to civilians and homes. That development of manners, however, took place in the upper strata of society, and did not penetrate much below them. Its restraints were broken down by the French Revolution, and the blow was the more deadly because the French had led the way in civilisation. Nevertheless, excess of violence produced a hopeful reaction, and the nineteenth century was marked by a development of manners which went deeper than before, if it did not rise higher. That century also saw a most notable decrease of wars. It was by far the most peaceful century that civilisation had yet known since the fall of the Roman Empire. Unfortunately, its restraints as well as its standards were being undermined—by the effects of the Industrial Revolution, the advance of science, the growth of materialism, the intensification of nationalism, the disunity of Christianity, and the decay of religion that was accelerated by the slowness of the Churches to adapt their too literal interpretation of Christian doctrine to the growth of knowledge. The breaches thus produced in the protective code of behaviour were enlarged by the Prussian development of the French Revolutionary armies' reckless practice of war into a theory of unlimited war. The destructive force of the combination opened the way for the sweeping overthrow of civilised restraints in the unlimited war of 1914–1918, and its sequel.

The collapse of the code of war-behaviour was followed by a more widespread collapse of the code of peace-behaviour. This started with a weakening of the influence of the home, and a crumbling of standards there. It affected the arts which became chaotically devoid of principle. It spread to the political sphere, where the unbridled emotions of the immature became dominant, and bolted with the reins of government, only to cause the replacement of constitutional by arbitrary rule. The unbridled ambitions of these new despotisms, and their unbalanced judgment, soon galloped Europe into a fresh conflict, of a still more unlimited nature.

Reflection on these consequences emphasises the primary importance of restoring a code of behaviour, both in private and in public life. To recognise its value is not to exaggerate it. Manners are a curb on the violence of the passions, but not a cure—which has to be provided by religion or philosophy. When manners become too artificial, they tend to lose their restraining influence. That has been illustrated in

the history of modern Japan. When the old growth of civilisation there—which was never strongly nourished by spiritual, as distinct from purely emotional, elements—came to be sapped by the intrusion of Western industrialism and materialism, the habitual form of manners survived. But it was a hollow shell. There was nothing except a rampant nationalism to fill the void.

Manners have much practical value in building or restoring civilisation. But they are only a preliminary stage, and for far-reaching effect they need to become a vehicle for the spirit. The growth of civilisation in Japan has suffered from a lack of spiritual power. It has been undernourished, too, because of the treatment of women as merely the sexual instrument of man, instead of his spiritual complement.

In the West, the spiritual contribution of women has received recognition for nearly a thousand years, as a distinctive feature of chivalry blended with Christianity. This recognition outweighed many handicaps. Women have played a great part in the nurture of civilisation—greatest of all in eighteenth-century France, but almost matched by their influence in Victorian England. In recent generations, their legal and then political emancipation has enabled a considerable number of them to play a part in public life. But there is all too much evidence that their effective influence, in civilising men, has been on the decline. What committees have gained, has been much outweighed by what homes have lost. Here was exercised the most real kind of influence—providing a counter-balance to the katabolic urges of men. Instead of providing a restfulness to balance men's restlessness, women have infused into domestic and social life a new and sharper restlessness of their own.

The breakdown of manners can be traced largely to the behaviour of women. Emancipation was taken to mean man-imitation. It tended towards the *neutralisation* of women, and of their influence. The imitatory effort naturally brought out their limitations, emphasising their points of inferiority rather than their complementary values. In attempting an approximation to man, they came to appear a poor caricature. The male of the species was made more conscious of the *comparative* drawbacks of the female than of her *essential* difference—wherein had lain the source, not only of her attraction to the other half, but her contribution to the whole.

III

The detractive effect was intensified by a radical change in women's appearance which developed towards the end of the first world war, and became more pronounced in the immediate post-war years. This revolutionary turn of fashion was initiated as a result of the shortage of material, and a governmental desire to economise textiles and steel, however small the saving. At the same time, these economic influences were backed by a surge of feeling among women themselves, who instinctively sought to express in dress and behaviour their sense of release from customary restraints, and their dream of release from inherent limitations. The shortening of the skirt became not merely a convenience, but a symbol. The same impulse was expressed in cutting short their hair, and casting off their corsets. They were unconscious of the risk that, in letting themselves be carried away on the current of relaxation, they might also loosen their hold on men, in a three-fold way—weakening both attraction and respect, and thereby losing influence. For attraction depends much on difference, which is sharpened by mystery, while respect depends much on dignity. Study of psychology and history brings awareness of the extent to which 'externals' mould 'internals'.

The influence of modes is closely related to manners. No one has more opportunity to observe its working than a military historian. For it was on these dual lines that a solution was found for the tremendous problem of developing soldiers' pugnacity for battle, yet keeping it under control outside the battlefield. 'Spit and polish' was more a peace discipline than a war discipline. Experience of any good regiment is a lesson in the way that the combined influence of behaviour and a mode of dress can mould character. The Guards are an outstanding example. The point was emphasised by Wellington's answer when he was asked if he thought it was true that 'habit is second nature'—'Second nature? It's ten times nature.'

It is always easier to break down character than to build it up. Bad habits develop quicker than good ones. Thus it would be foolish to discount the influence on manners and character of the revolutionary turn in women's modes that developed during and after the First World War.

The first phase of the transformation, or neutralisation, was one of *mannish* imitation. It was expressed principally in manners, though also in straighter lines of dress, and shortened hair—the 'bob'. Women became more brusque in their way of speaking—and, having less deep voices than men, merely sounded shrill. They took to the habit of swearing. They began to drink more, but took to the cocktail—symptom and symbol of restlessness—rather than to the

Riding Dress, 1851

Riding Dress, 1936

mellow wine. Their movements became faster—and, being short-legged, their walk became jerky. At first it was only a minority of women who adopted the mannish pose, but their prominence made the proportion appear larger. And the proportion steadily grew larger as the girls who were growing up copied the fashion.

There was then a transition into a *boyish* phase. This was a rather easier pose, at least for the younger women, and thus became much more widespread. It suited girls' desire for emancipation from parental control, and for licence to do whatever they liked. In behaviour it was expressed particularly in a spread of slang, lounging attitudes, and slouching gait. Gawkiness was its external hallmark, selfishness its internal symptom. In mode, it brought a drastic change in hair and figure. One of its chief characteristics was the 'Eton crop', or its milder version the 'shingle'. The other was the 'boyish outline'. Women sought to flatten their busts, narrow their hips, and broaden their waists, with the aim of achieving a hop-pole, or tubular figure. As an additional aid to their aim, the waistline of their dresses was dropped down to the hips—a fashion which made the young look silly, and the mature look grotesque. Even after fashion changed, short hair and shorts remained as legacies.

The next phase was the 'little girl' fashion. It came when women found that their new cult of masculinity was failing to attract men. Manners became rather less crude, but more childish. In dress, women wobbled between an inclination towards femininity and a hesitation to grow up, which produced first a slight lengthening and then a further shortening of the skirt; a substitution of childlike socks for stockings, initially for games and then in ordinary wear; and childlike forms of hair-dressing. The phase persisted longer, because it was at least more feminine than its predecessors, and because it was accompanied by a return to characteristically feminine styles for indoor wear. This reversion was such a relief to men's hunger for feminity that they accustomed themselves to endure what they were told was convenient during the day, fortified by the thought of seeing something more attractive in the evening. By the time the next war arrived they were so far conditioned by habit as to accept the whole-time presence of 'little girl' styles as a necessary part of wartime 'austerity'. But acceptance is not synonymous with attraction, nor with respect.

The 'little girl' fashion, like its 'boyish' predecessor, was an expression of the worship of *juvenility* that followed the First World War. This itself may be interpreted as a form of atonement

for the holocaust of youth in that war. The maturer generations were left with a guilty feeling that this slaughter was due to their failure. Their way of expiation was to defer to the young of the next generation, to give them free rein. Children were allowed to grow up not only without discipline, but without guidance. Parents were so anxious to be 'pals' with their children that they forgot their responsibility as parents.

For that failure, and its far-reaching effects, mothers bear the greater share of responsibility, since the home is primarily their domain. It lies with them, above all, to inculcate good manners. It is their more particular responsibility to train, by instruction and example, the mothers of the next generation. By aping juvenility themselves in dress and behaviour, they naturally forfeited respect—diminishing both their direct power of control and their indirect power of influence.

The depths of this descent were plumbed when high circles of Society developed a craze for 'Baby Parties', where the guests wore the garb of the nursery, played with toys, sat in high chairs, and were carried round the garden in perambulators. The popularity of this imbecility was not limited to the younger set. Wives of Cabinet Ministers attended such parties, and even took their husbands there—a fitting symbol of the irresponsibility which, like a slide down the banisters, tumbled them into the next war.

The distinctive catchword of the whole period was 'comfort'—at any cost. The outcome recalled the old saying: 'Carpet-slippers are not a habit; they are an attitude of mind.'

In the last few years before the outbreak of war, there was a partial reaction towards gracefulness and maturity. Women's manners were becoming more gentle, while in dress a new shapeliness emerged from the welter of sloppiness—marked by the gradual return of the corset, and even by a twilight reappearance of the crinoline in the final years of peace. But this reaction towards courtesy and good order came too late to put a check on the turbulence of the forces that had been unloosed during the years of social and domestic chaos—forces that found a catastrophic focus in the impulsive violence of the Nazis' ironically named 'New Order'. The walls of civilisation had been too badly weakened to withstand the strain, and Europe was submerged by the flood. It is too simple an explanation to describe the Nazis as bad men. Their social aims were inspired by good ideals, but even there the means distorted the end, and still more so in the political sphere. The Nazis might more truly be defined as a party where bad manners were carried to the extreme.

IV

If there is to be a better hope for the future, women must re-learn the grace of mature womanhood—and girls must learn how to grow into women. This is the only way to inspire the respect of husbands for wives, of youths for maidens, of children for mothers. Manners are created by graces.

It is significant that, after twenty odd years' experiment with modern styles of upbringing, the leaders and women of Soviet Russia have come back to the old style. Olga Mishakova, the Secretary-General of the Russian Youth Organisation, recently defined the new principles of feminine education: 'A woman must always remember that she is a woman. She must dress like a woman, talk like a woman, and walk like a woman. For enrichment of her personal life, her personal happiness, she must observe the purely feminine attributes and feminine virtues.' 'We had neglected the special education girls need to become good mothers and good wives, and we are now giving it to them.' Britain's women, too, need to learn that lesson afresh—to re-acquire feminine graces in order to revive manners.

The ideal of imitating, and duplicating, man has always been cherished by a small number of neuter-women, but only became a popular fashion in the wake of the last war. Bernard Shaw, with his characteristic candour towards causes he has supported, long ago pointed out its fundamental fallacy—'Unless woman repudiates her womanliness, her duty to her husband, to her children, to society, to the law, and to everyone but herself, she cannot emancipate herself.' In pursuing that mirage, women became lost in a desert—and dragged their children with them. To find the way out, they must first reach an understanding of how they have become lost, and of what it has cost.

There is need for a clearer realisation of the vital influence of women—as women. This lies, above all, in civilising men, and maintaining the continuity of civilisation. It is a far greater mission than can ever be fulfilled by attaining the minor political or professional success which, in the last generation, they have imitatively adopted as their standard of success—a tendency fostered by those who have themselves been failures in the elementary feminine test.

To be a successful woman—an adequate other half of the whole—it is necessary to achieve the qualification of sexual attraction. But it entails

The tight corset of 1906. *Tight corsets are returning today. And much medical opinion is returning to the view that they are healthy, within reason*

April 1929. *Official figures show the health of women deteriorated when waists were at their lowest*

much more than that. Real success depends on the spiritual force that is generated from the combination of the two sexes. Woman's contribution to that is widespread, but naturally developed best in the home. She is, above all, the homemaker. If she can there create an atmosphere of charm blended with sweetness, a current of energy by a sense of direction, the effect will extend far beyond the home. To become a 'lovely homemaker' is a great aspiration. It calls for much more than meeting material needs—it implies the creation of an outward and inward beauty.

Modern labour-saving devices are a help, in so far as they diminish drudgery; but become a drawback if the leisure they provide is devoted merely to the pursuit of pleasure. That drawback became predominant in the pre-war years. During this war, the situation has been reversed. Wartime conditions have pressed particularly hard on the homemaker, whose energy has been too fully absorbed in coping with the material necessities of life. Yet that experience may have been of indirect benefit in re-emphasising the importance of the home, while at the same time showing what the home itself loses when the graces of life are of necessity neglected. With the return of peace, it is likely that labour-saving devices will be more fully developed than before. The great issue is whether they will be applied with wisdom and understanding, for the fuller development of women's powers of contributing to the enrichment of life—in particular, to the graciousness of life, on which they have the preponderant influence for better or worse.

Good manners are a basic form of labour-saving device, because they avoid waste of energy in so many ways; above all, in diminishing friction. That applies both in the home and in the world. The manners of men are moulded by the manners *and* graces of women. The combined effect brings beauty into life.

V

The supreme values are philosophically defined as truth, beauty, and goodness. In relating this trinity to the Holy Trinity, truth is associated primarily with the Father, beauty with the Son, and goodness with the Spirit. It is through the beauty of the Son's example that the Christian religion has most appealed to mankind. And the Church has taught mankind to approach the Father by way of the Son. The Church, too, has long recognised the value of beauty, in its buildings and services, as a beginning and aid to the spiritual approach.

Reflection on these profound truths of experience reinforces the suggestion that, in seeking to revive civilisation, wisdom may lie in following the indirect approach through beauty—beginning with a revival of manners and graces.

Illustrations selected and lent by James Laver

THE REVIEW OF REVIEWS

THE NEW YEAR

1895 went out in fretful unrest. 1896 entered with a burst of romantic, not to say desperate, adventure. The dashing ride of Dr. Jameson and his Borderers across the Transvaal to the relief of the threatened citizens of Johannesburg transports us at a bound to the Elizabethan days, when such 'daring deeds of high emprize' were regarded with more favour than in our more tranquil time. But alas! such deeds of derring-do are only defensible when they are done, not when they fail to do, and the disastrous defeat of the gallant Doctor and his outnumbered force outside Johannesburg registers the crushing condemnation which the Destinies have pronounced. Blank amazement, profound regret, and some not unnatural indignation fill our hearts as we contemplate this astounding fiasco. Dr. Jameson was no fool. He was no hot-head. He was a careful, long-headed, prudent, sagacious administrator. And yet this is the man, whom we all knew so well, liked so much, and trusted so fully, who has made this fatal mistake! It is to me quite inexplicable. Taking Dr. Jameson's own standpoint, I utterly fail to understand how a man so sagacious and so prudent could have been so utterly misinformed as to the facts of the situation with which he attempted to deal. When a frontier officer ventures to take the responsibility of acting as if he were God Almighty, with no authority but his own will, it is indispensable that he should at least know his facts. But this was just what Dr. Jameson did not.

THE TROUBLE IN THE TRANSVAAL

The Transvaal Republic is run by a ring of Boer squatters, who constitute a close oligarchy of 15,000 adult males, governing with absolute authority a country as large as Spain, inhabited by not more than 500,000 persons, of whom 250,000 are natives. Into this primitive patriarchal organisation the development of the gold mines of the Randt has poured a turbulent flood of industrial life. Johannesburg, the San Francisco of South Africa, sprang in a few years from a mining camp into a wealthy bustling English city of nearly 100,000 inhabitants. These newcomers the Boers regarded with jealousy and suspicion, refusing to admit them to any share in the government of the Republic, whether they were Dutch or English, while compelling them to pay taxes. That taxation without representation is tyranny is a familiar commonplace of English-speaking communities, and against the Boer tyranny, as personified in the landed oligarchy headed by Paul Kruger, the newcomers, who were denied the rights of citizenship in the lands which their industry and enterprise had saved from bankruptcy, had both the right and the will to combine.

A FAMILY SQUABBLE IN THE WEST

The sensation occasioned by the revolt of the disenfranchised Uitlanders against the Boer oligarchy in South Africa for the time eclipsed the previous sensation occasioned by the sputtering protest of President Cleveland against British policy in British Guiana. The Government of the United States, forgetting or ignoring the fact that England had always from the first cession of the Dutch settlements in Guiana claimed that the ceded territory extended to the watershed of the Orinoco, invoked the Monroe doctrine to justify their intervention. The successive but unsuccessful efforts of British diplomacy to induce the Venezuelan Republic to accept compromises, by which we offered to give up varying strips of territory that we had always claimed as our own, were suddenly discovered at Washington to constitute acts of aggression by a foreign monarchy on an American Republic.

MAJOR TOSELLI, *Commander of Italian troops, cut to pieces in Abyssinia, near Makalah*

FRANÇOIS RABELAIS'

GARGANTUA AND PANTAGRUEL

REVIEWED BY JAMES EASTWOOD

Rabelais dissecting society, and writing his book

WHETHER or not Rabelais is your literary dish is a matter of taste, the strength of your stomach, and your fondness for glass houses and stone-throwing. You must love a rogue and be something of one yourself—which probably explains why he doesn't appear along with the more polite Montaigne, whom he taught much, on every gentleman's bookshelf. Connoisseurship of rogues is uncommon amongst us. We prefer port, dogs, a football team. Even women are scarcely considered subjects for profound inquiry. Perhaps such study is the prerogative of rogues. Across the Channel it is different. Rogues flourish and are admired. Perhaps the chronic instability of political systems over there, and the venality of the officials who serve them, have something to do with it—and a lightness of touch in certain national tempers. I mean, of course, the little rogues, the comparatively harmless ones, those with no money, who are frequently dirty and live on their wits, those who, in these latter days, have become gigolos, boot-blacks, the con-men of the Bucharest cafés, the hard-come, easy-go, gentlemanly beggars of Spain. Once they were rogues, neither pure nor simple, like Villon, perhaps wandering priests or scholars, the minnesingers, the strolling players, the professional twirp—the Fool. Now, a rogue may be basically an honest man. On the surface his morals may be of uncertain colour, but for mother wit, for zest, for sheer animal spirits, he has a pungency, a contempt for ordinary habits of mind and body that gladdens or irritates you, according to temper.

The fact that we, as a nation, find this sort of fellow irritating goes far, I think, to explain our aversion for satire, the sharper, coarser kinds of wit of the kind dispensed in some French and Central European cabarets, where the turns were not mere accompaniments of bouncing bodies to the rite of consuming underdone steak. Satire demands vulgarity. The other day I overheard a farmer discussing manure, about which you may know, there is a sort of running controversy in earthy circles. 'Nothing to beat muck,' he said. 'Muck goes back, through the beasts' bodies, to the land it came from. And that's good. Chemicals, bah!'

For chemical read 'much modern Anglo-American entertainment' and you have a thought that deserves pondering. The organic element is lacking. Rabelais, through Pantagruel and his creature Panurge, drew upon that deep substratum of muck, that pregnant, organic matter from which shot up the luxuriant growths of the Renaissance. The men of the Middle Ages had revelled in rough humour, and Panurge was their grotesque, emancipated offspring. He was, says Rabelais, 'a quarrelsome fellow, a sharper, drinker, royster, scowerer, and a very dissolute and debauched fellow, if there were any in Paris; otherwise, and in all matters else, the best man in the world.' He baited the watch; in his capacious pockets he carried itching powder, stink bombs, a bottle of old oil with which to besmirch anyone he saw in a rich new handsome suit, lice and much else with which he infuriated the people of Paris. The Lord Chamberlain would be upset if I were to probe deeper into his habits.

But Rabelais knew his public. 'Most noble and illustrious drinkers, and you thrice precious pockified blades—for to you and to none else do

I dedicate my writings . . .' But they were blades for whom bawdiness was an instrument of social change, who realised that it at once concealed and released 'the most glorious doctrine and dreadful mysteries, as well in what concerneth our religion, as matters of the public state, and life economical.' For the first time Humanism was receiving popular expression in the French tongue.

The modern reader finds in Rabelais a great deal that looks like hocus-pocus and which is, in fact, difficult to decipher even by those versed in sixteenth-century lore. Still, he was writing of things that were common knowledge to every man who could read at that time, and looked intelligently at the world about him. He laughed out the old mediæval scheme of things, now a mere fossil in the habits of men's minds; he laughed it out with the belly laugh, the horse laugh, the healthy chuckle, the dirty snigger. Everywhere were the effects of a great drought of the spirit. A friar himself, he perceived vice, corruption and false thinking beneath the habit and the cowl. He became a physician and faced the body as unafraid as he attacked the shibboleths of scholasticism.

Master Francis probably remained a Christian of sorts at heart. But he was of those who saw the earthly side of having life more abundantly. '*A boire*' is the stentorian bellow of the infant Pantagruel; '*Trinq*' the silvery message of the oracle of the bottle. The land was as thirsty then as in the nineteen-thirties. The false ascetics drew their habits more tightly about them and shrank into the cell of dogma. A gargoyle had unfrozen itself and was at their heels. Yet he himself began his adult life in practically the only way then possible for one in whom a passion for every sort of knowledge was blended with a disinclination to be guided by the requirements of purely professional training in the Church. Today anyone remotely resembling him in intellectual power, but not in his incomparable brilliance and bawdiness (for that is impossible), would be writing a column or holding forth on a brains' trust sponsored by a firm of soda-water manufacturers. But he was a wine drinker as well as a *savant* soaked in the old learning and the new. So assiduously did he pursue his studies, in fact, that his superiors grew suspicious of a man in whom monastic discipline failed to produce either humility or obedience. Discouraged, he managed to get the local 'Ecclesiastical Service Officer' to transfer him from the Franciscan to a Benedictine monastery. But no institution was untrammelled enough to satisfy him. He became a lay priest and embarked upon a study of medicine and anatomy, first at Montpellier, then at Lyons where, in 1532, he became a professional physician, working away meanwhile at *Pantagruel*. The first volume probably appeared the following year.

The Sorbonne and the clerics were openly hostile, but the book was immediately successful. As publication proceeded, officials, secular and ecclesiastical, talked of obscenity, sedition and heresy. There was a risk of persecution. Fool-prattle sounded unpleasantly in their ears. With sound instinct, French citizens during the fifteenth century had formed guilds of fools and *Sociétés Joyeuses*, whose activities 'provided outlet for both high spirits and social unrest'. In the Middle Ages popular fun had its place in the scheme of things. In the mid-sixteenth century, a time of transition, it was a danger to the state. Francis I suppressed the fool-babble and persecuted the fools and wise men. Rabelais was in no immediate danger, but he discreetly retired to Lorrain. His printer, Etienne Dolet, was a martyr to the New Learning. Only a few years before, Sir Thomas More, to whom Rabelais owed much, had been beheaded for his independence of mind. But Rabelais was careful to cultivate friendships at Court, and, while attacking the Church in print, thought it worth while, on one of his visits to Rome, to obtain absolution for infractions of monastic discipline from the Pope! After an absence from France of nearly five years, the air was clear enough for him to return to France and, with fame, surer of himself, take a Church living again. His giants had sufficiently overawed the authorities, and Panurge was a slippery fellow.

Why did Rabelais construct his tale around the enormous Gargantua and his gigantic son, Pantagruel? Probably because tales about giants were a regular part of the mediæval story-teller's stock-in-trade. Familiarity with the subject would leave his readers' minds freer to grapple with 'the most glorious doctrine and dreadful mysteries' of Humanism. To the childlike men of mediæval times giants were doubtless symbols of a dimly-perceived, almost unimaginable adult world. Heaven and hell and purgatory—for one or the other of which life on earth was but a preliminary—were the only true realities. But Gargantua and Pantagruel represented the self-conscious, all-powerful individual, glorying in his superiority to the world about him, not his subservience to the next. Still, it is significant that, as the story proceeds, the gigantic Pantagruel becomes more shadowy as the animality, the earthiness, the human nastiness and equally human fascination of Panurge bring to life the first real character in European fiction. His

Gargantua visiting the shops

pre-occupation with matrimony, his insatiable curiosity about sex, pretty well set the course of the novel for centuries. In this Rabelais was perhaps more prophetic than he knew. His own Utopia was probably the Abbey of Thelema (a complete antithesis to the mediæval monastery he loathed so much), where ladies and gentlemen enjoyed the delights of love and a life dedicated to polite conversation and a refined appreciation of craftsmanship and the arts, to 'the finer things of life': which sounds like an advertisement for luxury goods. The Abbey was, in fact, the first halt on the road that led to the country house and then to the Ritz, where neither Pantagruel nor Panurge is conspicuous!

But Rabelais was propounding an ideal, by its very nature unattainable. The only rule of the Abbey was: 'Do what Thou Wilt'—which, to a humanist like Rabelais, was a plea for freedom of conscience as well as the good things of life. But the sociologists have been busy. The Abbey was an image of the Golden Age, says one, 'where, since there is no basis of competition in property-force, the development of one individual cannot maim that of another. In short, the prophecy of the classless society.' A description at which Rabelais would have hugely enjoyed poking fun. Another sociologist, also of pinkish complexion, says, 'Do What Thou Wilt' means, in effect, 'Help yourself, the world is yours.' Scarcely a motto for a classless society!

No, it is best not to try to fit Rabelais into some ideology or other. He was too big, and also too much the precocious rogue of the French Renaissance; he hovered between two worlds, one certainly dead and the other, though not stillborn, a problem child, a tangle of conflicts. He had nothing really specific to suggest for achieving man's betterment. He probably expected too much of formal education—a result of his own inordinate love of learning for its own sake, the spell words cast upon him. But his enormous zest is apparent here, as in everything. Zest and experience, he seems to say; without them, what is a man worth? It is a message to the individual, not to depersonalised society or the state.

And so, in search of experience and an answer as to whether or no Panurge should marry, Pantagruel and his followers set forth on a highly unorthodox Grand Tour. To a strange assortment of lands and islands that were nowhere and yet everywhere, inhabited by bailiffs, long-livers, people with strange names, the Chitterlings, the Papefigues, the Papimanes; to the *Isle des Ferrements*, the country of the *Chats Fourres*, where tyranny is law, and to its dependency, inhabited by the ignorant ones; to the kingdom of Quintessence,

or rather 'the Queendom of Whims', an altogether delightful place where music cured all manner of diseases and old women were miraculously cast anew and again became 'young, quaint, clever, neat, pretty, juicy, right, brisk, buxom, proper, kind-hearted, and as right as my leg, to any man's thinking'. with this difference, that their heels were now much shorter, which 'made them yet more apt to fall backwards, whenever any man happened to touch 'em, than they had been before.' Of course the travellers were duly registered as Abstractors of Quintessence. And then, after one or two more stops, to the Country of Lanterns with its Oracle of the Bottle whose silvery pronouncement sends those rogues, Panurge and Friar John, into such transports that they, and even Pantagruel himself, burst into poetry. '*Trinq!*' It's a good end to a good story and an exhilarating journey that has taxed Rabelais' powers as architect, botanist, lawyer, physician, scholar, as seemingly little as the suppleness of the satirist's lash. In spite of its earthy philosophy, the book is never earthbound. The sense of ease, the brilliance of execution, seldom flag. It is a kind of wandering, of body and spirit, to stir not altogether nostalgic notions in the modern reader's breast. If someone would only travel our world with a mental equipment equal to Rabelais', going off on some alcoholic tour, unsponsored, attended by no Public Relations Officer, with no censor but his own wit! But perhaps these are not times when laughter, especially satirical laughter, comes easily. We are in the midst of our catastrophe, the victims of weariness. Satire is most likely to appear when there is an uprush of energy in the body of society. Rabelais wrote nearly two centuries after the Black Death had decimated Europe and undermined the old way of life. There had been time for recovery, and time, too, to forget the finer achievements of mediævalism—which, perhaps, explains his principal defect, his lack of respect for man's spiritual impulses. Still, the rate of social change today is quicker, and an uprush of energy may come sooner than now seems possible, with a modern Rabelais opening the sluices. He would have to be as unspecialised as his predecessor, a prodigiously learned, an uncommonly human man, and one who knew the value of good organic muck. Would we understand him, I wonder? Probably the only modern writer intellectually his equal is James Joyce—which shows the difficulty of making a twentieth-century Rabelais generally accessible. Still, a diet of pelicans should help.

And there's still the old trouble: our lack of taste for satire. It was Swift, perhaps our greatest satirist, of whom Saintsbury pertinently remarks somewhere that he would have been less of a misanthrope if he hadn't watered the little wine he did drink. Suggestive, if you take wine in its more symbolical Rabelaisian sense. There have been brilliant exceptions, especially in art, bordering on caricature: Hogarth, Rowlandson, Gillray, and, for all his perversity, even Beardsley. But they are figures of the past—looking through some old volumes of *Punch* the other day, it was quite astonishing to discover how much more *roturier* was our grandfathers' idea of political caricature than ours. Today we have good occasional pieces, but not even a periodical. How salty was the French weekly, *Marianne*, right up to the outbreak of war!

My edition of Rabelais is illustrated by Gustave Doré. What made him such a capital collaborator—for that's the effect he obtained—is perhaps partly explained by his early training with the satirical press of Paris. Contemporary critics thought such work unworthy of him. But by contributing to the *Journal pour Rire*, *Monde Illustré*, *Journal pour Tous*, and the rest, encouraged by that remarkable man, Philopon, the irresponsible parent of modern French humour, he at least brought first-class work to a broad public eager for satire, and kept himself in the main current of life—no unimportant qualification for any illustrator of Rabelais. Later on, when he turned to Cervantes, Milton and the Bible, he never forgot that he was presenting these works to the man in the street. His first attempt to illustrate Rabelais (later editions contained more drawings) was produced on 'something very like tea-paper', but it was at once clear that here was an artist in the grotesque who had got to the core of the man. A little time spent with Doré's drawings is a better introduction to Rabelais than weeks poring over learned tomes. His early years were spent amidst the half-mediæval grandeurs of Strasbourg; when still a youngster he and his parents moved to the mountains and pine forests of Bourg. In these places he learned to love the grotesque, the awful mysteries of '*le grand vague*'. Some say it fostered a German wildness in him; but his astonishing facility, his saltiness, his wit were wholly French, and the *esprit gallois* at that. Almost instinctively he turned to Rabelais. It was an affair of soul-mates answering one another across the centuries, two rogues enjoying an enormous joke.

Photography and process work have won their victory at a price. It was a sad day for the whole business of debunking when there was less call for the itch of the individual finger.

NEW BOOKS

BUILDING AND PLANNING

By G. D. H. Cole. *Cassell.* 10s. 6d.

This most carefully written book is largely the outcome of the work done by Prof. Cole as Director of the Nuffield College Social Reconstruction Survey during 1941 and 1944, and at the request of the Central Council for Works and Buildings, mainly in 1942 and 1943. An enormous wealth of material must have passed through the hands of the author, and it is admirable how he has managed to draft it into this concise volume. Apart from chapters dealing with general considerations, such problems as labour supply and utilisation, apprenticeship and training, the post-war demand for houses and for labour to build them, and the post-war demand for buildings other than dwelling-houses, war factories and the establishment of new towns, administration and, not the least important, the finance of housing, constitute the principal burden of the book. Prof. Cole computes that the annual rate of houses needed to meet currently accruing requirements will be 350,000; houses needed to clear off arrears within twelve years of peace 230,000, and houses needed to make good bomb damage 50,000—in all, 630,000 houses a year. The fulfilment of this programme would mean that, over a period of twelve years from the end of the war, we should have built roughly 6,500,000 new houses. Problems arising out of such needs of building are not less formidable. The author distinguishes between 'industrial building', 'community building' and 'educational building'. He wisely recognises that there is bound to be a hot contest for priorities in connection with post-war building, even if adequate plans are laid for the expansion of the labour force. It is to the credit of the book and evidence of the scientific approach of its author that he fully recognises the differences in view as to these priorities. Various answers are possible, but as Prof. Cole suggests, 'the least desirable answer is that rival claimants should be left to a planless scramble for as much as they can get.' The book is accompanied by interesting charts, tables and an index. But why is a bibliography missing? Many readers will regret this, in view of the many recent publications on the subject.

HERMANN LEVY

IMPERIAL COMMONWEALTH

By Lord Elton. *Collins.* 21s.

The chief merit of Lord Elton's book is readability. This he achieves by enthusiasm, a supple style and his instinct for the broad unconscious sweep of Imperial history, all of which amply serve to carry the narrative boldly forward. As an historian, therefore, he follows the tradition of Macaulay, Guedalla, Trevelyan, Chutchill, in the sense that he has produced a book that makes history considerably more exciting than the average contemporary novel. His five hundred odd pages allow plenty of space for the details that colour a story and the vignettes that give it life. Imperial history affords ample scope for such an approach. For it is to the apparently fortuitous events, the moral and physical courage of individuals and small groups that the Empire largely owes its growth—which accounts for the 'absence of mind' theory of British expansion. Until war came, we were apt to take the Empire for granted. And even today, perhaps, the Dominions are more acutely conscious of the Imperial connection than we, though there are, of course, large numbers of young Englishmen and women whose horizons have been immensely broadened by war travel. Many of them, in fact, have tended to suspect that the offspring are rather lustier than the parent. The social consciousness of Australia and New Zealand, for example; the enterprise and sense of opportunity that animate Canadians. There is danger here of inferiority complex, and especially as far as the American grandchild is concerned. The common task of reconstruction demands friendly rivalry in good works.

Lord Elton necessarily examines Imperial history chiefly from the English side of the water. The time has undoubtedly come when civilisation in new forms, both Eastern and Western, has gravitated towards new centres, and it is a matter of speculation, but of great importance, to decide just how the Commonwealth can adapt herself to changed world conditions without Britain moving out of the European spiritual sphere, as has been the tendency in the past. Lord Elton suggests that the Commonwealth may be 'the pattern, even the nucleus, of some wider organisation yet to be.' A distant hope, perhaps, in the light of current realities. But his book shows how remarkable an achievement the Commonwealth is in its own right.

JAMES EASTWOOD

ECONOMIC PROGRESS AND SOCIAL SECURITY

By Professor A. G. B. Fisher. *Macmillan.* 18s.

Ten years ago the author published a book under the title of *The Clash of Progress and Security* which attracted attention. By adding 'economic' to progress and 'social' to security, he now gives to his favourite theme a more definite meaning. The title might suggest that he would like to compare how far social security has been progressing with, or lagging behind, the development of economic wealth. But such expectation will be disappointed.

Professor Fisher does not seem to care much about social history—social security under the guilds might have been usefully contrasted with the later periods of early and modern capitalism —nor does he use much factual material. He is concerned with the wider sociological and, one might even say, philosophical aspects of how far, in a world of constantly progressing wealth, greater security for the individual and for the nation as a social unit can, and should, be secured. The aspects he depicts are in many ways distressing. In particular, his critical attitude towards certain suggested remedies which he calls 'blind alleys' is illuminating and makes interesting reading. The book is in this chapter definitely original, and the following chapter dealing with 'Some Third-Rate Solutions' none the less.

It is a merit of the Professor's outlook that he urges that 'supplementary policies should be given their own proper place, but as most of them have already received abundant attention, while the central problem has been sadly neglected, there is some justification for attempting to redress the balance by directing our thought almost exclusively to this fundamental issue', which in his view is 'a growing or expanding economy' and the necessity of meeting this issue by a continuous redistribution of the resources of production. This attitude is certainly the right approach for the first occupant of a chair of International Economics sponsored by the Royal Institute of International Affairs.

One notes with satisfaction the author's strong antipathy against autarchy or the Schachtian system of self-sufficiency and bilateral barter. The whole argument of this book might be summed up as a gallant attempt to establish the impossibility of such autarchy. 'Unless we are willing, in preparing our own policies, to take into account their reactions upon other economies, other economies will be equally unmindful of the reactions of their policies upon us, and the last state of all is likely to be a good deal worse than the first,' emphasises the author, and no remark could be more timely than this. While this outlook is everywhere in the book well argued, the chapters on social insurance, which naturally should take an important part in a book on economic progress and social security, are rather sketchy. There is no indication that the author has taken pains to study in any detail the voluminous and authoritative surveys of the International Labour Office, the latest reports of British Royal Commissions containing international evidence, or the monographical work of private investigators on such topics as health insurance, workmen's compensation, unemployment insurance and industrial assurance. Otherwise he might have been able to tell his readers that some time ago many countries, even with such modest economic progress as, for instance, Switzerland, achieved what in Britain many people regard as an en-entirely revolutionary innovation of the proposed insurance schemes. Yet this gap does not really impair what, on the whole, is an excellent book.

HERMANN LEVY

WAVELL

By R. H. Kiernan. *Harrap.* 6s.

'The British have no hope of victory! We are smashing towards our objective! British resistance has been shattered!' These were the words of Graziani when all seemed well for him in North Africa. It would have been wiser on his part if he had recalled the dictum of his German allies, expressed by General von Kleist in an army publication before the war, to the effect that Britain possessed one really great General, but that he, Wavell, was superlatively great. One may deprecate the publication of a man's biography during his lifetime, but this book on Lord Wavell is so informative and so well written that it must be treated as exceptional, even as is its subject. His ancestry has much of interest, but what the average reader will wish to learn is how the famous man spent his time before he became a household word. His headmaster at Winchester regretted the 'desperate step' of sending him into the Army Class, for he had, said the headmaster, sufficient ability to make his way in other walks of life. This was at a time when the duller sons of a family used to go into the army. Fortunately for us his father, himself an officer of the Black Watch, did not listen to the headmaster and the boy did not listen exclusively to what he learned in the Army Class. He continued in his devotion to literature which had marked him as a very small person when he would recite *Horatius* to his aunts for

threepence or refrain from doing so for sixpence from an uncle.

Sir William Robertson, then Commandant of the Staff College, said of him, when Wavell was a colonel and long before he was known beyond the army: 'Of all the officers who came under my notice I should consider Wavell by far the ablest.' It was owing to Robertson that he went for about a year to Russia in 1911, where he not only learned the language but studied the movements of a large army at a time when manœuvres by even a single division or corps were unusual in Britain. He visited Russia again in 1936 and on his return spoke plainly in praise of the Red Army. Most people took his utterances as mere expressions of politeness to his recent hosts, especially when he stated his admiration for the Russian development of parachute troops. But he saw what the Germans failed to see, so that Goering plaintively cried that the Russians had deceived them in making them believe that Russia was not a first-class military power. 'I came to the conclusion,' said Wavell, 'that the morale of the new Red Army was higher than that of the old Tsarist Army.' A good example of the way in which Wavell chooses his words occurred in 1917 when, after being seriously wounded in France and losing an eye, he was attached to the Russians in the Caucasus. He and the French attaché called on the Russian Chief of Staff to ask if his army would co-operate towards Mosul. The French claimed Mosul as a part of Syria, but the Russians would scarcely have pulled French chestnuts out of the fire. This Frenchman did not speak Russian very well and when he asked Wavell if he had explained about the flag—Wavell had simply said that the Turkish one should be hauled down—he answered that he had told the Russian all that was necessary about flags. On the other hand, Wavell is chary of making speeches to his troops—for a speech might cost a man a hard-won reputation! He has always believed that the troops can bear with, and even admire, a tough, hard leader if they know he is working in their interests. 'The horse,' he has said, 'should be cared for in the stable as if he were worth £500. But he should be ridden in the field as if he were not worth half a crown.' This book is worth a good deal more than the latter sum.

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LARGEST OF BOOK PUBLISHERS

Tour of R.A.F. Fighter Stations, 1942. From *The Royal Family in Wartime.* Odhams Press, Ltd. 5s. (The whole of the proceeds will be devoted to the funds of King George's Jubilee Trust.)

THE EXPLOITATION OF FOREIGN LABOUR BY GERMANY

International Labour Office. Montreal, 1945. 7s. 6d.

This is the story of the six to ten million foreign workers who were drafted to Germany during the war. The political and psychological problems are brought out very clearly. It is against international law to compel a conquered people to work for the conqueror's war effort and the Germans, typically, went to great pains to clothe the system with legality. Nevertheless the foreign workers lost their basic political and civil rights and worked in conditions of virtual slavery. In fact, the system failed to solve Germany's manpower problem: on the contrary, it led to resistance, notably the *Maquis* in France. The need for supervision sterilised vast numbers of potential workers who had to man the Gestapo, etc.

The book illustrates admirably the pitfalls of over-centralised control. The authorities, for example, never made up their minds above the effect of a sub-standard of living on efficiency. In the East they de-industrialised, then re-industrialised under the pressure of air-raids, and finally had to re-de-industrialise with the Russian advance. It was the master-plan which failed.

John H. E. Friend, the compiler, has produced a factual, documented survey which is nevertheless readable, and good value at 7s. 6d.

GUY NAYLOR

GENTILE AND JEW

A Symposium edited by Chaim Newman. *Alliance Press.* 12s. 6d.

THE ZIONIST MOVEMENT

By Israel Cohen. *Muller.* 12s. 6d.

Prevalent though vague anti-Jewish sentiments may be among some people in this country, it is difficult for the ordinary Englishman to realise the awful intensity of anti-Semitism on the Continent. Thanks to the centuries of insular immunity, he stands baffled, but sympathetic, before things like Belsen or a pre-1914 pogrom in, say, Russia or Poland. The mentalities of Jew-baiter and Jew alike seem equally alien, and yet we find ourselves compelled by circumstances to deal with two problems that are near to the heart of the European crisis: the thinness of an apparently civilised skin and Zionism. Our need for accurate information on both is vital.

The symposium edited by Mr. Chaim Newman, with its hundred Gentile contributors of every shade of opinion, covers most aspects of the Jewish problem. It contains exhortations to brotherly love, essays recommending assimilation and advocating national homes in North Africa, West Prussia and, of course, Palestine. Some contributors see the only hope for Jewry in World Socialism. There is a paper on the purely psychological side of the matter. As usual with works of this kind, there is much repetition. It does give a good idea of the diversity of views it is possible for apparently well-informed people to hold on the proper approach to a settlement. The result is that, though the book is obviously intended for the general reader, the effect is to confuse rather than inform. It is difficult to catch the 'sense of the meaning'—probably because the members are so ill-assorted.

No contributor seems really to grapple with two fundamental questions: What does the European spirit owe to the Jewishness of the Jew, and how far would that spirit be modified or developed by the fulfilment of Zionist ideas? Mr. Newman touches the subject when he refers in a footnote to Professor John Macmurray's assertion that Christianity has to purge itself of its Graeco-Roman elements to recover its roots in Hebrew tradition. 'Judaism has maintained the authentic Biblical concern for the right ordering of life in this world.' True—and the authentic European spirit must have its roots in Christianity, no matter how secular its expression may be. Clearly, the general significance of the Jews, if not their exact function, in the Europe of tomorrow demands full discussion.

I read *The Zionist Movement* when I was beginning once again to receive news of Jews I had known before the war, especially in Central and Eastern Europe. Most of them had been proud to call themselves 'good Europeans'. But now, after the nightmare, these men who once asserted that to be a good European one had to be a good Hungarian, Austrian, Pole, as the case may be, are looking longingly towards the shore of the Eastern Mediterranean and roundly asserting that it is possible to be a Palestinian and a good European at the same time. It will be interesting to observe the effects upon Europe of the presence of such men in the Holy Land. If the political and racial problems standing in the way of unlimited Jewish immigration can be overcome, the performance so far of the Jews in Palestine certainly suggests that a new centre of predominantly Western civilisation is arising which may exert very considerable influence throughout the Occident. Particularly valuable in this respect is Mr. Cohen's account of Jewish cultural activities in Palestine. But the book holds the balance nicely between economic, political and spiritual factors, so that there emerges a very clear picture of the historical background of Zionism, the leading personalities of the movement and events since the Balfour Declaration. It is, in fact, an essential work for the understanding of the rôle of the Jew and his aspirations in the world today. It includes a map, statistics and an interesting bibliography.

JAMES EASTWOOD

LAND FIT FOR HEROES

By George Sava. *Faber & Faber*. 8s. 6d.

'What provision are we making for the return of our fighting men?' This urgent question is the theme of George Sava's first novel, which portrays the fate of a young airman in this war against the background of his father's tragedy after the last war. The grim immediacy of the past six years has overshadowed the social tragedies of the 'twenties and 'thirties and this is a well-timed reminder that the soldier's heroic endurance has earned him a more fitting tribute than our shameful record of lethargic indifference.

Perhaps the most impressive quality of *Land Fit for Heroes* is its lack of heroics. With a quiet inevitability, the author follows the economic struggles of the 1918 war hero and his young wife through all their hardships, until chlorine, combined with disillusion, kills the one and hostile poverty the other. Their young son, estranged by his training from his environment, forges ahead in his engineering career until his brief marriage crashes and the outbreak of war enables him to forget his personal unhappiness in his achievements as a pilot. Finally, after a brilliant dog-fight, he crashes, and is so terribly burned that only his hearing and his consciousness remain, and it is through his unaccustomed efforts to solve the general problems of war that Mr. Sava introduces and concludes *Land Fit for Heroes*.

This is not a 'character' novel—in fact, its strength lies in the virtual anonymity of its personalities. Lacking any outstanding virtues or vices, sharing a dogged determination, they ably represent the vast majority of us; so that the reader feels that their problems are his problems. No, there is nothing outstanding about this book—except its sincerity. And even its banalities, its clichés, are convincing. Too many modern writers dissect character into X-rayed complexity, but forget that the essence of humanity, whilst yielding to observation, defies analysis. Mr. Sava is a trained observer. He presents his personalities and situations, but his conclusions are implicit in them. His power of emotional and intellectual conviction is the measure of his success. *Land Fit for Heroes* should be read by every individual with a sense of social responsibility.

JAN PERKIN

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WHY I AM A LIBERAL

By Sir William Beveridge. *Herbert Jenkins.* 2s. 6d.

It is interesting, if perhaps somewhat academic, to read this little book now that the results of the General Election are known, for it gives one a clue to the failure of the Liberal Party's powerful bid for revival. In it Sir William Beveridge outlines his own political philosophy and explains why he considered the Liberal Party to be the proper vehicle for implementing his programme of social reform. This radical programme is certainly impressive, and Sir William puts it across with commendable clarity and forcefulness, but it is difficult to see how it differs on any essential point from that of the Labour Party. Fears about excessive state control and nationalisation for its own sake were hardly very important compared with the danger of a split in the progressive vote. Many people who would normally describe themselves as Liberals, and who deplore the Philistine fanaticism of certain elements on the extreme Left, felt impelled to vote Labour in order to ensure the downfall of the Beaverbrook-Bracken hegemony.

The eclipse of the Liberal Party is, nevertheless, greatly to be regretted, and Sir William's personal defeat at the polls represents a sad, though let us hope temporary, loss to the House of Commons—a loss that is brought home to us by his speeches, reproduced in this volume, on foreign affairs, no less than on his own pet subjects of social insurance and full employment. Such a virtue has been made of expediency in recent years that our politicians badly need reminding, as Sir William has so often reminded them, of the importance of principle in international affairs.

TERENCE KILMARTIN

ILL FARES THE LAND

By Carey McWilliams. *Faber & Faber.* 12s. 6d.

At the end of 1939 a Congressional Committee, under the chairmanship of Senator La Follette, began its investigations into the denial of civil liberties to agricultural workers in California. The findings of this Committee, which verified the picture of the condition of migratory labour in California drawn by Steinbeck in *The Grapes of Wrath*, have provided Mr. McWilliams with much of the admirable documentation of this factual survey of the development of American agriculture into Big Business.

The processes described in *Ill Fares the Land* have, as Mr. McWilliams himself says, resulted in technological advancement; but the cost in human suffering has been colossal. The remedies he advocates—the extension to the farm worker of social legislation and the right of self-organisation, the establishment of a rural public works programme, the creation of 'rural rehabilitation authorities', patterned after the T.V.A., and the determination of the right to relief on the basis of need instead of residence—are described by Lord Portsmouth in his preface as palliatives only; and it is clear that Mr. McWilliams himself believes that a complete reorganisation of the American social and economic structure is essential if the miseries of the agricultural migrants, wandering from state to state in search of starvation wages, are to be ended.

Most economists today agree that 'slump' unemployment can be alleviated by the injection of purchasing power into the social machine, though they may differ as to the methods of injection, and as to the probably political consequences. The basic problem facing highly mechanised communities today, however, is how to divert, without undue hardship, to other tasks labour which has become redundant in a particular industry, either through technological advances or through changes in demand. Both these factors are involved in the unemployment of the American farmer: the migrant families from Oklahoma could not compete with the tractor; but neither could they during the depressed 'thirties find alternative employment in the towns. In its reaction to this situation the American community not only attempted through such devices as vigilantism to rid itself of its unproductive alignments in a way which offends against modern ideas of social morality, but exploited the surplus labour position by peonage and by starvation wages.

The problem of improving the standard of living of American agriculturists is complicated by the fact of soil erosion. Through education, propaganda, and perhaps through the provision of more undertakings of the T.V.A. type, this waste of social capital can be halted and to some extent cured. The other two factors in the elimination of the less productive elements in agriculture—mechanisation and the consolidation of farm units—both must, and should, remain. The American social conscience alone can ensure that the casualties of the process are not fatal.

M. A. NAYLOR

EAST IS WEST

By Freya Stark. *Murray*. 12s. 6d.

Those to whom the word 'Arab' conjures up at once a picture either of a romantic figure in flowing robes sweeping across the desert on a fiery stallion, or of a dirt-encrusted object in rags bartering eggs for a handful of tea-leaves, will do well to study this very fine book. For the Middle East is changing; and while romance and dirt are still there, a new factor has entered into the modern Arab world—the rise of the middle class, the effendis. Miss Stark's new book is 'the picture of the young effendi . . . and of the background against which he moves', and it is of particular interest and value today when the problem of Palestine, rapidly grown acute, is a test-case for Britain's future relations with the Arab countries of the Middle East.

When war broke out, Miss Stark was sent to Aden, where she did good work in putting Britain's case before the Arabs of that colony and of the adjoining Yemen. Her most striking success was the founding of a Brotherhood of Freedom open to all those effendis who believed in the cause for which we were fighting; similar organisations were later set up in Cairo, Alexandria, Baghdad and other centres throughout the Middle East. She records, and it is worth repeating, that as Britain's position grew more precarious, so did the numbers of the Brothers swell. Late in 1940 Miss Stark left Aden for Egypt and here the remarkable growth of the effendi class was at once apparent.

When she returned for good to England in mid-1943, Miss Stark had visited Palestine, Syria, Transjordan and Iraq (where, on her first visit, she was caught in the 'siege' of Baghdad during the Rashid Ali insurrection), had mixed with Arabs of all types and classes, and had found overwhelming evidence of the goodwill of the Arab world towards Britain. In Transjordan, in particular, she found the good relationship between Arab and British exceedingly marked. Nevertheless, throughout her wanderings she was continually being confronted with the Palestine question, and her comments on that now critical problem are wise and valuable.

Freya Stark is a writer about whom I find it hard not to be fulsome. Even if she had nothing of importance to say, her writing, with its almost lyrical quality at times, its fine imagery, its lightness of touch, would be a delight to read. But in *East is West* the matter *is* important; it is to be hoped the book will have a wide circulation.

RAYMOND ANDERSON

TO THE BOATING

By Inez Holden. *John Lane*. 7s. 6d.

Miss Inez Holden, in the rôle of mass-observer, is readable because she reflects the trend of the times. And time passes so quickly nowadays that it is sometimes useful to cast a glance back to what we were thinking, feeling and doing yesterday. But the short story demands of its exponents the gifts of observation and selection, judgment and compassion, insight and subtlety, and I would say that this author possesses only the first qualification in each part of essentials.

There is a painstaking heaviness about each of these fourteen stories—disappointing when one realises that the employment of a finer touch, selection of dialogue and ruthless deletion of catalogue phrases which repeat themselves from story to story, might have made some of them memorable.

However, 'The Scarf' and 'Exiles in Conversation' show Miss Holden at her best and allow us to hope that, in time, she will be less eager to report every word she hears, every action she sees.

There are three sketches in Basic English. I will only say that it seems a pity in these utilitarian days to ration deliberately the one thing that remains to us—our language, one of the richest in the world.

GIN AND BITTERS

By Jane Lane. *Andrew Dakers*. 10s. 6d.

This is a vigorous and detailed novel of early eighteenth-century London and the evils that were rampant at that time. It deals with a typical family of the 'laborious' class and their lives reflect one aspect or another of the larger, national life: the terrible consequences of gin-drinking, the financial rottenness that caused the huge disaster of the South Sea Bubble. And threading these rather mechanically contrived reflections is the story of the devotion of the brewer's clerk, a Jacobite, who for thirty years carries on with his treasonable pamphleteering and in the end, betrayed by his mistress, looking on the crowds on his way to the gallows, wonders whether 'such a people would ever pause to think, would ever learn the lessons of history, would ever realise their own strength, would ever unite to demand just government.'

Miss Lane's fictionising of history is at times rather laboured, but her descriptions of the boisterous life of the streets are engaging and one must applaud her insistence on the importance of the craftsman.

REGINALD MOORE

Looking Ahead

The Main Line Railways' post-war plans include the introduction of the latest scientific improvements in new locomotives and in re-conditioning existing engines. Passenger rolling stock will include new designs with bright colours, new fabrics, plastics and other materials. The finest railway service in the world will be offered to the British public as soon as materials and manpower permit.

GWR · LMS · LNER · SR

CROSS-SECTION
OF THE WORLD'S PRESS

The New Europe

THE structure of society in Europe is being completely overhauled economically, socially and politically. The war swamped the old one, and few regret its disappearance. It spelled misery for too many people. In western Europe, the common people have now taken over political power. They intend to use it to obtain economic and social power as well. In other words, political democracy is not enough for them. They seek economic and social democracy and apparently are now in a position to get it.

Thus it is that Paris and London have taken on the aspects of great proletarian cities. The clothes of the rich are as shabby as those of the poor. When new overcoats or dresses become available, they go to the latter. The rich and the poor pedal bicycles through the streets, stand in endless lines together, waiting for food or buses or a seat in a movie or a theatre. True, in Paris, during the last days, I have seen the same kind of people gathering in the Ritz for tea and dinner that Proust described. But most of them walked or stood like sardines in the subway to get there. Their clothes were worn and shiny. And, for dinner, despite the same old grand surroundings, they ate food which no worker in Detroit or Pittsburgh would put up with for a moment.

The shops are empty. There is nothing to sell. What little the nation produces goes not to those who have the most money to pay. That old law of supply and demand determining prices and who buys has lost all meaning. You can flutter a whole fistful of banknotes and shout to the house-tops for something you want to buy. It will do no good. What the nation produces is allocated by the state to those it considers most in need. Priorities and ration coupons are worth more than any amount of cash. Of course, there's the black market. But the police are stamping it out. The privileges of wealth become fewer every day.

Social-Democracy

WHAT the vast majority of people in Britain and France and the rest of western Europe apparently want is Socialism. The British and French elections demonstrated that. Scandinavia has already taken that road, and Holland and Belgium will shortly. Italy will take it, too, when the Italians have a chance to express themselves by the ballot, as will Spain as soon as Franco is gone.

You will have then all western Europe organised under a political and economic system perhaps best described as social democracy—based fundamentally on the program of the Social-Democrat parties. These parties all believe in gradual democratic change to a Socialistic system, with great care being taken not to upset the apple-cart during the transition. So far, their programmes go little beyond nationalising basic industries, banks and insurance companies and allowing labour unions a certain rôle in industrial and business management. They seem determined, also, to make the state all-powerful in directing the nation's economy and to push social security benefits.

At the moment, they have little regard for the Communists, whom they distrust. In Britain, the Communists are as unimportant as in the United States. But on the Continent they are stronger. In France, they emerged from the last elections as the largest single party.

European Cleavage

THIS situation is leading to a great cleavage, not only within the nations of western Europe but on the Continent itself. The old struggle between the Right and the Left appears finished. There is no more Right. The new struggle appears to be between Socialists and Communists. It is going on within each country, but it may also split Europe in two.

The dividing line may be roughly that running down from Stettin on the Baltic to Trieste on the Adriatic. East of that line, with the exception probably of Czechoslovakia and perhaps little Austria, eventual establishment of a Communistic régime looking toward Moscow is most likely. West of that line, the Social-Democrats, looking toward Paris and London, will rule. There is little love lost between the two. And the major problem of our time in Europe may well be the relations between these two forms of Socialism.

The western brand, represented by the Social-Democrats, still believes genuinely in true democratic process and in repect for the individual and his dignity as a human being. That's part of its appeal to the West.

WILLIAM L. SHIRER,
in the *New York Herald Tribune*

Neo-Fascism

THE emergence of neo-Fascist tendencies is a curious contribution to the current discussions on the merits and demerits of the various definitions of democracy. The ice of European democracy, on which we have been skating with some carelessness, is still very thin indeed. Italy—this should not be forgotten—was the first country to overthrow Fascism. It is now the first to set the neo-Fascist ball rolling. He would be a very bold optimist who would say that the ball will stop precisely—at the Brenner Pass.

One does not need to have very much political imagination to forecast what would be the distinctive features of some German neo-Nazism in two or three years' time, if not earlier. At its first inconspicuous appearance, it would merely utter the sacramental slogan: 'Away with Nazism as well as with anti-Nazism.' There would be a pleasant lure of 'objectivity' in such a slogan. And it is fairly easy to guess who would be prone to be caught by it. In the first place—people already inwardly groaning under the 'boredom' of anti-Fascism.

I would venture another guess about the future neo-Nazism. Hitler's heirs will probably not add the ingredient of anti-Semitism to the dish of nationalism and revenge which they will try to refurbish. (Mussolini, after all, had played 'the friend of the Jews' before he finally made up his mind to join hands with Hitler.)

An interesting pointer in this direction is the confession of Ley, written before he committed suicide. In it, Ley implored German youth to remain faithful to 'Nazi ideals', but to give up the folly of anti-Semitism. From many talks with former members of the Hitler Youth I have gained the impression that this appeal may have fallen on fertile soil. Philo-Semitism may yet, paradoxically, become one of the dangerous lures of neo-Fascism.

Observer

Changed Balance of Populations

THE difference between the Russian fertility rate and that of other nations is likely to produce spectacular changes in the equilibrium of populations in the next generation. Between 1940 and 1970 the population of the Soviet Union (comprised within the 1937 frontiers) is likely to increase by 78 millions, while during the same period the increase in the rest of Europe will be no more than 18 millions. Moreover, while the Russian curve will continue to rise after 1970, the rest of Europe will attain its maximum in 1960.

Up to 1950 the population of Western, Northern and Central Europe will increase by 3 million inhabitants and afterwards decline. About 1970 England and France will have lost about 4 millions each, while Eastern and Southern Europe will have gained 27 millions, two-thirds of which will be gained before 1955. Russia's increase of 78 millions is equal to 44 per cent during 30 years as against 55 per cent between 1900 and 1940. The distribution of population on the Continent will have changed as follows:

	Population in %	
	1940	1970
Western, Northern and Central Europe	40	34
Eastern and Southern Europe ..	30	28
U.S.S.R.	30	38

The composition of the population by age groups is more important than the total. In this respect, too, demographic evolution favours Russia. In Western, Northern and Central Europe, the number of males between 15 and 34 will fall by 7 millions, the group 35-44 will remain approximately the same, while that of 45-65 years will increase by 9 millions. In Southern and Eastern Europe, the increase will be felt especially in the over-35 group. In Russia the number of males between 15 and 34 years will increase by 13 millions, the 35-44 age group by 8 millions, the 45-64 age group by 14 millions. The youth population will be considerably stronger in Russia than in either of the other two European regions.

In all countries, belligerent, occupied or neutral, a considerable improvement in the birth-rate has taken place during the war, in striking contrast with the fall which characterised the period 1914–1918. In 1943 the increase in fertility in comparison with the 1938 level rose by 9 per cent for England, 10 per cent for France, 12·5 per cent for Holland, 18 per cent for Denmark and Australia, 25 per cent for the United States, 26 per cent for Switzerland and 30 per cent for Sweden. In spite of certain exceptions—Belgium and Germany in particular—the improvement has been almost universal. The cause of this unexpected phenomenon is obscure: the only factor common to all the countries concerned is the almost total disappearance of unemployment and the spread of economic planning.

La France Libre

'Pain is gain'

—Greek axiom

For generations mankind looked on pain as nothing but an enemy — something to be feared and hated. Not until medical knowledge groped its uncertain way out of the darkness of the middle ages did men perceive a glimmer of the truth that pain can in fact be a powerful friend and protector of the race. Without pain to sound the alarm, disease would spread and increase until no remedy could be of any avail. Without pain to point a guiding finger, doctors would be, to a very great extent, powerless to diagnose what is amiss.

Pain, then, is meant to be *used* : by the sufferer as an indication that something is wrong ; by the doctor as an indication of what that something is.

But as soon as it has done its job, it becomes merely an enemy, that must be allayed as speedily as possible by 'damping down ' the super-sensitiveness of the brain and nervous system.

That is the function of ' Cogene '.

' Cogene ' is not one drug, but a combination of four separate drugs, scientifically blended to produce an analgesic which will ' reach ' the most harassing nerve pain and yet leave no harmful after-effects.

Ask your doctor if ' Cogene ' is indicated. It is sold by all chemists at 1/1½d. a tube.

Never forget, though, that while ' Cogene ' will relieve the pain, it cannot remove the cause of the pain : only a doctor or a dentist can do that.

'COGENE'

(Regd. Trade Mark) *Brand Tablets*

A 'GENATOSAN' Product

Will you want

to buy your set anywhere and everywhere?

Because we want you to get the best value for your money, we limit the number and kind of shops that can sell Murphy Radio. It will pay you to look for a Murphy dealer.



C.R.C.173

Goutez voir ce nouveau melange! Vendredi

A United, Free Korea

THE numerous political parties, or factions, in Korea, which numbered forty-three at the last count, are having difficulty agreeing among themselves on the type and character of the government they want for a free Korea, or even on the means of achieving that end. That is not surprising. With their country split into American and Russian zones of occupation, between which there is little communication, and with no promise whatever as to when they can expect the occupying troops to leave, the Koreans are operating in a political vacuum. Perhaps the arrival of Kim Koo, the 70-year-old President of the Korean Provisional Government that was organised in Seoul in 1919 and has maintained itself in China since, may help them to arrive at a measure of unity not now evident.

Despite the disunity shown, there appears to be one matter on which all parties and factions are agreed. They want removed the artificial barrier set up along the Thirty-eighth Parallel that now divides their country, and they want the occupying countries to return Korea to its people to let them work out their own problems. It is difficult to see how they can be expected to show either unity or achievement of any political stability until the artificial division is abolished and they are at least given some date towards which they can work. . . .

New York Times

Industrialisation of South and Central America

IN Central and South America the exploitation of raw materials has been enormously increased to meet the demands of the North American market. Particularly is this so in the case of Brazil. Everywhere the growing influence of the United States makes itself felt in foreign and internal trade and especially in finance. The industrialisation of Brazil, Mexico and Peru could only be carried out thanks to the participation of American capital in the form of credits from the Export and Import Bank (as in the development of steel works in Brazil and the creation of others in Peru and Mexico) or under the form of subsidiaries of big firms in the United States bearing a more or less nationalist label, as in the case of the electro-chemical industry or the machinery industry of Brazil. The most conservative state of South America, the Argentine, has been swept up into this movement of industrialisation. Its progress was such that during the war the national production has outstripped the country's own needs and its exports have reached neighbouring countries and even overseas markets. In 1942 its export of manufactured products exceeded 100 million *pesos* as against 9·2 million in 1939. Between 1935 and 1943 the volume of industrial production has grown from 3·3 milliards to 7 milliards of *pesos*. From 1942 onwards the industrial production has been greater than its agricultural production. The second world war has brought about a radical change in the economic structure.

La France Libre

Empire Uranium

AS far as can be judged from published reports, the British Empire continues to be the world's greatest storehouse of uranium. Besides the large deposits at Great Bear Lake, Canada, extensive finds have now been made at Mount Painter, Australia; in the Northern Transvaal and Namaqualand, South Africa; and in the bed of the River Marmiswau in British Guiana.

Samples of euxonite, a multiple oxide, from the last-named, contained UO_2, with 8 per cent uranium content, and UO_3, with 3·5 per cent. No major new discoveries of the mineral appear to have been made in any other part of the world.

Latin-American World

Mr. Kingsley Martin in Yugoslavia

'I HOPE,' I said to Tito a few days before the election, 'that you will get 75 per cent. If you get 90 per cent, it might be a good idea to destroy 25 per cent of your vote.' Tito laughed and said, 'There is no need to worry; there will be a substantial minority in any case. I will be well satisfied with 65 per cent.' . . .

'The Fairest Election Ever' . . . But No Opposition

EVEN the most hostile observers admit that the voting and counting of the votes were watched by many people of different opinions and were beyond reproach. Criticism can only arise because there was no Opposition list and because all propaganda, posters, and demonstrations were for the National Front and were obviously in the hands of the Communist Party. The ballot itself was completely secret and uncorrupt. A British official who is very critical of the régime said: 'This is the fairest election ever in Yugoslavia.' . . .

KINGSLEY MARTIN,
in the *New Statesman and Nation*

Accept No Substitutes

NOW that the executive committee is taking steps to select some city in the United States as the seat of the United Nations, just a word of calm counsel may be in order to guard it from being carried away by the enthusiastic claims which several energetic American cities are making.

Many a city, we are led to believe, would be perfectly all right, but there is one virtue indispensable to the particular municipality that is to become the home of the United Nations.

No city can really receive serious considerations unless it is—as Bismarck, N.D., and Miami, Fla., have demonstrated by promotional maps on the subject, and as we are confident St. Louis would have demonstrated also if it had had time—that it is equidistant from all points on the horizon, and therefore authentically and genuinely (accept no substitutes) the centre of the globe.

St. Louis Post-Dispatch

Democracy and Fashion

DURING the last generation there has been an increasing margin of spending power among the masses, particularly in the younger age-groups. Even working boys spend more on their clothes than they used to; girls spend much more. And they are probably right to do so since so much depends on personal appearances, for the sake of job prestige, general social prestige, and attracting a mate.

Increased industrialisation has meant a vast increase in the proportion of clerical and distributive workers as against workers in heavy industry and agriculture. Even in a factory, of the mass-production, machine-minding type, it is possible to keep up a high standard of clothes and appearances even at work. Where no special clothes are necessary, these tend to become stereotyped into uniforms, with no effect upon the forms of ordinary dress.

Shortly after the First World War, there was an enormous improvement in the production of synthetic materials, in particular of artificial silk stockings, and this has done much to improve the appearance of working girls and to minimise the distance between them and more moneyed classes. Indeed there is hardly any luxury which is not today available to women of all social grades *in some form,* except the luxury of the absolute novelty of the model gown. Even elaborate hairdressing, which in the eighteenth century created a gulf between those who could afford it and those who couldn't, has now become almost within the reach of all. Make-up also has been vastly improved, and this weapon the emancipated young woman has not hesitated to borrow from her once formidable but now almost extinct rival, the *grande cocotte.*

That all this tends to promote marriage between members of different classes and so to the progressive decline of class distinctions, is obvious; that there will ever be any excessively rich people again seems more than doubtful. . . . Future developments depend upon the kind of state which finally emerges from the confusion of the Second World War.

JAMES LAVER in *Pilot Papers*

The English—Do They Wash?

IT was when I went to live in Paris that I had my first doubts as to whether we English washed. I made friends with a charming French comte, a hunting man, who had been invited to stay in some of the best houses in England. 'It is curious,' he said to me, 'that the English seem never to have been taught how to wash themselves.' I began to think he must be right when English friends of mine, who came to France, inquired of me as to the purpose of what they thought must be a foot-bath. It is found, fitted with hot and cold taps, in every French hotel bathroom, and in every bathroom in Brazil, where it often has an ingenious additional upward spray, but in hardly any bathroom in England. . . .

PHILIP CARR in *The Spectator*

Your drinking water must be pure . . .

STILL MALVERN WATER the purest known water, can still be supplied without restriction of area throughout Great Britain. Specially recommended by the medical profession because of its purity and freedom from mineral content, it is supplied in sealed bottles (extra large size). No home should be without a supply of Still Malvern Water, against possible emergency.

Obtainable from all Wine Merchants, Chemists and Grocers.

ISKUSTVO SZTUK PIEKNYCH UMĚNÍ ARTE

ART *speaks all languages*

A NEW CAREER

Post-war Industry, now and onwards, needs new advertising. Exports need catalogues, lists, trade directories, and design, for publicity in all languages. ART SPEAKS THEM ALL! Trained designers are needed NOW. If you can draw, or can learn, here is a new career open! Write for Prospectus (or appointment) and let us help build your future in advertising art. Finest tuitional service in England.

● *Studio open 9 a.m.–9 p.m. Buses pass door. Underground connects all Stations RESTAURANT*

● *Training includes every advertising need, fashions, posters, display, and all allied subjects*

DAY & EVENING CLASSES: ALL SUBJECTS

CHELSEA SCHOOL OF COMMERCIAL ART
50 GLEBE PLACE
CHELSEA, S.W.3

Summit SHIRTS

stay true to form

For good fit there are two lengths of sleeve to choose from, and the material is fully shrunk. The colours are fast. The collars are reinforced.

AUSTIN REED *of Regent Street*

LONDON AND PRINCIPAL CITIES • LONDON TELEPHONE: REGENT 6789

No post orders.

Time's Vertiginous Hierarchy

It is plain to me, as I read the editorial roster of *Time* magazine, that *Time* is approaching the absolute ceiling of classification. Just how it will be able to describe any new help hired after this point is a nice problem. Even in loose groupings, *Time* has already devised eleven altitudes of Editors—twelve if you count David Hulburd (Chief) as in a class by himself apart from other Bureau Heads. *Life* seems to have sixteen layers of operatives, but that's a picture outfit. Even so, *Life* is up against much the same difficulty. It's all right as long as both publications stay the way they are. The test will come when they get a full paper supply once again and start to go higher.

Time's roster is something to be attempted only in easy stages. Starting in swampy country with the little fellows, the Staff Correspondents, the amateur of administrative nomenclature ascends past:

Staff Correspondents
Bureau Heads
David Hulburd (*Chief*) (might just as well put him in here and get it over with)
Editorial Researchers
Contributing Editors
Associate Editors
Senior Editors

That was a good, brisk climb, and we are now on a kind of tableland; small, to be sure—only room for seven Senior Editors; altitude around eleven thousand feet. Far below us, we see the minute forms of the Bureau Heads and the Editorial Researchers. They look like pygmies from this elevation. The Staff Correspondents have all but disappeared, but here and there we can sight one through the faint haze, or perhaps it's only a jack pine. . . .

We resume the climb at sunup the next day. By midmorning we are half-way up the bald face of a veritable precipice. Nothing grows at such a height. The last gnarled outposts of timberline have vanished. Yet in this great silence, lofty and inaccessible, we find two Editors—just Editors—The Senior Editors presumably don't have the wind to climb this high. At any rate, here are Manfred Gottfried and, slightly above him, Henry R. Luce (alt. 19,870). Now three thousand sheer feet of Index tower over us; the summit itself is hidden for the moment in clouds.

We get out the pitons, rig the life lines. A single misstep will be fatal. Down in the flatlands, with the Staff Correspondents, the thermometer stands at ninety-four degrees. It's fifteen below zero up here where we are. We find ourselves wondering whatever became of David Hulburd. Memory plays strange tricks at these altitudes. We begin the painful ascent of the Index. . . .

Those watching us from the base camp told us later it took only thirty-five minutes, but it seemed hours while we clawed our way to the true summit—Editor-in-Chief, Henry R. Luce, all by himself (alt. 23,137). Having last seen him down at 19,870 as Editor, we were naturally astonished to find him again at the top. (We learned later that he has a secret route of his own, shared only with a few top-flight *Time* executives.)

New Yorker

Drinking Less and Less

More and more people are drinking less and less, not only here but pretty much all over the world. Drinking, according to official records, has decreased in every country in the world except France in the last generation. France, in 1940, consumed four times as much alcohol *per capita* as the United States and four and a half times as much as Great Britain. It's their wine consumption that shoots their average up and—this is not a wisecrack—they are apparently only just finding out that wine can also be intoxicating. Not long ago a French scientist wrote a paper on the mysterious effect of wine on people called *L'Alcoolisme Sans Alcool.*

The order of liquor consumption in the world is France, Spain, Belgium, Italy, United States, Germany, Sweden and Great Britain which tie. But if you try to conclude that it is emancipation of women that keeps the Anglo-Saxon countries moderate, you get nowhere. In Scandinavia, the ratio of male to female inebriates is 23 to one; in the United States five to one, and in Great Britain only two to one. Apparently in Merrie England the boys and girls get drunk together. . . .

Even dodging the big problem of the people who drink themselves into real trouble (which is, by the way, being pretty constructively handled in a number of important places), there are still unpleasant truths to be faced. Drivers involved in traffic accidents have alcohol in their blood beyond what is considered sober 10 times as often as the general run of drivers, and the percentage of drunk pedestrians killed in auto accidents is even higher. *That* alcohol concentration has been arbitrarily put at ·05 per cent, because lots of people can't drink more and drive safely. It's the equivalent of over two drinks on an empty stomach or more than three or four drinks after dinner. Beyond that, better let your wife drive. . . . *Collier's* (New York)

'One of the sweetest stories' . . .

A WAVE of femininity has been creeping slowly but surely upon the fashion world, and now we note a return to truly beautiful feminine curves. Where corsetry is concerned, we note smart, small mid-ribs, high contoured busts and, lo and behold—hips! But with it all, woman will not lose any of her much-prized comfort. And that's one of the sweetest stories ever told!

Corsetry and Underwear Journal

Unguarded Queens

DURING the secret manufacture of the Atomic bomb, any research workers who had bridge-playing wives were barred from working on it. It was feared that they would learn the secret and spill it over the bridge tables.

Daily Express

Riddle

IF, as you said last week, one gallon of water is required for every inch of goldfish, and myself, wife and son together measure 167 inches, and we are 7,000 and something on the local waiting list for a house, does this indicate anything to you? It does to us.

Letter in *Daily Mail*

Winston Arrives at Monte Carlo

MR. WINSTON CHURCHILL'S surprise arrival at Monte Carlo for a short holiday visit, is described in characteristic French reporting style in a lively article by Francis Rico in the Paris newspaper, *Les Nouvelles de Matin:* 'Night was just falling. Monte Carlo glittered with a thousand lights. A powerful automobile marked with the arms of General Alexander, and preceded by a jeep filled with British officers, stops before the Hotel de Paris,' he begins dramatically. 'A man with a corpulence greater than the average, descends with a three-quarter consumed cigar in his lips. Winston Churchill enters the hall of the hotel. Residents are stupefied. Women who are going out to the Casino in dinner gowns, surrounded by men in evening dress, go pale with emotion. Doors leading to the kitchens open to reveal the white caps of chefs. The man who made Hitler totter and who galvanised the whole world was there. . . . After dinner he ordered writing material, which was brought to him on a silver tray. He brought out an enormous fountain pen, and while his cigar smoked away in the ash-tray he wrote for more than an hour. "I would have given much to know what he was writing," sighs Monsieur Rico. Before retiring to bed, Mr. Churchill asked that a bathing costume should be obtained for him as he was going to swim next day.' The writer concludes his despatch by recording: 'When I passed before the porter's desk I heard excited men telephoning all over the place. The head receptionist cried out, "The largest one you can get!"' They were seeking a bathing costume for Winston Churchill.

Daily Mail

Reassurance

AMBASSADOR HALIFAX has been entertaining colleagues with a story about a speaking trip to Iowa. 'After one speech,' relates his lordship, 'an old farmer told me I was making a great contribution to American understanding of the British. I asked him how. "Well," he said, "before we heard you, we used to be scared of the British. We thought they could outsmart us. After hearing you, we ain't afraid no more".'

Sunday Mirror (New York)

Fraternisation in West Africa

A woman is never too old for constant caressing, *continuous fraternisation,* regular kisses, and occasional after-table chats with her husband. This looks a trifle; but it is very important.

Daily Service (Lagos)

a cradle can ROCK

but NOT *your plate*

Social security is a matter of politics and legislation, but *denture security* is often merely a matter of sprinkling Kolynos Denture Fixative on your dental plate. A denture which has lost its grip causes unnecessary pain and embarrassment. Restore comfort and confidence by using this tasteless, odourless powder: 1/3d. & 3/3d. tins.

KOLYNOS DENTURE **FIXATIVE**

makes false teeth 'stay put'

Also use Kolynos *Denture Powder* to clean false teeth — 1/3d.



Mains Time is Modern

PLUG IN TO GREENWICH TIME WITH

SMITHSECTRIC CLOCKS

NO WINDING ★ NO REGULATING

" *To unite Elegance and Utility and to blend the Useful with the Agreeable has ever been considered a difficult but an honourable task.*"

(A. HEPPLEWHITE, 1788)

—a task, too, in which the English cabinet makers of the best periods have always been particularly successful.

The craftsmen and designers at Heal's have lost none of their forbears' skill. In all the furniture they make, the pleasing simplicity of modern design is combined with fine quality of workmanship. We try not only to adorn the modern home, but to make it a place really convenient to live in.

HEAL'S

196 Tottenham Court Rd., London, W.1

EXPLANATION: *War conditions restrict the sale of Rose's Lime Juice in Britain. But in many parts of the Empire distribution goes on. Here, you see how we spread the news in those great countries that make up the British Empire.*
★ *Here is an advertisement to be published in India.*



HOW DOES YOUR GARDEN GROW?

" Oh *mali*, that was fine display of flowers you made on luncheon table. All the sahibs are saying it is like Chelsea Flower Show, plus plethora of knobs."

" *Humble though my station be, oh butler, I am no mean horticulturist.*"

" True, oh *mali*, for to my certain knowledge you have not watered garden for three whole weeks. Nothing there but dust and lizards."

" *Nevertheless cantonment has more than one garden. Furthermore the Colonel Sahib is shortly going on leave. It may be he will remember me before he goes.*"

" Oh *mali*, here is long arm of coincidence. Last night the Colonel Sahib gave big party. I myself provided much Rose's Lime Juice, lest there might be hangovers, with consequent retrospective lack of largesse."

"*Butler, you have put the matter in a conch shell. We of the East may be inscrutable, but we sure do know our onions.*"

ROSE'S—*There is no substitute*

CORRESPONDENCE

Not France, Germany

SIR,— The article in WORLD REVIEW dated October 1945, by Simon Harcourt-Smith, seems to me to be the epistle of a man unable to grasp or cope with the present and future problems of this very difficult world of ours. In fact, he seems to be unable to advocate anything different from the course we so unwisely adopted after the 1914-1918 war, namely, an Anglo-French alliance, which, as the people of this country knew, *or know now,* was the greatest mistake (or should I say one of the greatest mistakes) we have committed in the past fifty years.

If, after the 1914–1918 affair, we had made friends (as we should have always been) with Germany, instead of attempting to keep her under heel, there would have been no 1938 and definitely no 1939.

France, through her past three or four hundred years, has for a great power been most unreliable, although we do give her credit (as Edward Hulton's article so beautifully puts it) for her *limited* intellectual precocity, but astonishing, artistic virility.

The German nation and ourselves originate from the same stock, so surely with encouragement we could begin to think alike; and who can doubt the greatness of Germany (pre-Bismarck) in most spheres, even *her* 'intellectual precocity and artistic virility.'

L CPL. D. TILLY, R.E.M.E., Corsham.

W.R. Smells!

SIR,—You hope 'that our sentimentalists will not attempt to censure WORLD REVIEW as being anti-Russian.' Any impartial reader of the present W.R. would certainly be a fool if he didn't realise that its policy is violently anti-Russian.

Your magazine is giving off an unpleasant smell which reminds me of the pre-war journalism, when unscrupulous editors would print any misrepresentation of Soviet policy.

SIGMN. WOODWARD, Harpenden

Export Drive

SIR,—The woolliness of your recent editorial policy, and of such letters as Miss Clarke's, is painful. The export (*sic*!!!!) of the Sudetens is a radical and right solution of a problem that they themselves raised and, in the interests of frontier settlement on ethnographical lines on which they are so keen, should have been done long ago. You seem generally to confuse democracy with an all-in political scrum. If every shade of opinion must have expression as you would seem to desire, then surely there is a Nazi minority in Germany which should have the right to speak and take part in political administration? If there were less hysteria and special pleading in the arguments on Poland and Yugoslavia, one might place more credence in them. As it is, your championship of a pompous minority of Poles who have made more noise here than any other billeted minority (*sic*!!!!) and who would, within five minutes of being given their own way, create a proto-Fascist government, is just silly. The folly of government being so 'all-representative' that it is just inconclusive is shown by the example of Italy where the resulting political vacuum and frustration is now paving the way to a Fascist government. No wonder liberalism is generally discredited, fulfilling the old definition, as it does, of 'always seeing both sides of a question and always being on the other.'

HENRY ADLER, London, S.W.3

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

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